DISARMAMENT

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and Disarmament Prospects
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Tactical Nuclear Weapons—Do They Have a Future?

The Bargaining Chips

Pavel K. Baev

Political changes are taking place so rapidly in Europe that even the boldest predictions are outdated within a few months.

The unique feature of the current situation in Europe is the asymmetry of political and military processes. Developing the concept of a common European home, the experts see deep cuts in conventional arms as promising change in post-war political structures. Politically, however, we are now living in an environment which has been changed by the talks on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe (CFE) but which has been only slightly changed in military confrontation. This confrontation is expected to remain high even after full implementation of the cuts called for in phase I of the CFE negotiations.

A lag such as this between political processes and the negotiations on arms control creates further obstacles in the way of any attempt to resolve the problem. It is becoming an increasingly complicated task to measure the political interests of the major participants in the "European concert" with regard to tactical nuclear weapons. And it is also quite obvious that military logic is not applicable in this case.

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Any serious political observer can see a certain *rapprochement* in the positions of the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO countries on nuclear issues. The Atlantic Alliance chose a compromise in May when President Bush's initiative prevented a new "missile crisis". The Soviet Union is showing a new flexibility, a willingness to meet NATO half way. This was expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev in Strasbourg and by Eduard Shevardnadze in Brussels. It is obviously counterproductive to discuss the ultimate goals when we have not yet taken the first step. WTO can only propose its own definition of minimal deterrence, and hope that in the long run NATO will discover the incompatibility of nuclear weapons with the new emerging European security system based mainly on political guarantees.

This means that for the foreseeable future we must accept an affirmative answer to the question: Do tactical nuclear weapons have a future? This triumph of pragmatism requires an effective negotiating strategy, based on a step-by-step approach and on an assessment of a tactical nuclear balance and an analysis of the interdependence of nuclear and conventional forces.

Paradoxes of Tactical Nuclear Balance

During the 1980s the development of a nuclear balance in Europe was an important issue for Western experts. In the early 1980s they concentrated on a comparative assessment of theatre nuclear forces, but attempts to balance Soviet SS-20s with American Pershing-II and gound-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and to resolve the missile equation were never convincing. Following the INF Treaty such an analysis lost ground, and instead of evaluating combat capabilities, experts prefer to manipulate statistics without drawing any conclusions on the balance itself.[1]

The official assessments demonstrate the traditional divergence. NATO emphasizes that an enormous advantage in tactical missiles creates a total imbalance in favour of the Warsaw Treaty countries: the most dramatic expression of that position may be found in the Pentagon's annual report "Soviet Military Power". The Soviet Union insists that a NATO advantage in ground-attack nuclear-capable aircraft counterbalances other disadvantages and that there is more or less parity in the nuclear potential of the two alliances.[2]

Reliable information is available only on one type of tactical nuclear weapon—tactical missiles or launchers—where we can assume that WTO forces are more than 10 times greater than those of NATO.[3] It is rather difficult to find any logical reason for such a gap other than historical Soviet devotion to missiles. We can however perceive the absurdity of any attempt to draw general conclusions concerning a nuclear balance from this disparity.

Nuclear balance in Europe encompasses the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of a very broad spectrum of weapons, and even if we exclude Soviet and United States strategic systems targeted on Europe, French and British strategic forces, and sea-based weapons—and these are very serious limitations—it is still difficult to establish a balance. Even if we choose the simplest approach and take only three components of a balance—tactical missiles, nuclear artillery and nuclear-capable aircraft—the resulting comparisons can be only an approximation.

As regards nuclear artillery we can be sure that in two or three years WTO and NATO will have strict and rather low ceilings on tubes with a calibre of 100 mm and more. But even the precise definition of the artillery established in Vienna is not of much help in determining nuclear capabilities.[4] It is not too hypothetical perhaps to suggest that under a general ceiling both sides will have approximately the same number of nuclear-capable artillery systems.

Historically, a sharp disparity existed in nuclear artillery postures and combat missions. For NATO it was a genuine tactical nuclear weapon deployed on a broad scale and performing an important role in deterrence—to say nothing of its self-deterring effect. WTO on the other hand did not deploy any nuclear artillery up to the mid-1970s—according to Western sources,[5] since regrettably there are no official Soviet figures on the matter. Then it began to introduce a large inventory of self-propelled and nuclear-capable artillery and during a 10-year period it created a potential comparable to that of the other side.[6] It would seem that no one in NATO is seriously worried about this shift: perhaps the reason for that indifference is the diminishing military value of nuclear artillery.

As regards nuclear-capable aircraft we find a great many difficulties and uncertainties. The contradictions over aircraft are probably the most vital issue in the CFE talks, and it would appear that the negotiators are not going to come to any acceptable definition of ground-attack or strike aviation. But even if they agreed in Vienna on an overall ceiling for combat aviation (including interceptors), we would not be any closer to breaking the deadlock with regard to air-borne tactical nuclear weapons.

Both sides have their reasons for claiming that the other side enjoys a significant advantage in nuclear-capable aircraft. Soviet officials insist on NATO superiority in carrier-based aircraft. Of the total of 1,630 aircraft, according to WTO data more than 50 per cent can be considered nuclear-capable.[7] NATO experts refer to Soviet medium bombers and land-based naval aircraft. The report "Military Balance", which is quite reliable, gives 2,300 nuclear-capable aircraft for WTO and 2,200 for NATO. However, these figures do not prove the existence of parity.[8]

It may be possible to compare strike aviation combat capabilities with the help of some mathematical models,[9] but such a method would become ineffective after the introduction of air-to-surface tactical nuclear missiles. These stand-off weapons are the least disputable elements of NATO's so-called "modernization programme" and have some chances for deployment in the mid-1990s. The same can hardly be said about follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL)—anti-tactical advanced cruise missiles (ATACMs).

The most unclear element of the nuclear balance in Europe is the number of tactical warheads. The United States is believed to possess about 4,200-4,300 bombs, artillery shells and Lance missile warheads in Europe, though this figure can hardly be taken for granted. About 200 British and 250 French tactical warheads should be added to arrive at a total. There is however virtually no information on the Soviet arsenal, with the modest exception of the fact that 500 warheads were withdrawn from Eastern Europe in 1989. Western experts assume that up to 8,000-10,000 warheads are deployed in Soviet forces—this is perhaps a gross overestimate—but that huge disparity did not prevent NATO from reducing its stocks by 2,500 warheads during the 1980s. Moreover, further unilateral cuts are being considered and, as is known, the latest Nuclear Forces Requirement Study prepared by SHAPE recommended the withdrawal of another 1,000 warheads.[10]

All these paradoxes could have only one rational explanation: there is no such a thing as a tactical nuclear balance in Europe. The total number of tactical nuclear weapons is so high and their real military value is so low that it is possible to balance 10,000 warheads with 2,500, and 1,600 missile-launchers with 136. It is highly probable that during the past tactical nuclear build-up and the present build-down the strategists of both alliances never seriously took into consideration the parameters of the other side's posture. It is also highly probable that strategic requirements were not the dominant factor, but rather the military-bureaucratic inertia.

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The Interdependence of Conventional Forces and Tactical Nuclear Weapons

We must begin with one obvious but nevertheless surprising postulate directly connected with the aforementioned paradox: there are no such things as tactical nuclear forces. It is not enough to state that tactical nuclear weapons are dual-capable systems—they are organic to Army corps and Air Force wings, and operable through the same C^3I (command, control, communication, intelligence) system. The only specific feature is the so-called "request sequence" mechanism (which is of doubtful effectiveness).

Certain strategic implications may be derived from this postulate, namely the difficulty—to put it mildly—of forming any tactical nuclear reserve at the early stage of a conflict: "Use it or lose it". But more important nowadays are the disarmament implications. France and the United Kingdom will probably find a way to keep their tactical nuclear weapons untouched during phase I of the CFE talks; this is less probable for the United States. As for WTO, there is no doubt: it is impossible to implement the planned cuts without deep reductions in the nuclear potential.

It looks as if no one is particularly concerned about artillery. It is generally accepted that as a nuclear delivery system it has no future. There is a lot of fuss about aircraft but in a couple of months the negotiators will leave the generals to deal with the nuclear implications. The source of real concern, however, is the only element of nuclear potential that remains beyond the framework of current talks: tactical missiles.[11]

Even a prejudiced observer cannot say that deployed missiles seriously affect the strategic situation in Europe, and it is difficult to expect that the introduction of Hadès and ATACMs with "appropriate counter-measures" on the part of the Soviet Union would add some drastically new features to this situation. The real problem is the race in respect of missile technologies. The emerging technologies as such are the most serious threat to the current disarmament process: they may reduce the cuts and undermine the primary goal, namely, the elimination of the possibility of a surprise attack. The next generation of missiles could provide a number of suitable platforms for emerging technologies—the nuclear functions may become secondary. That is why it is so important to close this "window of vulnerability" and create a comprehensive system of negotiations with appropriate verification structures.

There is another aspect of the interdependence of conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons that is worth mentioning. For years, even while selling the nuclear programmes, NATO authorities were exploiting the thesis that a sufficient tactical nuclear potential was the indispensable (and the cheapest!) means of neutralizing the Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces, especially tanks. Nowadays this thesis seems a little outdated, and public relations people at NATO headquarters are developing a new idea—that tactical nuclear weapons have an independent and unique role in the strategy of flexible response. This independent role obviously lacks validity—so does the strategy itself—but as for the "compensatory approach" it looks as if the Soviet generals in their turn could exploit it. Is the modest tactical nuclear potential not the best means of compensating for the NATO advantage in quality of armaments and personnel under equal ceilings? This thesis may already have found its place in the doctrine of "reasonable sufficiency".

The Guidelines for the Negotiation Strategy

During 1989 WTO and NATO were gradually approaching an agreement on the need for negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. But even with this agreement there remain a number of crucial problems concerning the participants, the goals, and the subject of future talks that must be resolved in 1990.

The rigid interdependence between conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons creates a kind of linkage between formally independent talks, and the best guideline for the negotiators will probably be the projection of cuts settled in Vienna onto nuclear postures. This guideline does not however fit in with the rapid changes in the political situation. Diplomats will hardly have time, as they had in Vienna, to settle the mandate and they should be prepared to withstand the pressure to achieve quick and tangible results.

In those circumstances the very need for talks could become questionable. Why could the two alliances not proceed with unilateral cuts and fix the ceiling for minimal means of deterrence later on? There are at least two serious factors in favour of negotiations. The first is verification: it is too complicated a question for any superficial analysis. The second is stability: the talks create a suitable mechanism for control of the changes and therefore enhance stability. But this mechanism should be very effective in projecting political dynamics into the strategic realities.

It is rather difficult to provide such effectiveness through the traditional rules and procedures of negotiations aimed at the establishment of a balance of forces on a certain level. Why should we establish a balance if we never had any? Such an artificial method would be very time-consuming and rather inflexible. Perhaps we should view tactical nuclear balance as a general goal that can be reached when minimal means of deterrence are on the agenda. In the early stages however one could accept a non-traditional approach based on asymmetrical cuts that would not eliminate all the present disproportions immediately.

Only this asymmetrical step-by-step approach can provide acceptable answers to a number of difficult questions relating to negotiations. For the first stage it is possible to identify the three most controversial questions: the proposed answers are purely theoretical.

The first question focuses on the warheads. The task of imposing limits on them is of course urgent and deserves high priority, but taking into consideration the sparsity of data and the problems of verification, it would be better to leave it to the second stage. In the beginning the negotiators will be preoccupied with delivery systems and can keep an eye on the unilateral cuts.

The second question touches on the delicate matter of British and French tactical nuclear weapons. The uncompromising attitude of these countries to encroachment on their nuclear forces is well known, and here we could easily take the path leading to the all too familiar deadlock. There is only one way to avoid it, namely to keep British and French tactical nuclear weapons outside the framework of the first stage and to concentrate again (as in the INF Treaty) on United States-USSR forces. Of course, European States will be participants in the negotiations.

The third, and most difficult, question relates to nuclear-capable aviation. NATO decided to ignore this question and now the Soviet Union is facing the uneasy decision whether or not to lay aside the air-based tactical nuclear weapons and concentrate negotiations on land-based aircraft. This decision depends very much upon the essence of the compromise with regard to aircraft that will surely be reached in Vienna. The satisfactory agreement on intercepters may encourage Soviet authorities to demonstrate flexibility on tactical nuclear weapons, but the grand sacrifice in the CFE talks could prompt new attempts to reduce the ceiling for tactical nuclear weapons. One thing is clear—it will be much more difficult to reach an agreement over the broad agenda, if it will include aircraft.

Rational and mutually acceptable answers to these questions could provide a guarantee for dynamic progress in the negotiations. It may also be useful to work out several scenarios.

One of them could be the elimination of nuclear artillery. It is obviously not worth while to impose certain sub-ceilings on nuclear calibres under the overall ceiling settled at the CFE talks. Verification could pose numerous problems for any attempt to limit the nuclear shell stocks. Besides being the most desirable from the political point of view the “zero option” is the most feasible.

Then there is the missile scenario, which includes a number of intermediate decisions. One of them could be the asymmetrical ceiling with an equal and rather low sub-ceiling (about 50 launchers) for Central Europe. Another is the definition of two types of tactical missiles according to range (up to 150 km; 150-500 km). The “zero” proposal on longer-range missiles would mean exchanging 650 Soviet and WTO deployed missiles (R-17 or Scud B) for NATO plans on the FOTL missile (probably ATACMs). Obviously for both sides missiles will remain very useful bargaining chips for the foreseeable future.

After these initial reductions of tactical nuclear weapons, the nuclear warheads will probably become a matter for negotiation, and as a preliminary scale we could take 1,000— this figure is surely of some abstract importance. Such a potential cannot be called symbolic, but it is much less destabilizing than existing arsenals. After that, we can again discuss the total elimination of tactical nuclear weapons and a nuclear-free Europe.

Notes

[1] One of the most detailed compilations of data may be found in Alan Sweedler, “Nuclear Weapons in Europe”, paper presented to the author. See also C. Kelleher, “NATO Nuclear Operations”, *in* “Managing Nuclear Operations”, A. Carter/J. Steinbruner, eds. (Brookings, 1986).

2 The most definite statement was made by S. Akhromeev. See "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Superiority of Parity?", *Pravda* (19 April 1989).

3 It should be noted that official WTO data published in January 1989 appeared to be significantly higher than Western estimates.

4 A perfect example may be found in: International Institute of Strategic Studies, "Military Balance". The experts have changed the list of nuclear-capable artillery and included several towed systems produced 40 years ago.

5 United States Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger, in his report "The theater nuclear force posture in Europe" (1975), presented a detailed analysis but did not mention Soviet nuclear-capable artillery.

6 Well-known expert Phillip A. Karber stressed this conclusion in his paper "The Soviet Threat: Comparative Assessments" (1988), p. 22.

7 It should perhaps be pointed out that these data include as many as 15 NATO carriers in the Atlantic area.

8 There are a lot of uncertainties about the nuclear capabilities of such aircraft as MiG-29, Tornado, Jaguar and F-15E.

9 Soviet politology in recent years has seen rapid progress in modelling. See, for example, *Disarmament and Security Yearbook 1983-1989*, chap. 14: "Relative Estimates of WTO and NATO Forces in Europe".

10 See H. Binnendijk, "NATO's nuclear modernization dilemma", *Survival* (March/April 1989).

11 In 1988 Jonathan Dean insisted that the CFE mandate should include 6 types of "penetrative weapons": 5 are now on the table, but tactical missiles were set aside. See J. Dean, "How to reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact forces", *Survival* (March/April 1983). The author had an exchange of views with Ambassador J. Dean on this matter at a conference on arms control in Europe, held at Bellagio, Italy, in December 1989.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons—
Do They Have a Future?

Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament Prospects

André Brie

Fundamental changes for the better are now under way in international relations, particularly in the East-West relationship. These changes have opened up real prospects for a process of genuine and substantive disarmament in almost every field. However, the situation with regard to tactical nuclear weapons is quite contradictory. These weapons belong to the category of non-strategic nuclear weapons, in which the first nuclear disarmament steps were taken in implementation of the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—the INF Treaty. Yet, tactical nuclear weapons and naval forces are the only fields of major military relevance on which negotiations have not yet begun, for several reasons.

For one thing, the political positions of the two major military-political alliances differ widely, and for another, extremely complicated problems are involved in finding the proper approaches to such negotiations and in dealing with the related military and technological aspects. The present article will deal only with the relevant positions espoused by the States members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, taking into account at the same time the diverse, yet basically con-

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structive, views of Governments, politicians, scientists and scholars in numerous non-aligned and neutral States with regard to disarmament in tactical nuclear weapons.

Significance of Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Inherent Dangers

In discussions on security and disarmament policies, the subject of tactical nuclear weapons is generally underestimated. As it is generally open to question whether nuclear weapons can contribute to stability in a time of crisis, it is reasonable to have the same doubts with regard to tactical nuclear systems, particularly battlefield nuclear weapons with the shortest ranges.

The reasons are twofold. First, large arsenals of such weapons are stationed in Europe along the line of contact between the world's two major military alliances. In times of crisis or in conflict situations a relatively relaxed permissive action régime is required if the tactical nuclear system is to have any political or military effect at all. What is more, there is a potentially high risk of losing such weapons at an early stage, in view of the dynamics with which an assumed conflict would unfold. The principle of "Use it or lose it" illustrates this particularly dangerous situation.

Secondly, the argument that tactical nuclear weapons serve "sub-strategic deterrence" is highly questionable. Nuclear deterrence is itself a questionable security concept since its functioning is based on confrontational thinking, a progressive modernization of nuclear weapons and the resultant destabilizing tendencies. It involves a host of imponderables and, in the final analysis, it makes nuclear proliferation inevitable. However, the confidence which the West has been placing in that strategy must be taken seriously. Therefore, one can envisage a concept of minimum nuclear deterrence to serve over a longer period as a step on the road to common security in a demilitarized world.

However, this is a proposition which cannot be maintained with respect to tactical nuclear weapons. At the same time, even for that category of weapons, partial solutions will be inevitable, primarily in view of existing political positions. Even if one saw nuclear deterrence as a guarantor of international security, as its proponents do, it would be difficult to substantiate the purported need for the existence of tactical nuclear weapons and for their further refinement. The complexity of the matter derives from the fact that these weapons generally threaten to upset nuclear stability and call into question the principle of strategic deterrence inasmuch as they are meant to serve as a barrier to the "final escalation", whereas strategic nuclear weapons (as even critics of the concept of deterrence can agree) may well be regarded as instruments of a primarily political value. Assuming that tactical nuclear weapons were really used in an attempt to prevent escalation and to stop a strategic nuclear exchange from destroying the world, their use would lead to the crossing of the "nuclear Rubicon", thus rendering a conflict uncontrollable. As it is the military purpose rather than the destructive power that makes these weapons different from strategic nuclear weapons, it appears that in a scenario such as that described above the chance for de-escalation and a return to reason would be rather slim.

It would take almost blind faith in the concept of tactical nuclear deterrence to believe it would actually function and not to see these weapons as destabilizing. In fact, they pose a threat to security. Their very existence and the related modernization programmes demonstrate a preponderance of military thinking over security needs. The complete elimination of tactical nuclear weapons would have no adverse effects whatsoever on the security of any State, nor would it impair defence and security strategies. Besides, it would make no difference to the non-nuclear-weapon States in Central Europe—where such a tactical nuclear exchange would be unleashed—whether they were hit by strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. At the tactical exchange level their territories would already be devastated, and their peoples would be wiped out.

It would be equally adventurous and unjustifiable to believe that tactical nuclear weapons could serve to blackmail developing countries or that they would serve as a security guarantee in the event of any such country acquiring or possessing nuclear weapons. The greatest danger of all is perhaps that tactical nuclear weapons might actually be used in these regions, apart from the potential threat of their being used to knock out large battleships or submarines on the high seas.

Even if it is recognized that the military justification for tactical nuclear weapons is questionable and that the political dangers are considerable, the objective of full disarmament or even reductions in this weapons category would still be very difficult to achieve.

In 1989, the NATO countries reaffirmed their 1983 Montebello decisions on tactical nuclear weapons, that for these holdings, reduced to a minimum, to render the best possible contribution to deterrence the delivery systems and warheads would need to be serviceable, ready for action and effective. Aware of that, the NATO countries have agreed on a number of possible improvements. It is well known that work is under way on a follow-up system for the United States Lance missile and on new air-launched and sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons.

These endeavours are continuing, notwithstanding the sweeping changes on the European continent, which make it more and more difficult to justify politically the need for such systems, not to speak of the deployment of such weapons. Nevertheless, the political positions held by either alliance are already indicative of how difficult future negotiations might become.

Political Positions

The NATO States have consistently pointed to the priority which attaches to the Soviet-American START negotiations as well as to conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals. In effect, they make the opening of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons contingent upon results in the above-mentioned fields. It should, however, be noted that, within NATO, positions vary as to what results should be obtained in regard to conventional disarmament before starting negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. At their summit meeting late in May 1989, States members of NATO adopted a Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament, in which they pointed out the following, under the heading "Sub-Strategic Nuclear Forces":

> "In keeping with its arms control objectives formulated in Reykjavik in 1987 and reaffirmed in Brussels in 1988, the Alliance states that one of its highest priorities in negotiations with the East is reaching an agreement on conventional force reductions . . . . Once implementation of such an agreement is under way, the United States, in consultation with the Allies concerned, is prepared to enter into negotiations to achieve a *partial* reduction of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile forces of shorter range to equal and verifiable levels."[1]

The Federal Republic of Germany and a number of smaller NATO countries interpret that as implying that negotiations on that issue should start soon after the conclusion of an agreement at the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe (CFE), while primarily the United Kingdom and—to some extent—the United States hold that such negotiations can get off the ground only if and when the CFE agreement will have been largely implemented, a process which certainly will take quite a number of years for completion.

The basic aspects of the NATO position on that issue can be described as follows:

First, the start of negotiations is made contingent upon the results of the CFE negotiations.

Secondly, the complete elimination of tactical nuclear weapons is expressly rejected, the argument being that

> "the sub-strategic nuclear forces deployed by member countries of the Alliance are not principally a counter to similar systems operated by members of the WTO. [Rather, they] fulfil an essential role in overall Alliance deterrence strategy by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which a potential aggressor might discount nuclear retaliation in response to his military action".[2]

Thus NATO countries merely favour a reduction of tactical nuclear armories leading to equal ceilings at lower levels.

Thirdly, the Western readiness for negotiations expressly relates only "to American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range".[3] This means that air-based and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear artillery and non-American tactical nuclear weapons are left out of the process entirely.

Fourthly, the negotiations contemplated would be bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, to be held in consultation with the allies concerned.

Fifthly, as a matter of principle NATO supports a steady modernization of tactical nuclear weapons, even regarding it as a condition for further reductions.

In the past, Warsaw Treaty member States accorded top priority to the problems of nuclear disarmament. Beginning in 1986, however, they have focused more on conventional disarmament and on the interrelationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament in Europe. On that score, the positions of the two alliances have come closer. Nevertheless, the Warsaw Treaty continues resolutely to plead for an early start of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and for their conduct in parallel with the CFE negotiations. As to the objectives and principles proposed for these negotiations, NATO and WTO positions still differ widely.

In a declaration adopted at their session held in Berlin on 11 and 12 April 1989, the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty called upon States members of NATO to open negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The Declaration adopted by the Ministers outlined the following fundamental positions of the WTO States:

First, the Warsaw Treaty States consider tactical nuclear arms as essential elements of a surprise attack rather than a necessary component of nuclear deterrence, and they are of the opinion that

> "the retention, modernization and, all the more, the further build-up of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would increasingly destabilize the military-strategic situation in Europe and would be incompatible with the efforts aimed at resolving the disarmament issues on the continent".[4]

Secondly, the Warsaw Treaty defined as the objective of the negotiations

> "the phased reduction and eventual elimination of the tactical nuclear arms in Europe . . .".[4]

Thirdly, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty believe that

> "mutual renunciation by the sides of any modernization of tactical nuclear arms would be conducive to creating a propitious political atmosphere for such negotiations . . .".[4]

Fourthly, these negotiations should cover all kinds of tactical nuclear weapons and their delivery.

Fifthly, although the WTO States held that the final decision as to the participants in the negotiations should be taken only after multilateral consultations, they seemed to favour multilateral negotiations between "all interested member States". They believed that participants should be

> "the nuclear-weapon Powers of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, respectively, [and] in particular those [States] possessing nuclear-capable tactical systems and those having tactical nuclear arms deployed in their territory".[4]

Sixthly, the WTO States reaffirmed their constant support for setting up nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe. (In this context it should be recalled that the Soviet Union's proposals of January 1986, aimed at ridding the world of all kinds of nuclear weapons, focused on a global solution to the problem of tactical nuclear arms.)

Negotiating Problems and Possible Solutions

Given the current political attitudes of the East and the West, outlined here, it seems improbable that comprehensive disarmament of tactical nuclear arms will become a reality in the foreseeable future, even if this were the most reasonable solution in the light of the dubious military and political role of these arms. The main stumbling-block is the declared position of Western nuclear Powers that tactical nuclear systems constitute an essential component of nuclear deterrence and military stability. Obviously, this is a security-policy axiom that cannot be refuted by critical arguments. In the final analysis, those advocating the complete elimination of tactical nuclear arms can do nothing but hope and work for the political climate to change to the disadvantage of tactical nuclear armament.

The entire discussion is hampered by enormous political, military-technical and verification problems, which are bound to emerge when it comes to partial solutions. This is due, in particular, to the fact that, on the one hand, delivery systems for tactical nuclear warheads are mostly dual-capable (artillery systems with a calibre of more than 150 millimetres; ground-, air- and sea-based short-range missiles, cruise missiles and stand-off weapons; rocket launchers; aircraft). Moreover, it seems hard to make a definite and verifiable distinction between tactical and non-tactical nuclear warheads. Although there now exists a general categorization in terms of available warheads, an identity of characteristics cannot be precluded.

The following reduction and disarmament options would be conceivable, although they would in any case be hampered by the complications described above.

First, a comprehensive and global zero-option for all kinds of tactical nuclear arms. As mentioned before, Western nuclear Powers do not agree to it at present, and the People's Republic of China, too, might link this option to its known positions as regards Soviet and American advance moves in the field of nuclear disarmament. Comprehensive disarmament in nuclear-capable tactical delivery systems would be possible and verifiable only in the framework of complete and general disarmament. A global zero-solution for tactical nuclear warheads would encounter intractable verification problems as long as it was not coupled with parallel measures to limit and monitor all stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons.

Secondly, a mutual Soviet-American renunciation of tactical nuclear arms. For that move, too, there exist no political prerequisites. Verification would be just as problematic as in the case of a global solution.

Thirdly, a third zero-option for Soviet and American ground-based missiles with a range of up to 500 kilometres. Among all conceivable approaches to negotiations, this seems to be the simplest way to reach an agreement on cuts in tactical nuclear arms, with the possibility of extending the INF Treaty to this area just through a protocol. Although such a solution would require far-reaching unilateral disarmament steps on the part of the Soviet Union (which possesses over 1,500 launchers for these missiles whereas NATO has 136 in all), the West is still displaying considerable opposition. However, partial unilateral cuts in such arms by the Soviet Union, pressure by the general public and the nearly impossible modernization of the obsolete Lance missile system deployed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany might soon result in a changed Western position.

Fourthly, elimination of nuclear artillery. Basically, there is a growing willingness both in the East and in the West to reduce these nuclear weapons systems, since there are hardly any doubts as regards the threat they pose to military stability and their senselessness from the military viewpoint. The main problem, however, lies in the dual capability of the respective artillery systems. Since they account, to a considerable extent, for conventional artillery, the issue cannot be resolved simply by eliminating the firing systems. The elimination of the nuclear warheads of those systems by way of negotiation is bound to fail in view of the impossibility of differentiating verification methods. Nuclear-artillery disarmament is nevertheless possible and realistic. It should be implemented by the unilateral withdrawal of nuclear artillery ammunition by each side respectively, a step which could be accompanied by confidence-building measures and possible voluntary inspections. Moreover, within the framework of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, effective and comprehensive verification of such a withdrawal would become possible. However, the storage of warheads by nuclear-weapon States could also be monitored only in the framework of comprehensive nuclear disarmament.

Fifthly, the reduction of air- and sea-based tactical nuclear arms and their elimination. Cuts in, and the dismantling of, nuclear-capable combat aircraft would be verifiable in principle even though global (bilateral or multilateral) solutions would be extremely costly. Moreover, it is not the nuclear-weapon States and their allies alone that possess nuclear-capable aircraft. However, this problem is at present compounded by the fact that there are no realistic political prospects for the political good will of the nuclear Powers, which is required to this end. Precisely defined partial solutions for the reduction of combat aircraft achieved in the Vienna CFE talks would, however, also apply to this area. For the purpose of ensuring political and military stability, great importance is attached to the complete elimination of sea-based tactical nuclear arms. Considering the combat capabilities of such weapons and the temptation to use them against aircraft carriers, other major naval targets and submarines, it would in any case seem most likely for a nuclear confrontation to break out on the high seas. Currently, the political will to tackle this issue appears to be rather weak.

However, there are positive developments in this area. Verification problems could be solved by using sophisticated technical means, above all through effective challenge inspections. The extremely destabilizing effects that would result from sea-based tactical nuclear arms during periods of crisis and conflict make it imperative to attach great importance to the reduction of these weapons.

The United States and the Soviet Union could initiate a process to that effect, and all other nuclear Powers could join in at a later stage.

Sixthly, nuclear-weapon-free zones. Zones free from nuclear weapons would no doubt be conducive to disarmament measures in the field of tactical nuclear arms. On the one hand, the status of such zones could be monitored effectively; on the other hand, they would help to bring about a situation between the two alliances in which the presence of tactical nuclear weapons could no longer be justified. As is known, NATO States are strictly opposed to such zones in Europe and at the present time a change in this attitude is not discernible. It would, however, considerably facilitate disarmament steps in the field of tactical nuclear weapons, since the military significance of these weapons within the territories of the nuclear Powers themselves would decline substantially.

Proposed Steps towards Nuclear Disarmament

In view of current political positions and various technical problems relating to the negotiations, I should like to point out the following steps towards disarmament in the field of tactical nuclear arms, all of which could be implemented in the foreseeable future:

—A third zero-option for Soviet and American land-based missiles having a range of up to 500 kilometres;

—The unilateral elimination by each side of nuclear warheads for artillery systems, together with confidence-building measures and voluntary inspections;

—The elimination of sea-based tactical nuclear weapons.

Such measures, disarmament in other fields and further positive changes in international relations should make it possible to tackle the issue of complete global disarmament in the field of tactical nuclear arms.

Notes

1 "A Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament", adopted by Heads of State and Government at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 29 and 30 May 1989 (issued in United Nations document A/44/481), annex II, para. 48.

2 *Ibid.*, para. 44.

3 *Ibid.*, para. 43.

4 "Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe", issued by the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty at its session held at Berlin on 11 and 12 April 1989 (reproduced in United Nations document A/44/228, annex II).

The Role of Nuclear Deterrence in Non-Provocative Defence

Thomas Enders

During most of the 1980s, nuclear weapons were the main item of a rather scanty East-West dialogue. Even after the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—the INF Treaty—had been concluded in December 1987 and the focus of arms control had shifted towards conventional weaponry in Europe, the question what to do with the shorter-range nuclear arsenals of the two alliances remained high on the international agenda. However, in the wake of the banning of the land-based intermediate-range (500-5,500 km) nuclear forces of the super-Powers and the concomitant political-psychological "fall-out", this became more a West-West than an East-West issue. Hard as it may be to believe, only twelve months ago the Atlantic Alliance was facing a serious crisis over the question of nuclear "modernization". In retrospect, and particularly against the backdrop of the stunning, truly revolutionary changes during the second half of 1989 in Eastern Europe, NATO's row over its European-based nuclear weapons looks trivial indeed.

Those in the West who—like this author—only a year ago firmly believed that a swift decision to modernize these

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weapons was essential to the Alliance's cohesion and further progress in European arms control, have had to realize that they had vastly overestimated the importance of the nuclear question for the new, unfolding East-West relationship. However, those who now claim that it was the prevention of any modernization decision on NATO's part that cleared the ground for the sweeping political changes in the East are grossly exaggerating the political implications of the nuclear issue as well. The point here is not that nuclear weapons in Europe have ceased to be an important politico-military topic but rather that the events in Eastern Europe have simply changed the ground rules of the nuclear debate. It has become doubtful whether old criteria and parameters still apply. Furthermore, 1989 allowed the prediction that nuclear deterrence and nuclear-arms control would no longer play the same dominant role in the East-West relationship of the 1990s as they did during the preceding decade. This should in many ways facilitate efforts to deal with European-based nuclear weapons in the years ahead.

The Changing Political Landscape in Europe

In just one year all hard-line régimes in Eastern Europe (with the exception of Albania) were toppled by more or less spontaneous and, for the most part, peaceful popular movements. All these countries are now on their way to becoming democracies, with free elections, multiparty systems, market economies and "de-ideologized" armed forces. This development undoubtedly contributes much more to confidence-building in Europe than such actions as the scrapping of thousands of missiles and tanks. The implications for the European security setting are of a fundamental nature.

First, democratic East European countries, even if they are still members of the Warsaw Pact and maintain capable armed forces, do not pose a military threat to the West. Equally important, however, is the fact that democracies between the Elbe and the Bug will not feel threatened by the West either.

Secondly, the pressure for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from these countries is therefore bound to increase, quite irrespective of the arms-control process. The Hungarians have for some time been known to be eager to get Soviet-stationed forces—occupation forces in the eyes of the people—out of their country: the overthrow of the Ceaucescu régime is likely to spur on this effort. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the new Prague government has already entered into bilateral negotiations with Moscow to get rid of the Soviet troops that crushed the "Prague spring" of 1968. It will probably not be very long before similar aspirations arise in East Germany, where more than 350,000 Soviet troops are concentrated. All in all, it does not seem that Soviet-stationed forces in Eastern Europe have much of a future.

Thirdly, related to this development, forces stationed in the West, particularly United States, French and United Kingdom forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, are bound to be cut back very substantially as well. Because of a gigantic budget deficit, the United States is already planning a massive pull-back from Europe. This would of course require fundamental changes in the Alliance's military strategy.

Fourthly, as Eastern Europe turns democratic, the long-time division of the continent is ended and both NATO and the Warsaw Pact lose their predominant role in the European security setting. New, comprehensive security structures, probably growing out of the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, will gradually assume functions hitherto fulfilled by two antagonistic alliances. The process of unification of the two Germanys will provide a strong impetus to this development.

These are the major trends or factors that are bound to shape the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. Above all, if the post-war era of forces stationed in Europe is coming to a close, this will inevitably mean very considerable reductions of shorter-range nuclear weapons deployed alongside United States and Soviet ground and air forces on foreign territories in peacetime. If arms-control negotiations on strategic nuclear forces do not start from these assumptions, they will be doomed to political irrelevance.

Nuclear Weapons in Europe: How Few are Enough?

The change in the political landscape raises the question whether nuclear weapons[1] are still needed in Europe: Should they have a future? And if so, how few are enough?

The most fundamental observation is that nuclear weapons have become a fact of life, whether we like it or not. One can abolish the nuclear "hardware" but the "software", that is, the knowledge of how to build the bomb, cannot be eliminated. Popular demands to ban nuclear weapons are not therefore a realistic proposition. "Living with the bomb", as Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker put it some thirty years ago, remains the challenge we have to face up to. There is no easy answer to the question whether or not nuclear weapons have been the main contributor to peace and stability between East and West, and particularly in Europe, throughout the last four decades, but there can be little doubt that they changed the thinking of statesmen and military men on matters of war and peace very fundamentally. In a way, this is highlighted by the fact that an overwhelming majority of politicians in East and West readily subscribe to the notion of "common security", which is based upon recognition of the fact that there is no alternative to the prevention of war in the nuclear age.

However, even if the two super-Powers and their respective security alliances agreed that nuclear weapons were no longer needed for the prevention of war between the two sides, they could not dare to abandon their nuclear arsenals entirely. The sobering fact is that they may need a nuclear deterrent against the emerging nuclear/chemical-weapons Powers in the South. This task requires sizeable strategic nuclear-weapons postures; low numbers would probably increase rather than lessen proliferation incentives. It is essential in this context that an integrating Europe reserve for itself the option of an independent nuclear deterrent through French and United Kingdom forces.

In sum, there is as yet no point at which it could be envisaged that the two super-Powers or France and the United Kingdom would be willing to scrap their strategic nuclear arsenals. Faced with the proliferation processes (nuclear and chemical weapons; ballistic missiles) outside the East-West context and the Chinese potential, it is highly unlikely that the United States and the Soviet Union would be willing to cut back their respective weapon inventories to "minimum" levels as proposed by some arms-control experts, for example to 500 warheads on each side.

Whatever may happen to NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Europe will certainly not become one large nuclear-weapon-free zone; nor is the end of nuclear deterrence in Europe in sight. Although the future of the Soviet Union is fraught with many uncertainties, the Soviet Union will remain a nuclear super-Power for some time to come. In fact, there is simply nothing that would back the Soviet claim to be a super-Power equal to the United States other than its impressive strategic nuclear inventory. Consequently, this is the one field in which efforts to modernize Soviet forces go on unabated. Possible strategic arms reduction agreements notwithstanding, a robust strategic nuclear posture provides the USSR with redundant intercontinental as well as regional nuclear options in Europe. The other European nuclear Powers are France and the United Kingdom, which are both in the process of expanding their strategic nuclear postures.

However, sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe are a different matter. At the core of the problem is the American nuclear presence on the continent.

In its "Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament" of May 1989, the Atlantic alliance reaffirmed its position

> "that for the foreseeable future, there is no alternative to the Alliance's strategy for the prevention of war, which is a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up to date where necessary. Where nuclear forces are concerned, land-, sea-, and air-based systems, including ground-based missiles, in the present circumstances and as far as can be foreseen will be needed in Europe."[2]

This is indeed a cautious and flexible statement but nevertheless one wonders whether the Heads of State of NATO countries would still unanimously subscribe to this passage. What did the Alliance partners "foresee" when they signed the Comprehensive Concept in Brussels? Did they, for example, expect that *Solidarnosc* would take charge of the Polish government just a few weeks later? Did they give any thought to the possibility of democratic and peaceful revolutions in the German Democratic Republic, in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria? Did they believe that the Berlin Wall would come down before the year was over? And did they think through the profound political and military-strategic consequences of all this a year ago? Certainly not. It is therefore not advisable to rely solely or primarily on the "Comprehensive Concept" when trying to define NATO's future nuclear requirements.

Traditionally, United States nuclear weapons in Europe are intended to contribute to Alliance security "by providing deterrence through retaliation, denial, and presence, and by reassuring . . . (the) allies of the U.S. commitment to Europe".[3]

However, there has always been a potential for conflict between the deterrence function and the reassurance function of shorter-range nuclear weapons. During the recent modernization debate in NATO this was highlighted by the—unfortunate—German saying, "The shorter the range, the deader the Germans". Since the INF Treaty destroyed the "escalation ladder" theory, politicians have come to view the remaining theatre nuclear weapons less as instruments for enhancing the credibility of escalation and the American strategic nuclear guarantee than as means to fight a limited nuclear war in Europe. Thus most Germans, on whose territory the bulk of United States shorter-range nuclear forces is deployed, obviously do not draw much reassurance from the presence of these weapons. Against the backdrop of the democratization in Eastern Europe, the proposition that new, extended-range missiles would not necessarily fall on German soil (but rather on Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) does not sell well either, as Foreign Minister Genscher emphasized repeatedly. The times where mere rumours that Washington might withdraw some of its many thousand European-based nuclear warheads made West European politicians very nervous are clearly gone.

Nowadays, the demand for political reassurance through nuclear presence is very modest indeed. Coupling the deployment of nuclear weapons to the United States conventional presence in Europe in the form of the familiar "No nukes, no troops!" equation does nothing, certainly, to increase the demand for nuclear reassurance in the current political environment. However, it often tends to be overlooked that reassurance of Western Europe's non-nuclear States is closely linked to their participation in the Alliance's nuclear planning. The Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, has had considerable influence on the development of NATO's political guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons in Europe. But participation in planning requires a willingness on the part of the non-nuclear States to share nuclear risks and roles with the United States. From a United States point of view, the sharing of nuclear risks provides the basis for the extended deterrence-guarantee to Europe. Hence Uwe Nerlich's strong warning against efforts to confine nuclear deployment to the territory of nuclear-weapon States:

> "This would be a complete reversal of interests and policies of non-nuclear weapons states. It would deprive non-nuclear weapons states completely of any critical role in the management of crisis and conflict. It would undo decades of evolution toward a deterrence system governed by control, self-restraint and participation."[4]

The question is, how much politicians are prepared to pay for nuclear participation and extended deterrence if the possibility of armed conflict between East and West is deemed extremely low. NATO's recent debate on strategic nuclear forces has clearly shown that in a low-threat environment domestic considerations can easily prevail over the strategic-military calculus.

If we turn to the "pure" deterrence value of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, the picture is somewhat less confusing. Ironically enough, it is Robert McNamara who—unwillingly—presents a strong case for the retention of United States shorter-range nuclear weapons in Europe when he writes:

> "To the extent that the nuclear threat has deterrent value, it is because it increases the risk that nuclear weapons will be used in the event of war. The location of nuclear weapons in what would be forward parts of the battlefield; the associated development of operational plans assuming the early use of nuclear

> weapons; the possibility that release authority would be delegated to field commanders prior to the outset of war—these factors and many others would lead to a higher probability that if war actually began in Europe, it would soon turn into a nuclear conflagration."[5]

Therefore, one could add, the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe serves to underline, in the minds of decision-makers in East and West, the tremendous, existential risks inherent in any clash of arms on the continent.

In the context of the impending conventional arms reductions in Europe, there are a couple of other arguments which support the retention of theatre nuclear forces in Europe.

First, conventional stability as the sole pillar of European security is a questionable proposition, all the more so since the eastern part of the European continent has entered the turbulent waters of profound change. At least for the Soviet Union, a resurgence of "old thinking" cannot be excluded. Furthermore, in a politically and technologically dynamic world, a once and for all assured conventional "structural incapacity for attack" is at least as improbable as an impenetrable missile defence.

Secondly, especially if one aims at radical reductions of conventional weapons and new, hitherto untested defence structures, nuclear deterrence can serve as a valuable stabilizing element. The presence of nuclear weapons can strengthen the willingness of cautious leaderships to go ahead with far-reaching conventional disarmament.

Thirdly, the emergence of destabilizing technologies and their military application can by no means be excluded. Until both—East and West—succeed in establishing an effective and reliable régime to curb the qualitative arms competition, nuclear weapons can serve as a hedge against destabilizing technological breakthroughs.

The conclusion of these observations is that the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe is not only compatible with substantial reductions in conventional weaponry but a prerequisite of stability-oriented disarmament and restructuring. This is not to argue that Europe must cling to nuclear deterrence for eternity. It is simply too early to tell when and in what circumstances European security can safely do without the nuclear safeguard.

However, these observations do not lend themselves easily to recommendations as far as force-posturing is concerned. With the momentous political change in the East, Mikhail Gorbachev's unilateral military reductions, and a very promising agreement on the horizon concerning the reduction of conventional forces in Europe, it is extremely hard to make a convincing case for a certain sub-strategic nuclear posture: Are we, for instance, still operating under the

> "present circumstances of NATO's Comprehensive Concept as regards ground-based nuclear missiles? What good are new, ground-based missiles if they destroy whatever legitimacy is left for nuclear deterrence in the Federal Republic?"[6]

Furthermore, to return to the initial question, how many nuclear weapons does the Atlantic Alliance need in Europe in the future? This numbers game is highly arbitrary, but there is clearly a tendency to arrive at ever lower figures. If the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe says he needs 2,900 nuclear warheads to do his job, some politician will appear on the public scene and declare that according to his own calculation, only 2,000 or 1,500 weapons are required. This of course will be contradicted by another politician or a civil expert who argues that some 500 warheads is the absolute minimum necessary for deterrence, and so on. It is impossible to keep track of all the figures and associated concepts that are floating around in public. This has long ceased to be a serious business. But where is the bottom

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line? Is there one? The main difficulty is that we are in a period of rapid change of the political parameters and assumptions on which military requirements need to be based. The speed and extent of this change are unprecedented since the Second World War. For instance, the military threat potential of the Warsaw Pact seems to consist now *de facto* of nothing more than the Soviet armed forces.

Another difficulty the Alliance is facing in sizing its future nuclear forces in Europe lies in the fact that it has long abandoned the notion of extensive nuclear war-fighting in favour of stressing selective strikes aimed at rapid war determination. This is clearly embodied in NATO's "General Political Guidelines" for the use of nuclear weapons in Europe. To calculate nuclear requirements for selective options intended to serve primarily (though not exclusively) political goals is distinctly more difficult than calculating requirements for extensive war-fighting options. However, it is relatively safe to say that NATO's present nuclear doctrine could do with hundreds rather than thousands of nuclear warheads in Europe. What has driven numbers up in the past was the "general nuclear response" role, that is, the missions of European-based nuclear weapons in an all-out nuclear war. Some analysts have convincingly argued that in the future this role should be left to strategic forces.[7]

Towards Existential and Co-operative Deterrence in Europe?

It may well be inevitable that the Atlantic Alliance will arrive at some form of "existential deterrence"[8] as regards the future United States nuclear posture in Europe—existential deterrence in the sense that NATO might eventually have to settle with a small and less than optimal sub-strategic posture which would act as a deterrent primarily through its presence in the European "war theatre", reminding decision-makers of the ultimate risk of armed conflict rather than through its distinct and refined war-fighting capabilities. In a way, this process was already initiated with the INF Treaty.

In terms of hardware, the Alliance ought to acknowledge that the concept of replacing the aging Lance missile system with a new, ground-based nuclear missile is essentially dead. Barring a major policy reversal in the Soviet Union, it is highly improbable that any German government would accept new missiles on its territory at a time when Eastern Europe is turning democratic and the two German States are preparing for some new form of unity. Ground-based nuclear missiles have come to symbolize the nuclear threat as such for the German public.

However, NATO might manage to keep the old Lance system in place throughout much of the 1990s. Though the system's military utility would be very limited, it might nevertheless serve as a bargaining chip for arms control and provide an incentive to existential deterrence.

If sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe have a future, this will be the case mainly in the form of aircraft-deployed weapons. Aircraft have the advantage that they can strike beyond the potential battlefield area, that is Central Europe, and against the Soviet homeland. Thus they are the only weapons left in Europe that fit the requirements of NATO's "General Political Guidelines" for longer-range selective strikes against the potential aggressor. Owing to their poor penetrability into Warsaw Pact airspace, they would need to be equipped with stand-off weapons. These planes would be partly deployed on continental and United Kingdom air bases, as in the past, and partly on aircraft-carriers in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic.

Nuclear-tipped artillery projectiles have a very short range (30 km maximum). If employed in case of war, they would explode exclusively on German soil. Yet up to now, the German public at large has not become very excited about these weapons, which are typically viewed as nuclear war-fighting means *par excellence*. Their deterrent value is often underestimated. Robert McNamara's description, cited above, of how deterrence works in Europe is, above all, applicable to nuclear artillery. The mere existence of hundreds of nuclear-capable artillery pieces on the forward edge of the potential battlefield heightens the risk of acts of conventional aggression. At the same time, nuclear artillery does conform with the notion of non-provocative defence much better than any other nuclear-weapon system inasmuch as artillery—unlike certain missile systems—cannot be used for strategic-operational pre-emption. The modernization of NATO's nuclear artillery shells has been going on for some time already. The most important feature of this modernization programme is perhaps that the incoming new warheads (W 70 and W 82) are for the first time equipped with state-of-the-art electronic "permissive-action links" (PAL), which practically exclude unauthorized use of the shells.

However, the future of nuclear artillery in Europe is uncertain. Apart from special German sensitivities ("The shorter the range, the deader the Germans."), it is the prospect of major United States troop withdrawals from Western Europe that suggests quite drastic reductions in the field of nuclear artillery projectiles as well.

Some of the problems NATO is facing with respect to its nuclear-weapons systems in Europe might be alleviated by new stationing schemes for the nuclear stockpile. If the warning time in Europe increases as a result of conventional disarmament and disengagement measures, then one can at least consider basing many or most of NATO's sub-strategic nuclear warheads in the United States. In the event of crisis they could be redeployed to Europe, provided that the necessary facilities and infrastructure were kept in place. Perhaps NATO could even create a "rapid nuclear deployment force" for Europe.

Whether a more or less deliberate shift towards existential deterrence in Europe would be acceptable to NATO, and in particular to the United States, is an open question, but there may simply be no alternative to such a development as the East-West conflict further recedes and new, comprehensive security structures evolve on the old continent. In such an environment French and United Kingdom nuclear forces would provide (existential) extended deterrence to their non-nuclear neighbours, even without any formal guarantees or promises.

However, NATO's nuclear policy is not independent of the Soviet Union's policy and posture. At present, the Warsaw Pact enjoys a significant numerical superiority over NATO in theatre nuclear-weapon systems, particularly as regards ground-based ballistic missiles. But Soviet spokesmen have declared repeatedly that Moscow is ready to give up its superiority in strategic nuclear forces (SNF) arms-control negotiations with the West.

Moreover, Mikhail Gorbachev's statement on 6 July 1989 at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and the Soviet-Finnish declaration of 26 October 1989 conveyed the message that the Soviet Union is open to compromise on the question of nuclear weapons in Europe and ready to abandon its former anti-nuclear rigidity. Although he does not admit it so openly, Mr. Gorbachev has obviously also abandoned his grand design for a nuclear-free world by the year 2000. He now displays interest in the principle of "minimum nuclear deterrence" in Europe and has called upon the West to set up joint expert groups to discuss the matter thoroughly. This policy shift is only logical: if the USSR is prepared to give up its huge conventional preponderance in Europe and adopt a truly defensive military doctrine, it may want to rely more heavily on the nuclear safeguard for its security. The result of this may be a convergence of nuclear deterrence thinking in the West and in the Soviet Union.

This surely is a promising development and may open the way to some form of co-operative deterrence in the sense that both sides would agree to certain (low) weapon ceilings and modernization schemes and the elimination of the most threatening nuclear systems. The resultant sub-strategic postures need not necessarily be symmetrical. That of course requires that discussions about minimum deterrence in Europe and future SNF negotiations not be limited to one or two weapon categories but rather follow a comprehensive approach. Whether and how far agreement on a co-operative approach can be reached is of course an open question. But at a time when a United States President can call his Soviet counterpart "partner in peace", there is reason for cautious optimism.

Notes

1 This analysis confines itself to sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. The term "sub-strategic" covers all nuclear weapons to be disposed of after the INF Treaty, from nuclear artillery shells to nuclear-capable aircraft. Other synonymous terms used in the text are: "theatre nuclear weapons", "shorter-range nuclear weapons" and "tactical nuclear weapons".

2 The text is reproduced in United Nations General Assembly document A/44/481, annex II, para. 45.

3 Stephen D. Biddle and Peter D. Peaver (eds.), "Battlefield nuclear weapons. Issues and options", *CSIA Occasional Paper No. 5* (Harvard University, 1989), p. 6.

4 Uwe Nerlich, "Nuclear deterrence in NATO strategy: roles of nuclear forces in a changing environment". Paper presented at the Workshop on Political-Military Decision Making in the Atlantic Alliance, Schaeffergarden Manor House, Copenhagen, June 1989, p. 5.

5 Robert McNamara, *Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age* (New York, 1986), pp. 118-119.

6 See Karl Kaiser, "Why nuclear weapons in times of disarmament?", in *The World Today*, August/September 1989, pp. 138-139.

7 So for example Nerlich, "Nuclear deterrence in NATO strategy".

8 For a discussion of the notion of "existential deterrence", see Lawrence Freedman, "I exist therefore I deter", *International Security*, vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 177-195.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons—
Do They Have a Future?

United States Tactical Nuclear Forces and the Future of Deterrence

John C. Hopkins and
Patrick J. Garrity

Since the mid-1950s, the United States has developed and deployed a wide variety of nuclear weapons that are generally referred to as "tactical" or "theatre" nuclear forces (TNF). The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China have also fielded nuclear weapons systems that fit generally into this category, although they may have different designations for them.

In this article an attempt is made to examine the future role of United States TNF at a time when, over the next several years, the United States and its allies must make critical decisions about the modernization of TNF and arms control. These decisions will be made in the context of a rapidly changing geopolitical environment, which is forcing all major States to rethink their national objectives and pol-

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icies—a reconsideration that includes both the viability and the advisability of heavy reliance on nuclear weapons in Western security policy. The political changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union over the past year, among other remarkable developments, suggest that we are moving into a new era of international relations. Projected developments in nuclear and conventional military technology may also be important, but technology does not seem to be the critical determining factor for future TNF requirements, as it was perhaps in earlier periods.

The first section of this article examines roles and requirements for United States tactical nuclear weapons that have emerged over the past 40 years, and the problems that have traditionally been associated with TNF. These requirements and problems are then used as the basis for identifying and assessing critical TNF issues that will confront the United States and its allies over the next few years. Finally, several general conclusions are drawn about the most likely outcome of American and allied decisions concerning the future of tactical nuclear forces.

In our judgement, United States TNF—and those of other nuclear Powers—will not disappear in the foreseeable future. However, American (and Soviet) TNF will most probably decline significantly in numbers and types. The role of the remaining United States TNF will depend greatly on how the United States and its allies perceive the Soviet challenge, and on the degree of public support for a security policy which includes a TNF capability.

The authors would like to stress that this article is not intended to represent the policy of the United States Government. Where appropriate, in order to provide a context for the discussion, they have tried to spell out official American policy as they understand it, but the analysis and conclusions are those of the authors alone.

Traditional Roles and Requirements for United States TNF

The principal purpose of the United States armed forces, including its tactical nuclear forces,

> "is to secure our objectives and defend our interests by deterring aggression against the United States, its allies, and its interests. This requires that potential adversaries perceive that the costs to them of initiating aggression are likely to outweigh any benefits they might accrue",[1]

The United States Government holds that deterrence, and not political or military advantage, is the ultimate American test of the value of TNF.[2]

To deter aggression, the United States has designed and deployed three general types of military power: conventional forces, short-range and intermediate-range tactical/theatre nuclear weapons, and longer-range strategic nuclear forces. TNF are intended principally to form a link between conventional forces and strategic nuclear forces. Tactical nuclear forces help link the two by raising the prospect that local conventional or nuclear aggression against American forces overseas or against American allies may lead to retaliation by United States strategic forces. The use of TNF would be intended to deny the aggressor victory in a regional conflict, and to convince the aggressor that he faces strategic retaliation if he continues his attack. This United States and allied policy is known as flexible response. The deployment of TNF is *not* intended to permit the United States to fight and win a nuclear war limited to a theatre. Rather, TNF deployments enhance deterrence by making certain that a would-be aggressor cannot expect to wage conventional or theatre nuclear war without facing the prospect of further escalation. A limited conventional incursion, however, would be met by conventional forces only.

In performing this linkage function, United States tactical nuclear forces inevitably affect the interests of American allies, on whose soil or in whose territorial waters TNF may be based. The deployment of TNF must therefore reassure those allies of the seriousness and reliability of the American guarantee of their security—which guarantee is commonly known as extended nuclear deterrence, or the American nuclear umbrella.[3]

To reassure its allies, the United States has taken steps to ensure that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies participate fully in deciding the number and type of TNF deployments, in the deterrent policies that govern the potential use of those weapons, and in any decision to use TNF. To support this American policy of reassurance the United States has agreed to supply tactical nuclear warheads to certain allies through programmes of co-operation. The United States maintains possession of these warheads during peacetime; during a crisis or actual conflict these weapons could be released to allies, who would then provide the actual system (for example, an aircraft) by which the weapons would be delivered.[4]

Finally, TNF represent in some sense a deterrent and a counter to superior enemy conventional forces. American military officials have historically believed that in some circumstances United States conventional forces would be outnumbered in critical theatres—a weakness that might otherwise tempt a potential aggressor to attack. These officials do not believe that TNF can solve this military problem, and they do not consider tactical nuclear weapons to be an "ordinary" part of the United States and allied armed forces. Rather, the United States and its allies assume that possession of these nuclear forces immensely complicates an aggressor's planning and conduct of an attack, and raises the risks and costs of such a war for an aggressor correspondingly. To ensure their credibility, TNF do have military roles and missions, but these roles and missions are subordinated to the two political requirements (linkage and reassurance) discussed above.

In our judgement, the real-world functions of tactical nuclear weapons are considerably more ambiguous and controversial than this general account might suggest. There are a number of reasons for this ambiguity and uncertainty. First, and most important, the deployment of tactical nuclear forces has been and continues to be controversial among some allied Governments and their public. To the allies, American strategic nuclear weapons are, for the most part, far away. But TNF are often deployed on or near allied territory, and hence become targets for a would-be aggressor. If deterrence were to fail, the TNF of both sides might be used on allied soil. TNF may offer a degree of reassurance of the American commitment, but they also inherently raise the prospect of limited nuclear war and the actual use of nuclear weapons in wartime. The enhanced radiation-weapon controversy of the mid-1970s, the debate over the INF deployments in the early 1980s, New Zealand's refusal to permit the visits of United States Navy ships that might contain nuclear weapons, and the growing dispute in NATO over modernization of the Lance missile are recent examples of these allied governmental and public concerns about TNF.

Secondly, the ways in which certain types of TNF are deployed raise serious questions among some analysts about whether or not those deployments are stable,[5] that is, whether they conform to a set of political and military conditions that dampen tendencies towards war or violent change. It is suggested by some that the range and characteristics of specific TNF—for example, nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic missiles—would place pressure on the United States and its allies to use these systems before they were destroyed or captured during a conflict. During a crisis, such pressure to "use or lose" could theoretically prompt one side or the other to initiate hostilities or, if a conflict had broken out, to escalate the conflict when it might otherwise be stopped. The United States Government itself does not judge short-range TNF to be a likely cause of war or escalation, and we believe this judgement to be correct, but the United States and its allies have been interested in reducing any "use or lose" pressures that might actually exist.

There also exists the unlikely possibility of accidental or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, or their capture by terrorists. The United States and its allies have taken very substantial precautions in this regard, including the use of permissive action links, commonly known as PALs. (Permissive action links are mechanical or electrical locking devices that prevent the use of the weapon without the explicit permission of proper political authorities.) The United States has also incorporated insensitive high explosives (IHE) into its new nuclear weapons designs. The use of IHE dramatically reduces the risk of accidental detonation of the high explosive in the weapon and thus of plutonium dispersal in the event of an accident or deliberate attack on the weapon itself.[6] Western Governments continue to stress the importance of safety, security, and use control, and this emphasis is certain to affect future TNF policy and deployment decisions.

Thirdly, we note that throughout the period after the Second World War, the United States has limited the deterrent and military roles of TNF to large-scale attacks by the Soviet Union and its allies. The United States Government does not recognize such a limit in principle, but on the two occasions since 1950 when the United States engaged serious military opponents (North Korea and North Viet Nam), it did not resort to nuclear weapons. We believe this sets an important precedent for non-use of American nuclear weapons against non-Soviet Powers.

In short, the United States has assigned major deterrent functions to its tactical nuclear forces since 1945, and deterrence requires TNF to be capable of fulfilling certain military roles and missions. We observe, however, that the military roles and missions have often been overshadowed by political limitations and controversy. Will the next decade witness any major changes in the current TNF framework?

Critical TNF Issues and Decisions

Over the past decade, the United States and its allies have taken a number of important actions to support the requirements and adjust to the problems associated with TNF.

First, the United States, in conjunction with its allies where appropriate, has largely removed some TNF types from service—for example, atomic demolition weapons, air defence systems, some types of anti-submarine weapons. For the most part, these TNF systems were of older designs and had very short ranges. The United States pursued such a change in its TNF stockpile in part to reassure allies, who were growing concerned that these older, shorter-range systems did not serve properly to link allied conventional forces with American strategic weapons.

Secondly, in removing these systems, the United States and its NATO allies have unilaterally reduced the total number of TNF, while planning to modernize some of the remaining TNF stockpile. In 1979, as part of its decision to deploy the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile systems in NATO, the Atlantic Alliance decided to reduce its total nuclear stockpile unilaterally by 1,000 weapons. At Montebello, Canada, in 1983, NATO announced that an additional 1,400 nuclear warheads would be removed. These two reductions have resulted in the lowest NATO nuclear stockpile in Europe in twenty years.[7]

The intent of this reduction process, among other goals, is to extend the range of the modernized TNF systems and thereby enhance the linkage aspect of tactical nuclear weapons. Extended ranges make it clear that it will be the aggressor's territory, and not that of the victim alone, that will suffer the consequences of aggression. Extended ranges will also help improve TNF survivability against enemy attack, and thus alleviate concerns about any "use or lose" pressures.

Thirdly, the United States reached an agreement with the Soviet Union for the first time on reductions in TNF (the INF Treaty). The INF Treaty eliminated all Soviet and American ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. Ironically, by removing these long-range TNF systems, the INF Treaty worked against the preferred United States and allied policy noted above, that is, the development of more survivable systems with longer ranges. Nevertheless, the precedent of the INF Treaty is an important one: TNF systems have now become an integral part of the larger arms-control process that includes conventional forces and strategic nuclear forces.

Will this pattern of TNF reduction, modernization and arms control continue over the next decade? We believe that further TNF reductions, whether undertaken unilaterally or through negotiations, will almost certainly take place. The outcome of any TNF modernization is much more problematic. The most controversial decision in this regard will concern the proposed modernization of NATO's Lance ballistic missile, which has been deferred by the Alliance until 1992. The continued deployment of nuclear artillery shells, and any subsequent upgrades to these systems, is another controversial subject because of their extremely short range. Finally, the United States and its allies must determine whether to deploy the proposed air-launched tactical short-range attack missile (SRAM-T). The continued deployment or modernization of each of these TNF systems will depend heavily on United States and allied assessments of how well they support linkage and reassurance—as well as on further developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

We note that the United States military, and especially the various regional and functional Commanders-in-Chief, will be very strongly represented in any decision about which TNF systems to retain in the United States stockpile. In their recommendations about TNF, the Commanders-in-Chief will weigh heavily the national policy-makers' assessment of the threat and the specific military missions that are required of them.

Overshadowing all of these deployment/modernization decisions is the ongoing arms-control process relating to conventional forces in Europe (CFE) and the proposed negotiations on short-range nuclear force (SNF). The conventional and nuclear balance in Europe could be altered dramatically as a consequence of these negotiations, thus necessitating major changes in the TNF stockpile.

This brings us to an important point: we believe that the future of TNF will be determined primarily by the rapidly changing political and strategic environment, rather than by particular decisions to deploy or retire specific tactical nuclear systems. A number of such political changes are noted below, along with a brief discussion of the evolution of military technology and operations.

Qualitative Changes in the East-West Conflict

A major part of the changes that can be expected in the international environment is due to potential shifts in Soviet goals and policies, and to the dramatic political changes we have recently witnessed in Eastern Europe. There are great uncertainties about the ultimate course and outcome of Gorbachev's reforms, but in all probability, the Soviets will be preoccupied with their own economic revival for

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much of the next thirty years, and could well pose less of a global military threat to Western security.

A substantial decline in the Soviet military threat would have important implications for TNF. TNF were deployed in the first instance to compensate for local Soviet conventional superiority and thereby to enhance deterrence. If this superiority were no longer to exist, much of the military rationale for TNF would not necessarily disappear, however, because (*a*) TNF would still represent an important linkage between conventional and strategic forces; (*b*) it has been historically difficult to ensure deterrence with conventional forces alone; and (*c*) the Soviet Union, with its inherent geostrategic advantages on the European continent, could again constitute a major threat to Western security, over either the short term or the longer term.

The context within which TNF systems are deployed in Western Europe could also change significantly if the Soviet Union removes its military forces, including its TNF, from Eastern Europe. This Soviet withdrawal, which seemed inconceivable only a short time ago—and it is by no means certain even today—would require all of the NATO allies, including the United States, to re-think entirely their military force structure and planning. We cannot predict the outcome of such a re-evaluation on the future of TNF, other than to observe that it would tend to weaken the political rationale for the deployment of United States TNF on the European continent itself.[8]

A New Strategic Environment

For the past forty years, the structure of international relations has been dominated by a bipolar pattern of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Over the next several decades, the international system is likely to be marked by a continuing evolution of the international system away from the bipolar pattern. Part of this evolution will occur because of the projected improvement in Soviet-American relations. But regardless of the state of United States-Soviet relations, other nations will continue to enhance their power relative to that of the United States and the Soviet Union, and these nations will increasingly have the capability to assert their own interests.

We do *not* believe that the emerging international system is likely to become "multipolar" in the nineteenth-century sense, where five European Powers were considered to be of the first geopolitical rank. The international system of the early twenty-first century might more appropriately be characterized as "multi-power" or "multi-dimensional", wherein the major States interact and compete on more equal terms over an increasing range of issues. There will, however, continue to be important disparities among nations in terms of technological, political, economic and military strength.[9]

Over this period, we think that the United States is likely to place relatively greater emphasis on threats to its national security other than those posed by Soviet military aggression. This shift in United States defence priorities would come about in large part because of the current and projected reduction in the Soviet threat. But in addition, the United States (as well as the other major Powers) is becoming increasingly aware of the need to maintain security through its general economic and technological competitiveness. Nations can also be expected to face serious environmental and health problems throughout the twenty-first century. Issues such as the global warming trend, the international debt, and AIDS may expand the political agendas of many States, perhaps supplanting to some extent the more military-oriented concerns that have marked the era following the Second World War.

What implications do all these changes in the international environment have for the future of tactical nuclear weapons? Arguably, nuclear weapons of all kinds were an integral part of the post-war bipolar order, where they were used to deter global conflict between two well-defined adversaries. Nuclear weapons may be expected to play a different role in a more complex, multi-Power international environment, however—depending in part on the extent to which other potentially hostile nations (besides the Soviet Union) develop nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems. In any case, because of this greater international complexity and uncertainty, American national security policy will likely place the general political concept of stability at the top of its list of objectives. The United States and allied interest in stability will tend to place even more serious constraints on where TNF can be deployed and on the deterrent policies associated with them.

The Evolution of United States Alliances

In our judgement, the formal United States alliance system is likely to change over the coming decades to account for alterations in relative power among the members, emerging allied interests outside the United States–Soviet competition, and changing threat perceptions. If deterrence of Soviet military aggression ceases to be the prime object of critical United States alliances—it will probably remain an important objective—then the requirements for TNF may decrease correspondingly.

The degree of any contraction of TNF roles will depend primarily on whether (and how much of) a military threat from a hostile Power is perceived by these alliances. In any event, as their relative power grows, United States allies may be inclined to emphasize those weapons systems that are under their direct control. In some cases, this may lead to further nuclear proliferation. At the other extreme, it is conceivable that some nations could make their adherence to a

United States alliance conditional on that alliance's being explicitly non-nuclear in character.

Although the changing character of the United States alliance system may reduce the need for TNF, we believe that some level of American nuclear weapons will still provide the United States with an essential measure of political and military support for its allies. Assuming the allies do not perceive an immediate and severe military threat, however, any American nuclear guarantee will tend to be regarded more as an insurance policy than as a primary means of security. Such an insurance policy will be enhanced by a nuclear force that is neither "present" nor "threatening" in peacetime, but which is perceived politically as providing linkage to United States strategic nuclear forces if circumstances warrant. This approach may cause the United States to emphasize tactical nuclear forces that are based in the United States or at sea, as opposed to forward-deployed TNF.

New Political-Military Contingencies

The bulk of United States TNF requirements, in terms of numbers and types of systems, has been driven largely by the American commitment to deter Soviet aggression against Western Europe. The European theatre may cease to be the principal focus of the United States military over time, however, if East-West relations continue to improve and as the nature of the United States alliance structure evolves. To be sure, Europe will undoubtedly remain of vital political interest to the United States for the indefinite future. According to United States Secretary of State James Baker:

> "America's security—politically, militarily, and economically—remains linked to Europe . . . . As President Bush stated in May [1989], the United States is and will remain a European power."[10]

In the context of this firm commitment, however, it is our view that the direct American military contribution to European security may be substantially reduced over time.

We also assume that the United States will remain committed to ensuring the security and independence of other regions that are deemed vital to its security (Middle East/south-west Asia, western Pacific/north-east Asia, Caribbean Sea/Central America). In addition to any potential challenge from the Soviet Union in these regions, the United States must take into account the fact that a number of rising nations, some friendly with and others hostile to the United States, can be expected to acquire substantial quantities of advanced weapons and the means to deliver them accurately over long ranges. These Powers can also be expected to acquire chemical, or even biological, weapon capabilities, and in some cases nuclear weapons. The United States will accordingly be interested in developing a policy and force posture that anticipates and seeks to deter the use of nuclear weapons (and other weapons of mass destruction) by non-Soviet Powers. Such a posture may or may not require nuclear weapons, however.

Arms Control

The conclusion of the INF Treaty, and the prospective completion of the CFE and START agreements, have raised questions about the future of the remaining nuclear forces of the NATO alliance. President Bush announced in May 1989 that the United States would engage in short-range nuclear force (SNF) negotiations with the USSR as soon as a CFE agreement was concluded. He indicated that reductions in NATO SNF should be undertaken only when Soviet advantages in conventional forces are removed or significantly reduced.

If conventional arms control, together with unilateral measures, can truly establish a non-nuclear balance where it is much easier to defend than to attack, then the military roles and missions for United States nuclear weapons in theatre warfare may be quite different, and possibly much less, than in present circumstances.

There may well be good reasons for retaining tactical nuclear weapons even if an improved military balance of conventional forces can be brought about. Among other considerations, it is difficult to define a stable conventional balance, and even more difficult to keep it so. Nevertheless, negotiated TNF reductions will seem more attractive if Western confidence in the resilience of the conventional force balance grows.

The long-term future of United States-Soviet TNF arms control may depend in large part on the actions of other States. For example, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States may be willing to eliminate or reduce specific types of TNF if other nations are free to deploy the same types of weapons or delivery vehicles without restriction. Or the super-Powers may be confronted by nations that are determined to close themselves off from the East-West nuclear competition through the establishment of nuclear-free zones, the banning of nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships from their ports, and the like.

Public Opinion

Over the past decade or so, segments of public opinion in key nations—West, East and non-aligned—have demonstrated increased scepticism about the morality and practicality of nuclear deterrence. This "delegitimization" of nuclear weapons might be defined as reduced public confidence in the reliability and safety of nuclear deterrence arrangements, and lessened certainty about the prudence, strategic necessity, and moral legitimacy of posing nuclear threats to adversaries.

This scepticism about nuclear deterrence is by no means universal. The United States and allied Governments maintain the position that nuclear deterrence represents an essential part of their security policies, and even many critics of present Western nuclear policy would not reject the concept of deterrence altogether. Nevertheless, as resistance to the concept of deterrence has become more widespread, the United States and its allies have found it increasingly difficult (although not impossible) to make and implement decisions about nuclear force modernization and arms control. The public controversy over the enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb), and over the INF deployments in the late 1970s and early 1980s are examples of this problem for Western Governments.[11]

Changes in Military Technology and Operations

Partly because of these political pressures, and partly because of the favourable trends in the international environment, American policy-makers are unlikely to be interested in deploying TNF systems with significantly more advanced military characteristics. There are several potential evolutionary developments that might otherwise be explored. For example, it is possible to develop very-low-yield nuclear weapons that, combined with very accurate means of delivery, could cause relatively less incidental damage than current weapons. Other concepts envisage the use of nuclear systems with enhanced amounts of specific weapons effects, such as electromagnetic pulse (EMP) or microwaves. These special output devices would be designed to disrupt or destroy enemy communications and sensor systems.

As opposed to these potential military improvements in TNF, the United States and its allies are much more likely to continue to emphasize programmes aimed at increasing the safety, security, command and control features of new and upgraded nuclear systems. Such measures could include the application of even more sophisticated PALs; the addition of optical logic systems to complement existing mechanical and electrical safety devices; and even the separation of fissile nuclear material from the rest of the weapon.[12]

Conceivably, some (though certainly not all) military roles that have previously been assigned to nuclear weapons will be allotted to future advanced conventional systems. Improvements in key non-nuclear technologies, especially sensors, computers, and communication networks, and in munition accuracy and lethality, will be essential to this process by making it easier to identify, attack and destroy enemy targets. In any case, TNF will continue to have a unique political and psychological value for deterrence as compared with conventional systems.[13]

Conclusions

Given the considerable uncertainties that exist concerning the future political, fiscal, military and technical environment, any projection about the long-term future of theatre nuclear weapons in American and alliance security policy must be made cautiously. Nevertheless, we offer several observations for consideration, not to predict future United States or allied TNF policy, but to provide an assessment of where current political and military trends may take us over the next decade or so.

The United States can be expected to maintain a TNF stockpile for the foreseeable future, but the number and types of deployed TNF will probably decline owing to political pressures and technological developments in conventional and nuclear weapons systems. These TNF reductions can be expected even in the absence of a formal arms control agreement, although the pace and nature of a TNF draw-down might be quite different if it is done unilaterally or in tacit conjunction with a Soviet TNF reduction.

Political criteria for TNF deployments will continue to overshadow military or technical requirements. There is a very real question to what extent political circumstances will permit modernization of the remaining United States TNF stockpile. This is a serious issue, given the considerable age of many existing systems, which must be replaced, upgraded or retired. The most likely candidates for this process of attrition are nuclear artillery shells, short-range ballistic missiles, and naval tactical weapons. Air-delivered systems, especially stand-off weapons, are the most likely to be deployed and retained. In some cases, advanced, long-range conventional weapons systems could be employed for missions that are now thought to require TNF—especially against fixed targets such as enemy command posts. The United States military tends to be sceptical about the capability of advanced conventional munitions to replace TNF for many tactical missions in a large-scale conflict.

With respect to future TNF characteristics, the United States will continue to give highest priority to safety and security. The survivability of TNF systems will also be rated highly. Technologies that might significantly enhance military effectiveness will receive less priority. Potential new TNF capabilities (for example, low-yield, special output) are not likely to be seriously considered in the present climate. Such capabilities might become more attractive to American leaders, however, if the United States pursued a more unilateral national security policy, one that is less affected by alliance political constraints, or if the international environment became considerably more hostile.

The United States choice as to which TNF systems to retain may be significantly affected by increasing restrictions on the deployment of nuclear forces aboard ships or on allied territory. American choices may be further restricted by the growth of nuclear-weapon-free zones that cover land, territorial waters and airspace, and by the attitudes of allies and other nations. This suggests that the United States may prefer to design long-range strategic nuclear (and conventional) forces that can be used for "tactical" purposes. The remaining American TNF might be based in the United States (especially for air-delivered systems) or on naval platforms that do not require overseas servicing.

Given the potential nuclear (and other types of) proliferation, the United States may at some point be required to reconsider the deterrent requirements for its TNF in third world contingencies. The United States will obviously wish above all to deter such attacks. Nevertheless, the United States must think through how its force structure and operations should be configured for conflict in a regional theatre where one or more nations possess nuclear weapons, as well as how it should respond if nuclear deterrence fails. At the same time such contingency planning need not involve nuclear weapons.

To sum up: the traditional American and allied conception of the deterrent role of tactical nuclear forces—linkage, reassurance, military effectiveness—will probably change substantially over the next decade. The ultimate outcome of this process of change will depend principally on the degree to which the Soviet challenge to Western security is moderated, and on the ability of Western Governments to articulate to their publics the need for nuclear deterrence in a vastly changed international environment.

Notes

1 Frank C. Carlucci, *FY 1990 Report of the Secretary of Defense to Congress* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 34.

2 The most comprehensive public articulation of United States TNF policy is given in: James Schlesinger, *The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe: A Report to the United States Congress* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Defense, April 1975). Much of the discussion of the United States perspective on TNF in the text that follows is taken from this report.

3 For a broad discussion of this concept, see Michael Howard, "Reassurance and deterrence", *Foreign Affairs 61* (Winter 1982/83), pp. 309-324.

4 An informative source for the details about how nuclear weapons fit into NATO strategy is Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "NATO nuclear operations", *in* Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner and Charles A. Zraket, eds., *Managing Nuclear Operations* (Washington, D.C., Brookings, 1987), pp. 445-469.

5 See, for example, Leon V. Sigal, "The case for eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons", *Arms Control Today* (September 1989), p. 16.

6 Siegfried S. Hecker, "Statement to the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, FY 1989 Authorization Hearing", 3 March 1988, p. 9.

7 John R. Galvin, "Modernization of theater nuclear forces", *NATO's Sixteen Nations* (Special Edition, 1989), p. 27.

8 Current and future Soviet foreign policy is discussed in essays by Seweryn Bialer, Lawrence Freedman and Daniel Goure *in* Patrick J. Garrity, ed., *The Future of Nuclear Weapons* (New York, Plenum, forthcoming 1990).

9 See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Understating U.S. strength", *Foreign Policy No. 72* (Fall 1988), pp. 108-109, and John Lewis Gaddis, "How the cold war might end", *Atlantic Monthly* (November 1987), pp. 88-100.

10 Speech by Secretary of State James A. Baker III at the Berlin Press Club, 12 December 1989, cited in *The New York Times* (13 December 1989), p. A10.

11 David S. Yost, "The delegitimization of nuclear deterrence?", draft manuscript, October 1989.

12 Orval E. Jones, "Nuclear weapons engineering". Paper presented at the Los Alamos Conference on the Future of Nuclear Weapons, 7 June 1989, pp. 3-4.

13 Our understanding of the future of military technology was greatly enhanced by conversations with Paul White, Steven Crow and William Basujz.

Security Concerns in the South-East Asian and Pacific Regions

The Cambodian Conflict: Prospects for a Negotiated Settlement

Muthiah Alagappa

Introduction

The Cambodian conflict has been the focal point of international politics in South-East Asia since December 1978. The escalating conflict between the radical-nationalist Khmer Rouge and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam during the period 1975-1978 became enmeshed in the concurrently escalating Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Soviet conflicts culminating in the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 and the punitive Chinese attack on Viet Nam in February/March 1979. China continued to maintain political and military pressure on Viet Nam, with the latter receiving massive political, economic and military support from the Soviet Union. Soviet acquisition of military facilities in Viet Nam and American concern for the security of Thailand added a Soviet-American dimension to the conflict.

Vietnamese domination of Indochina, viewed by Thailand as an unprecedented violation of its strategic environ-

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ment, resulted in reinvigoration of Thai-American security relations and, what is more significant, in Sino-Thai military alignment. American military presence in the region acquired greater acceptance by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a counterbalance to the growing Soviet military power. Out of concern for the security of a member State but also because Vietnamese action violated a cardinal principle of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, ASEAN became politically engaged in the conflict. The organization of a loose three-party resistance Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) against the Hanoi-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) also spawned an intra-Khmer dimension. The conflicting goals and vested interests and linkages of these numerous actors at the global, regional and local levels resulted in a complex conflict structure and a stalemated situation.

Several developments—principally improvement in Sino-Soviet relations but also the willingness of Norodom Sihanouk and Hun Sen to enter into dialogue[1] and the policy of Thai Premier Chatichai Choonhavan[2]—made for flexibility in hitherto entrenched positions and began a peace process which culminated in the Paris Conference in August 1989. Despite the lack of pre-Conference progress in resolving the so-called "internal dimension" of the conflict, it was widely anticipated that the concerns and interests of the principal external actors would prevail in Paris and make for a settlement. In retrospect it is clear that this expectation was not well founded. Following the failure in Paris, attention has shifted to the military conflict among the Khmer factions, which has intensified in the wake of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia late in September 1989.

Concurrently Thailand, the United States and Australia have taken initiatives or advanced proposals concerning resumption of the peace process with a view to achieving a negotiated settlement as soon as possible. This article examines the continuing obstacles and the prospects for a negotiated settlement through a discussion of the following matters: the impact of recent developments, principally Sino-Soviet normalization, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the change in Thai policy, on the structure of the conflict; the possible outcomes of the military contest and their consequences; and the likelihood of success of the continuing and new diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict.

Major Developments and their Impact on the Structure of the Conflict

Sino-Soviet Normalization

Sino-Soviet *rapprochement* appears to have had more limited impact on the resolution of the Cambodian conflict than anticipated. While both China and the Soviet Union became more flexible, the concessions made were the minimum necessary to facilitate normalization of bilateral relations without jeopardizing long-term interests and their commitments to allies in the region. Normalization, while ending the Sino-Soviet conflict, does not terminate the geopolitical rivalry between these two countries, which seek to consolidate and enhance their major-Power status and role in the Asia-Pacific region. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, alliance with Viet Nam would continue to make strategic sense, albeit the urgency may be reduced.[3] This relationship also continues to make the USSR a relevant player in South-East Asia and cannot be matched or replaced by the expected improvement in Soviet relations with the ASEAN countries, which for political and economic reasons would continue to be limited. Thus it is not in the Soviet interest to "ditch" Viet Nam. Such action would also undermine the credibility of the Soviet Union as an ally. The Soviet strategy has therefore been concurrently to improve relations with China and at the same time restructure and consolidate relations with Viet Nam. In line with this strategy, the Soviet Union was instrumental in bringing about an early Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, but it has been unable or unwilling to pressure Hanoi to make concessions on the internal dimension of the conflict.

For China, the Cambodian conflict signifies much more than just an obstacle in its relations with the Soviet Union. The Chinese view of the conflict is grounded in considerations of security, international status and prestige, and its future role in South-East Asia. Indochina has been the locale where both the United States and the USSR have attempted to contain China in the post-war period. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the attempt by Viet Nam to establish special relations with Laos and Cambodia as well as Soviet inroads into South-East Asia were viewed as inimical to Chinese security. The Vietnamese invasion was also perceived as a blow to Chinese prestige and credibility for which Hanoi had to be "punished". Thus while Vietnamese withdrawal in conjunction with Sino-Soviet normalization eases China's security concern on the southern flank, it appears inadequate to satisfy concerns of prestige and credibility. Moreover, the form and content of a settlement in Cambodia will, in the Chinese view, affect South-East Asian perceptions of China, and thus affect China's future role and influence in the region. Consequently, acceptance of the *fait accompli* in Cambodia does not appear to be in the Chinese interest. While the certainty of Vietnamese withdrawal appears to have been adequate to meet the Chinese condition *vis-à-vis* the Soviets in the light of broader strategic considerations, it is clearly perceived as inadequate for normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations or for resolution of the Cambodian problem.

In the light of the foregoing, the USSR and China appear unlikely to exert pressure on their client State/faction to make concessions in order to arrive at a negotiated political settlement. Normalization of bilateral relations further reduces the urgency. To gain further acceptance among the ASEAN countries and in keeping with "new thinking", Moscow would continue to be positively disposed towards attempts to resolve the conflict. It will, however, look for reciprocal compromises rather than urge what it perceives as unilateral concessions on the part of its allies. Similarly, while Beijing has demonstrated some flexibility in relation to Khmer Rouge participation in an interim government, it is unlikely to terminate its support for that faction.[4] Termination of support at this juncture would also be unpalatable to Beijing at a time when its international prestige is at a low level following the events of the spring of 1989. It is likely to be viewed as a sign of weakness and of succumbing to international pressure.

Sino-Soviet normalization, however, decouples the conflict from the broader strategic calculations of the major Powers, and highlights the local and regional dimensions, which have been overshadowed by the conflict between the two major Powers. Specifically, it draws attention to the Sino-Vietnamese dimension, which continues to be a key structural element of the Cambodian conflict. While Soviet support for Viet Nam is not in question, Sino-Soviet *rapprochement* has made it much more circumscribed and conditional, setting quite clear limits on Vietnamese ambitions and behaviour. With conflict escalation no longer an option, Viet Nam has to come to terms with China. Similarly, it becomes incumbent upon China to reassess its relations with Viet Nam quite independently of, although not in isolation from, its relations with the Soviet Union.

The long-term interests of China and Viet Nam would argue for normalization of bilateral relations.[5] For China, a friendly Viet Nam minimizes the opportunities for hostile coalitions on its southern flank. Viet Nam by itself should not be a security threat to China. Despite this interest, Chinese policy thus far has driven Viet Nam into the embrace of the Soviet Union. Beijing now has an opportunity to develop a suitable and mutually beneficial basis for long-term relations with Viet Nam. It is even more in the interest of Viet Nam to mend its relations with China. While it may not be completely free of the Chinese threat and hence an alliance relationship with the USSR may continue to be necessary, Viet Nam cannot prosper under a state of siege. Moreover, recognition of the vulnerability ensuing from undue dependence on the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries at a time of rapid changes in East-West and Sino-Soviet relations should induce Viet Nam to improve relations with China. In fact, it appears to have recognized this and has made overtures to China. These include deleting an "enmity" reference to China in the Viet Nam Constitution, withdrawing troops from Laos and Cambodia, reducing the force level along the Sino-Vietnamese border, and praising the Chinese model of development. Hanoi was one of the very few to support the Chinese crack-down on pro-democracy students in June. China responded to the early overtures of Viet Nam by agreeing to bilateral talks, which began in January 1989 between Viet Nam's Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing. Despite Viet Nam's interest, the bilateral talks have not resulted in a major breakthrough. There are many obstacles standing in the way of normalization.

The principal one is the Cambodian problem, manifested in the form of the role of the Khmer Rouge in an interim government, euphemistically referred to as power-sharing. It is also the key issue on which the Paris Conference foundered. Viet Nam perceives any arrangement that may allow for the return of the Khmer Rouge as being incompatible with its security, while China views any arrangement that excludes the Khmer Rouge as unacceptable. Deep suspicion and distrust of each other and the belief that the other party is seeking full victory for its protégé make for a zero-sum situation. For the present, both countries appear not to be in the mood to compromise.

With Sino-Soviet normalization out of the way, the benefits of a non-hostile government in Bangkok and political conservatism gaining ground in Viet Nam,[6] Hanoi may be disinclined to make concessions, at least not in the short term. It is pertinent to note here that the decision to withdraw from Cambodia was intensely contested by the conservatives.[7] The moderates' argument that withdrawal was necessary to end Viet Nam's international isolation and to gain access to Western aid and assistance so vital to the restructuring of Viet Nam's ailing economy, and the army's frustration and desire to extricate itself from the Cambodian quagmire won out. However, continued international isolation of Viet Nam may strengthen the conservatives. The dire state of its economy and the desire to benefit from economic relations with the free market economies may yet force Viet Nam to soften its position. This expectation, however, must be counterbalanced by what Hanoi is being asked to concede: acceptance of almost total defeat in the contest of wills and abandonment of the strategic purpose that has governed its international conduct over the last decade and a half. Further concessions may be regarded by Hanoi as providing an opening for the restoration of a hostile Khmer Government and the renewal of the Khmer-Vietnamese conflict, which precipitated the present Cambodian conflict in the first place. Hanoi may also view its withdrawal from Cambodia as a significant enough gesture to bring about termination of external military aid to the Khmer Rouge and also to appease the international community and gradually to bring about an end to its international isolation. It would attempt to extract maximum benefit from its withdrawal before beginning to contemplate further concessions.

Similarly, Beijing is in no hurry to terminate its support for the Khmer Rouge. So long as the Khmer Rouge is part of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, Beijing does not have to suffer the political cost of supporting this faction on its own. To present a more favourable international image but also to exert influence through an internationally acceptable figure, Beijing will continue to support Norodom Sihanouk. Comprehensive settlement, that is settlement of the internal dimension of the conflict in Cambodia, has become the pre-condition for normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Notwithstanding this pre-condition, the incentive for, and the legitimacy of, direct Chinese military pressure or action against Viet Nam would be considerably reduced (except perhaps in the Spratlys) and also be subject to international condemnation. Chinese military pressure and influence will have to be applied principally through the Khmer Rouge. Thus China is unlikely to terminate its support for that faction except in the context of an overall settlement.

The crux of the problem in Sino-Vietnamese relations is how to subordinate and overcome short-term conflicting demands in the interest of long-term considerations that are beneficial to both countries. This relationship is likely to work itself out only gradually.

Thus Sino-Soviet normalization, while making for an important change in the structure of the conflict, thus decoupling it from the calculus of major-Power relations and preventing an escalation of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, has not ameliorated the Sino-Vietnamese dimension of the Cambodian conflict. Sino-Soviet normalization does not appear to have had an effect for the better on the intra-Khmer dimension. In fact, it may have intensified this dimension. As it has in Afghanistan, the USSR has armed, and can be expected to continue to arm, its local client,[8] with China continuing to arm the Khmer Rouge and the non-Communist factions. There is the possibility that one or two ASEAN countries, Singapore and possibly Malaysia, may step up their supply of arms to the non-Communist factions or that Washington will begin to supply military aid in addition to the non-lethal aid it is already providing.[9]

Vietnamese Withdrawal from Cambodia

The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, in effect, removes the Vietnamese threat to Thai national security, minimizing the Thai-Vietnamese dimension of the conflict. In fact, it rewards and reinforces the Chatichai vision of "turning the Indochina battlefield into a market place", making for greater confidence and flexibility on the part of an economically and politically dynamic Thailand. Vietnamese withdrawal has also transformed the nature of the military contest in Cambodia. The ongoing fighting is not between Vietnamese troops and Khmer resistance forces but among Khmer factions supplied by external forces. This is much more reflective of a civil war for power and a war by proxy than of a war of national liberation against occupation forces.

This accounts for the refusal of the CGDK, China, ASEAN and their supporters to verify or accept that the withdrawal had taken place. Although Viet Nam claims to have withdrawn all of its remaining 26,000 troops, the CGDK and China claim that substantial military (30,000) and civilian elements remain in Cambodia. In the absence of recognized international verification, it would be difficult to judge these claims and counter-claims. It is possible and quite likely that Viet Nam would have left behind some military and civilian elements. There are, however, strong *a priori* grounds to believe that the bulk of the Vietnamese troops have left Cambodia. First, China would not have agreed to normalize relations without a Soviet guarantee to this effect, unless of course it completely sold out on its chief obstacle to normalization. Secondly, if in fact Vietnamese troops remain in substantial numbers, they cannot be hidden for long. Their exposure will completely undermine Vietnamese and Soviet credibility, wiping out the little international support and sympathy they have gained. Thus far there has been no hard evidence of substantial Vietnamese troop presence in Cambodia, except for reports from the CGDK factions. The British Foreign Secretary's written reply to a parliamentary question supports the view that Viet Nam has withdrawn its combat units from Cambodia.[10]

Vietnamese withdrawal and the shift in focus from the diplomatic arena to the battlefield also highlight the intra-Khmer dimension and the enormous problems of national reconciliation. In particular it draws attention to the key role of the Khmer Rouge, making it more difficult for it to hide under the cloak of the CGDK. The goal of preventing the return of the Khmer Rouge to power has assumed greater importance in Western countries and is being elevated to the same level as denying legitimacy to the PRK Government.

Change in Thai Policy

Soon after assuming office, Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan articulated a new approach to resolution of the Cambodian conflict, an approach which departed quite significantly from the formal Thai and ASEAN positions. Chatichai's approach is grounded in his vision of "turning the Indochina battlefield into a market place", which in turn rests on the belief that for Thailand to maximize its current political and economic dynamism, it requires a peaceful environment and co-operative relations with all its neighbours. His policy accepts a certain measure of Vietnamese political influence in Cambodia in the short term, but the hope is that over the long term the opening up of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet Nam to market forces will reduce Hanoi's influence in Vientiane and Phnom Penh, increase that of Bangkok, and also pave the way for more amicable relations among all

States in the region. The policy also relies to some extent on traditional Khmer-Vietnamese antagonism and Theravada Buddhist cultural affinities that Thailand shares with Laos and Cambodia. On the basis of this ''philosophy'', Thailand has since August 1988 begun to improve relations with all three countries of Indochina, notwithstanding the continuing conflict in Cambodia.

Thai policy towards Laos shifted early in 1988. The immediate concern was to terminate the Ban Rom Klao border conflict but other considerations, including general border security, trade, cultural affinities and Bangkok's hope of weaning Vientiane away from Hanoi, were also important. Under Chatichai this shift assumed greater significance inasmuch as it was viewed as a forerunner to improving relations with the other two countries of Indochina. Chatichai visited Vientiane in November 1988 and concluded an agreement to set up a joint border committee to delineate the common boundary in 40-odd disputed locations, using the 1907 Franco-Siamese Treaty and accompanying documents as the framework. Economic and cultural co-operation is also proceeding apace. Bilateral trade and Thai investment in Laos have increased, but only slowly because of the many structural problems in the Lao economy.

Thai relations with Viet Nam have also been on the upswing. Under pressure from the foreign policy exploits of Chatichai and General Chavalit Yongchaiyuth, Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila visited Hanoi in January 1989—the first senior-level visit in 13 years. Since then numerous senior officials, including Deputy Prime Minister Bichai Rattakul, and a House Foreign Affairs Committee delegation have visited Hanoi. A number of bilateral accords including a fishing agreement are under discussion. Friendship associations have been established in both countries to promote bilateral co-operation. There has been considerable interest in upgrading bilateral economic relations. Several high-level seminars have been held and many Thai business delegations have visited Viet Nam. During Bichai's visit it was agreed to set up a joint commission for co-operation to strengthen bilateral trade and economic co-operation. Thai investment is on the rise and bilateral trade has surged from baht 20 million in 1988 to baht 200 million in the first quarter of 1989.[11] A number of joint ventures are now operational.

However, progress has fallen short of initial expectations, the main limitations being shortage of foreign exchange and the underdeveloped physical, economic and financial infrastructure in Viet Nam. Thai investment has also been held up because of the lack of investment guarantee arrangements and profit repatriation and bureaucratic problems. Hanoi, while eager to secure capital and technology, is also cautious to avoid exploitation by Thai businessmen. Notwithstanding these limitations, Bangkok's relations with Hanoi have come a long way since August 1988.

Bangkok's relations with Phnom Penh are also on the mend. Chatichai's three meetings with Hun Sen have helped the diplomatically isolated PRK Government, and border trade between the two countries is flourishing despite the ongoing military conflict.

There has been considerable acrimony between Thai Foreign Ministry officials and Chatichai's advisers over Thailand's Cambodia policy. This, in turn, is linked to the rivalry in Thai domestic politics among Foreign Minister and leader of the Socialist Action Party (SAP), Air Vice Marshal Siddhi Savetsila; Prime Minister and leader of the Chart Thai Party, General Chatichai Choonhavan; and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army (RTA), General Chavalit Yongchaiyuth. However, recent developments in Thai politics suggest that Chatichai's Indochina policy is on the ascendant. The National Security Council and the Royal Thai Army have been ordered to follow his line. The Foreign Minister has stated that henceforth his ministry will adopt a low profile, allowing the Prime Minister a free hand in Thailand's Cambodia policy.[12] Thus, barring changes in Thai domestic politics, the Chatichai approach is likely to become effective Thai policy.

This change in Thai policy has several implications. First, as pointed out earlier, in conjunction with Vietnamese withdrawal it minimizes, if not eliminates, the Thai-Vietnamese dimension of the Cambodian conflict. Secondly, it quite significantly undercuts the premise of the policy positions of ASEAN and the United States, shifting the burden almost exclusively to the illegality of the Government in Phnom Penh. Concern for the security of Thailand was a key issue in galvanizing United States and ASEAN support and in formulating the common policy. Thus it would be ironic for Thailand, the front-line State and the one whose security was supposedly in jeopardy, to adopt a conciliatory policy while its ally and fellow association members adopt a confrontational policy towards the countries of Indochina.

The continuation of Chatichai's policy creates a dilemma for ASEAN. It may become infectious for some other ASEAN countries. In fact, Indonesia has been pursuing a dual-track policy of its own for a number of years but in the interest of ASEAN solidarity it has been subdued. Malaysia is exploring opportunities for expanding trade with Viet Nam. Thus a situation could emerge in which the ASEAN collective would decide to continue its current policy but with some member Governments or even elements within them seeking to improve bilateral relations with Hanoi, Vientiane and Phnom Penh. Such a situation, however, cannot be sustained for long without undermining the credibility of the Association. ASEAN may have to forge a new consensus and policy more in accord with the prevailing interests of its member States or reshape the latter to conform to the current policy.

Change in Thai policy also poses problems for the United States, which allegedly following ASEAN's lead, supports Norodom Sihanouk as the central figure in a process of national reconciliation. Although the United States does not have direct leverage over any Khmer faction, it is not without influence if it chooses to act. International political and economic isolation of Viet Nam would be very difficult to sustain without the United States lead. Recently, for example, in concert with Japan, the United States successfully exerted pressure on the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to withhold lending to Viet Nam even though the latter had satisfactorily carried out the economic reforms recommended by the World Bank.[13] Relaxing its opposition to international aid and lending to both Viet Nam and Cambodia, lifting its own trade embargo against these two countries, and "delegitimizing" the Khmer Rouge are levers the United States can use to affect the situation. It has, however, chosen not to do so, citing Norodom Sihanouk's preference for co-operation with the Khmer Rouge, and ASEAN and Chinese interests as justification for not lifting its trade embargo.[14] Current strains in Sino-American relations and Washington's concern to prevent further deterioration may also counsel against a change in policy at this juncture. The United States continues to insist on a comprehensive settlement in Cambodia.

However, change in Thai policy, Vietnamese withdrawal, and increasing apprehension that the Khmer Rouge may regain power are beginning to undermine the intellectual premise of the present United States position, resulting in growing pressure for change in its policy. A bipartisan group of 203 House and Senate members wrote to Secretary of State James Baker opposing United States support for the Khmer Rouge to share power as part of a Cambodian peace settlement.[15] The United States Congress, which had sanctioned military aid to the non-Communist factions just before the Paris Conference, apparently to strengthen Sihanouk's hand at the Conference, has since become more reluctant because of the concern that these arms may end up with the Khmer Rouge. It has now attached a restriction to the United States military appropriations bill to prevent the Bush Administration from using the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) contingency fund to supply military aid to the non-Communist factions without its authorization.[16] These concerns and pressure also underscore, in part, peace proposals initiated by the United States, which are discussed later.

Considerations similar to those in the United States are also precipitating a re-evaluation of the Cambodia policies of several Western countries.[17] The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for example, recently restated its position that the British stand in the United Nations Credentials Committee did not mean that it was ready to deal with the CGDK as a government, much less with the Khmer Rouge. The United Kingdom has offered $US 394,000 worth of aid to UNICEF for disbursement in Cambodia and a British diplomat based in Bangkok would, for the first time since 1978, visit Phnom Penh in connection with this aid.[18] Sweden and Finland for the first time abstained in the United Nations vote on Cambodia. They are reported to be considering opening embassies in Hanoi. Australia, while supporting the ASEAN position, may also be close to developing some form of relations with Cambodia.[19] Under growing domestic pressure Canberra is exploring other possibilities that would exclude the Khmer Rouge from an interim coalition government.[20] Australia has a relatively large contingent of aid workers in Cambodia and recently announced that it would open a trade office in Viet Nam. Canada is also reportedly evaluating its Cambodia policy. A delegation of three Canadian diplomats headed by Allan Sullivan, the Canadian Ambassador to Rome and Co-Chairman of one of the sub-committees at the Paris Conference, visited Cambodia late in October. These actions and offers of humanitarian assistance are, however, still rather tentative and minuscule. Whether the preliminary efforts cited above will gather momentum resulting in a substantial change in international orientation remains unclear. For substantial change to occur and for release of the massive assistance required in the reconstruction of the war-ravaged economy of Cambodia,[21] there has to be a change in the position of the United States and Japan.

Two conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing discussion of the major developments and their impact on the structure of the conflict. First, while these developments have ameliorated the Sino-Soviet and Vietnamese-Thai dimensions, they have not had a similar impact on the remaining three dimensions—Sino-Vietnamese, Vietnamese-Khmer and intra-Khmer. The role of the Khmer Rouge is the key interconnecting issue between all three dimensions. In many ways improvement in Sino-Vietnamese relations holds the key to the resumption of the peace process although it is not adequate to fully resolve the problem. The prospects for a breakthrough in Sino-Vietnamese relations through direct bilateral negotiations do not appear bright in the short term, although not impossible. Consequently, developments in the battlefield which may have the potential to alter the standing of their respective client factions is assuming greater significance and attention. The second conclusion is that changes in Thai policy in conjunction with Vietnamese withdrawal have undermined the foundations of the policy of the international coalition led by ASEAN and the United States, precipitating a re-evaluation of policy in a number of Western countries and also posing a dilemma for the ASEAN collective.

The Military Conflict: Possible Outcomes and Consequences

All the Khmer factions, with the support of their foreign backers, have been preparing for, and have intensified, their efforts in the battlefield to consolidate and enhance their bargaining position. The political, military and administrative prowess of the PRK, of which so little is known, is critical in estimating possible outcomes of the military contest. Assessments of PRK capabilities vary from quite positive to very negative.[22] For certain, the PRK would not be able to wipe out the resistance forces. There is no reason to expect Phnom Penh to succeed where the Vietnamese with all their military might and experience have failed, although the Vietnamese withdrawal removes a political liability for the PRK. The PRK has lost some ground to the CGDK forces. The Khmer Rouge captured the gem-mining town of Pailin on 22 October 1989 and is reported to be preparing to attack the major city of Battambang. The Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) is reported to have captured some villages and outposts in the Banteay Meanchey province but the Sihanouk faction has not yet engaged in combat. Whether the CGDK forces will be able to make substantial progress in capturing and holding important towns and large tracts of territory for a prolonged period and to establish some kind of political and administrative framework remains uncertain. This will also be a function of the political and military unity and capability of the three Khmer factions. The political unity of the CGDK is tenuous at best. Inter- and intra-factional strife is common. The ability of the coalition to conduct a well co-ordinated military campaign against the PRK has yet to be proven.

The Khmer Rouge, best organized and equipped of the three factions, will continue to be the dominant military force in the CGDK but whether it is sufficiently strong to inflict telling damage on the PRK remains unclear. The non-Communist resistance forces, even with substantially increased military supplies, are unlikely to become a significant military force in the foreseeable future. Thus the PRK and the Khmer Rouge are the protagonists in the military contest.

It is estimated that the Khmer Rouge has stockpiled supplies to enable it to continue fighting for at least a year even if external assistance is terminated and the PRK has been well supplied by the Soviet Union and Viet Nam.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, three possible outcomes may be envisaged.

Scenario 1: The PRK would collapse before the end of the first dry season in May 1990.

Scenario 2: The PRK would survive continued harassment from the Khmer Rouge but with massive assistance from Viet Nam and the USSR, that is, there would be protracted conflict, not unlike the situation in Afghanistan. External assistance and the intensity of the fighting in Cambodia are, however, likely to be on a much smaller scale when compared to Afghanistan.

Scenario 3: The PRK would gain the upper hand in containing the resistance forces, enhancing its domestic and international credibility.

Scenarios 1 and 3 would provide little incentive for a negotiated settlement. The CGDK will form a new government under scenario 1, and in scenario 3, the PRK will see no need to accommodate even Norodom Sihanouk, except as a political gesture without the substance of power. Scenario 2 could possibly facilitate a negotiated political settlement but only after a considerable period of time has elapsed and even then only under very specific circumstances, namely that the cost would become unbearable (for Viet Nam or the USSR) or the PRK's military standing would weaken considerably, or certain external actors (ASEAN, the United States) would see it as no longer in their interest to support the Khmer Rouge or the continuation of the conflict. More likely in this scenario is the possibility of prolonged conflict with no decisive shift in favour of any faction.

As scenarios 1 and 2 are much more probable in the short term than scenario 3, their possible consequences for

Cambodia and the region merit attention. Should scenario 1 come to pass, Sihanouk may assume command in Phnom Penh but effective and quite legitimate power would lie with the Khmer Rouge, with little to prevent it from seizing political control at some future date. Under these conditions the potential for Khmer-Vietnamese and even Khmer-Thai hostilities would be quite substantial. Viet Nam can be expected to support PRK resistance against the Government in Phnom Penh. Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge would become even more beholden to Beijing, not only to counter perceived external threats, but also to enhance their domestic position in the manoeuvring for power which must be anticipated. Through this, Beijing may increase its leverage in the mainland South-East Asian security complex.

Should scenario 2—protracted conflict—transpire, the region must brace itself for another long period of strife in Cambodia with every possibility for greater engagement by its immediate neighbours (Viet Nam, Thailand) and also external Powers (China, less so the USSR). Both these scenarios will certainly increase the cost for ASEAN, especially Thailand. A pro-China Cambodia, which is likely to be the consequence of scenario 1, would increase the Chinese influence and role in South-East Asia and may not be in the interest of ASEAN. Similarly, intensified fighting, as envisioned in scenario 2, is also not in the interest of the ASEAN countries. It could spill over into Thailand; the flow of arms and supplies through Thai territory would increase; refugee outflow may increase; and it would be a personal set-back for Thai Premier Chatichai Choonhavan. Thailand would also have to address the difficult problem relating to the scope and level of support it should allow for the CGDK forces, especially the Khmer Rouge. Premier Chatichai would be confronted with the dilemma of having to reconcile the conflicting imperatives of maintaining good relations with China and the desire and need to stop the fighting in Cambodia.

As of mid-December 1989 the PRK has lost some ground, principally to the Khmer Rouge but also to the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). These losses do not as yet appear to have had a significant impact on the stand of the PRK in relation to the role of the Khmer Rouge in an interim government. However, if there are further losses and the PRK begins to lose confidence, then its position may become more flexible. Khmer Rouge advances in the battlefield are also likely to increase apprehension in Western countries and introduce greater urgency into the peace process. A stalemate in the battlefield on the other hand is unlikely to create the necessary conditions for negotiations.

Continuing and New Diplomatic Efforts

The ASEAN-authored yearly resolution on Cambodia in the United Nations was adopted on 16 November 1989 with the support of 124 countries, 2 more than in the previous year.[23] For this diplomatic approach to yield results a decisive shift has to occur on the battlefield against the PRK, otherwise protracted conflict and continued stalemate would be the outcome.

Meanwhile the Thai Prime Minister, the United States and Australia have separately initiated proposals in an attempt to reintroduce momentum into the peace process.

The initiative of Thai Premier Chatichai Choonhavan is in many ways a continuation of his earlier efforts, temporarily brought to a halt by the Paris Conference. Soon after the failure in Paris, Chatichai and his advisers engaged in consultations with all four Khmer factions, Viet Nam, China the United States, France and other countries. Chatichai held extensive discussions with Chinese leaders in Beijing to seek their endorsement of a proposed meeting and to ensure Khmer Rouge participation. Recognizing the intractable nature of the problem of power-sharing in an interim government, Chatichai's initiative seeks to decouple it from the issues of verifying Vietnamese withdrawal, cease-fire, and cessation of external assistance. The emphasis is on a step-by-step approach, leading eventually to a comprehensive settlement. The immediate goals are to break the current impasse, to stop the fighting, and to foster economic relations. The issue of power-sharing, if it cannot be resolved through negotiations, should be resolved through elections, which would be supervised by the international control mechanism (ICM). That body also has the responsibility of verifying the withdrawal, supervising the cease-fire and conducting a population census.

This proposal has several merits: it does not attempt to find a diplomatic compromise on the intractable issue of the Khmer Rouge; it seeks neither to apportion blame nor to punish any country or faction; it accepts the situation on the ground as reality while at the same time not conferring *de jure* status on it; it can stop the fighting and the suffering of the Khmer people; it accepts elections as the means for deciding who shall exercise political power in Cambodia; and provides for a strong international role. It can, however, be criticized for some of these very same reasons: that by concentrating on the intra-Khmer dimension and accepting the *de facto* situation, it defines the conflict as an internal one and excludes the crucial Sino-Vietnamese dimension; by internalizing the conflict, Viet Nam is let off the hook; that by accepting the PRK, the Vietnamese action is condoned; and that it can result in a partial settlement.

Thus far, Chatichai's proposal for a limited meeting of the four Khmer factions, the ASEAN countries, Viet Nam, France and Laos, has received international support, in some cases grudgingly and with scepticism. All parties have agreed to attend the meeting. Jakarta has agreed to host the meeting if all parties come with a will to resolve the conflict. In other words, concessions and compromises must be worked out before the meeting.[24] The auspices for the talks is likely to be that of the Paris Conference rather than the earlier Jakarta meetings. The dates and agenda have yet to be decided.

While expressing support for the proposed meeting, the key actors have advanced different interpretations of it and different expectations. Viet Nam hopes that the meeting will focus on verifying its withdrawal, cessation of external assistance, and the establishment and supervision of a cease-fire. While declaring itself not opposed to discussion of the issue of power-sharing, Hanoi states that the demand of the CGDK factions for a four-party coalition government is unreasonable and that this is an internal affair that should be decided by the Kampucheans.[25] Similarly, China, while agreeing with Chatichai that international verification of the Vietnamese withdrawal is important, states that a quadripartite coalition government is the only solution and that a situation like that in Afghanistan should be prevented in Cambodia.[26] The United States has rejected the step-by-step approach.[27] The Soviet Union appears to have adopted a relatively low-key posture in responding to the various proposals. In discussions with the United States, while endorsing the need for a comprehensive settlement, it has called for the vacation of the United Nations seat in order to clear the air and for safeguards to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge. Singapore is not supportive of phased settlement.[28] Sihanouk, who is to be represented by his son Norodom Ranaridh at the proposed Jakarta meeting, states that the conflict is not among Cambodians but continues to be between Cambodia and Viet Nam. Consequently he would only agree to a cease-fire in the context of an overall settlement.[29] The Khmer Rouge, not favourably disposed towards the proposed meeting, states that it can only agree to a cease-fire if Viet Nam and the PRK agree to verification under United Nations auspices and formation of a quadripartite interim government.[30] The PRK, on the other hand, is against such an interim government and wants to exclude the Khmer Rouge from any power-sharing.[31] The positions of the key actors have not shifted and there is no consensus as yet in favour of the Chatichai approach. Only the Khmer People's National Liberation Front has recently stated that it is not opposed to a phased settlement if it will eventually lead to a comprehensive settlement.[32]

In the light of the inflexible positions of the various key parties, the probability of forging a consensus for the Chatichai approach appears rather slim. In the absence of such a consensus the proposed Jakarta meeting is unlikely to yield any substantive progress in the resolution of the conflict.

The United States proposals are motivated in part by growing apprehension that the Khmer Rouge may regain power in Cambodia. There are, in fact, two United States proposals, one advanced by Secretary of State James Baker, dubbed the "Baker formula", and the second advanced by Congressman Stephen Solarz.

The Baker formula, advanced within the context of a comprehensive settlement, seeks a compromise on the issue of the Khmer Rouge by suggesting "marginal participation" by this faction.[33] Also, because of the deep mistrust and animosity that divide the four factions, the proposal is that a settlement should be worked out in the context of the United Nations framework and that the four factions should be "persuaded" to accept it. This proposal has been discussed with China, the USSR and the ASEAN countries but there does not appear to be any urgency in underscoring it because of the perception that conditions are not yet propitious.

The Solarz initiative seeks to side-step altogether the issue of Khmer Rouge participation in an interim government.[34] It proposes a United Nations-administered interim administration on the Namibia model that would prepare for and supervise elections. The assumption that the proposal will be acceptable to all parties as they have pledged to accept elections as the mechanism for deciding the future political authority in Cambodia appears rather unrealistic. Declarations of support for elections by the Khmer Rouge and the PRK should be viewed as more rhetoric than genuine. Otherwise their firm stance regarding the interim coalition government does not make sense. This is especially so with respect to the Khmer Rouge, which is not expected to do well in "fair and free" elections. The Solarz initiative is still at the conceptual level, with current efforts directed primarily towards developing a consensus in Washington to get it accepted as a United States proposal.

The proposal outlined by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in November 1989 builds on the Baker formula and the Solarz proposal. It calls for the dismantling of the PRK Government, vacation of the United Nations seat held by the CGDK, and the creation of a United Nations interim administration, which would administer Cambodia for an appreciable period of time before organizing general elections.[35] This proposal seeks to achieve the dual purpose of excluding the Khmer Rouge from an interim government and of denying legitimacy to the PRK. The Australian plan envisages a requirement for 200 United Nations officials to form the civilian administration and 5,000 to 7,000 troops to monitor the cease-fire.

Sihanouk, while still preferring a four-party interim administration, has endorsed this proposal because of the deadlocked situation.[36] He has however qualified his support by stating that he would agree to vacate the United Nations seat only after the formation of the United Nations interim administration and international verification of Vietnamese withdrawal. It should be noted that under this proposal Sihanouk would lose his guaranteed privileged position as head of State before elections. The rationale for continued cooperation with the Khmer Rouge would wear thin and the difficulties of holding the CGDK coalition together in the run up to delayed general elections may become quite formidable. Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi, while endorsing the proposal, has stated that the "problem has reached the stage where the Cambodian parties ought to make their own decision".[37] The Khmer Rouge has rejected the proposal, while China "took note" of it, reiterating its position that a provisional power-sharing government should be set up.[38]

The PRK may be supportive of the proposal because it would exclude the Khmer Rouge from the interim administration, the Khmer Rouge would have to contest the elections on its own political standing and in the process become more exposed, the PRK bureaucracy is likely to continue in place, and it makes good diplomatic sense to appear favourably disposed to a not-too-unfavourable international initiative at this time. However, Hun Sen and his close political aides would have to relinquish political power. Viet Nam may also be supportive for the reasons cited above although it may continue to insist that a United Nations role is possible only after the Cambodia seat in the United Nations is vacated. This, however, may only be tactical and also a technicality which need not be a major obstacle. The Soviet Union, currently an advocate of a larger United Nations role in such conflicts, can also be expected to be supportive.

The Australian proposal, while attractive on several counts, has to overcome three problems. First, it must be accepted by the PRC and the Khmer Rouge. Although the latter has rejected the proposal, Beijing can still persuade the Khmer Rouge to change its mind. But for this to happen Beijing must view the proposal as not detrimental to its interests. It should also not view the proposal as collusion between Washington and Moscow to minimize, if not eliminate, the Khmer Rouge as a viable political force in the run-up to general elections. Thus, while not rejecting the proposal outright and wanting to convey the impression that it is for a settlement in Cambodia, Beijing would seek to preserve and enhance the position of the CGDK and by extension that of the Khmer Rouge. It would also seek to modify the package in such a way that Viet Nam would not emerge "victorious".

Secondly, an underlying premise of this proposal is that because the local and regional forces are unable to arrive at a compromise settlement, the major Powers, in the interest of international peace and security, should take it upon themselves to agree on a settlement and use the leverage at their disposal to "persuade" the local parties to accept it. This essentially top-down approach assumes that the difficulties that cannot be resolved at the local level can be resolved at the level of the major Powers because of their broader interests. The consequence of this approach could be that in the mid-to-long term, the local dynamics of the conflict could re-exert themselves and undermine the settlement. Thus a major challenge is to devise a settlement that does not deviate significantly from the realities on the ground and which takes due account of the aspirations of the contending parties. This highlights the great need for national reconciliation among the four parties, which is still not in sight.

Thirdly, and related to the second problem, there is a need for consensus and commitment on the part of the major Powers, not only to devise a settlement, but also to make it stick at least for a number of years. Moreover, the United Nations must be prepared for a peace-keeping role and a force that far exceed its undertakings hitherto, including that in Namibia.

Conclusion

While the principal developments discussed in this article have helped to improve the Sino-Soviet and Vietnamese-Thai dimensions of the conflict, they have not had a similar impact on the other three dimensions—Sino-Vietnamese, Vietnamese-Khmer and intra-Khmer. The intra-Khmer dimension may, in fact, have been exacerbated. All three of the remaining dimensions are deeply intertwined, with the issue of power-sharing, that is, the role of the Khmer Rouge, as the interconnecting link. To break the current impasse and move the peace process forward there has to be a mutually acceptable compromise on the question of the Khmer Rouge. However, as pointed out earlier, left to themselves the contending parties do not appear ready for such a compromise.

There are, however, a number of possible developments that may issue from the battlefield and/or the rapidly changing international circumstances, which may, because of their potential to affect the relative military and diplomatic positions of the PRK and the Khmer Rouge, induce some changes in the inflexible positions of the contending parties. As of now, four such developments may be identified.

First, a further loss of confidence on the part of the PRK may make Phnom Penh and Hanoi more amenable to accommodating a role for the Khmer Rouge or to finding a way out of the impasse that does not exclude the Khmer Rouge.

The second is Soviet and Eastern European pressure on Viet Nam and the PRK to accept minimal participation of the Khmer Rouge in an interim coalition government. Such pressure could possibly have its origins in the context of the dramatic developments taking place in Eastern European countries and in East-West relations. However, Soviet pressure is likely to be tied to improvement in Sino-Vietnamese relations and a safeguard against the Khmer Rouge regaining exclusive power in Cambodia. In the light of the new developments, a number of the Eastern European countries may choose to act quite independently of the USSR and withdraw their support from the PRK. Such action will further isolate Viet Nam and Hanoi, and Phnom Penh will find it exceedingly difficult to resist Soviet pressure under these conditions.

A third and related development may issue from domestic political changes in Viet Nam. The ascendance of moderates in Hanoi, if it does come about, may make further concessions possible in the interest of economic reform. It is pertinent to observe here that for the moderates a non-threatening Cambodia has become acceptable on the basis of the view that Viet Nam's future security lies in economic development and that an end to the conflict is necessary in order to secure the necessary international assistance.

The fourth development would be a move by Thailand, some other ASEAN countries and members of the larger international community to recognize the government in Phnom Penh or to "de-recognize" the CGDK because of their growing apprehension that the Khmer Rouge may regain exclusive power in Cambodia. This would be a boost to Hanoi and to the PRK and it might also induce the PRC to be more flexible. It is pertinent to recall here that there is little sympathy for the Pol Potists from Beijing. Pol Pot and his radical policies are more in line with Mao Ze Dong than with Deng Xiao Ping although the ascendance of hardliners in Beijing raises some doubts on this score. Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge is based essentially on *realpolitik* considerations. Consequently the PRC may be inclined to respond to this international swing by reducing its support for the Khmer Rouge and be content to exercise its influence more through Sihanouk. However, international recognition of the PRK, if it does materialize, would be gradual, with the key countries such as Japan and the United States holding out as long as possible.

Should the above-mentioned developments or a number of them transpire, then the prospects for a negotiated settlement would improve. In this context the Australian proposal would appear to have the greatest potential for developing a package acceptable to all parties, at least in the short term.

It should, however, be observed that even if an international settlement is reached, its viability would be in doubt. The past histories of the competing Khmer factions, their radically different philosophical orientations, possession of military capabilities and access to external support suggest that manoeuvring for political power, including resort to violent struggle in the medium if not the short term, cannot be excluded altogether. "Fair and free" elections are unlikely to resolve the question who is to govern Cambodia. Elections may not be without legitimizing value, but then such legitimacy counts for little in a country lacking a tradition of peaceful transfer of political power.

Notes

1 The first meeting in this dialogue took place in Paris in December 1987, the second in January 1988 and the third in November 1988. The first two meetings were between Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and Hun Sen, with the third meeting enlarged to include representatives of all four factions.

2 On becoming Prime Minister in August 1988, Chatichai initiated a new approach to resolution of the Cambodian conflict, which differed markedly from that advocated by the Thai Foreign Ministry.

3 For a discussion of Soviet policy towards South-East Asia since 1985, see Muthiah Alagappa, "Soviet policy in South-East Asia: towards constructive engagement?" (forthcoming publication).

4 "Yang sends letter of support to Sihanouk", *China Daily*, 29 September 1989.

5 See Michael Leifer, "The Kampuchean conflict", in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *In Search of Peace* (Kuala Lumpur, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1988), pp. 57-64.

6 Under pressure from conservatives, Viet Nam has ruled out the kind of political pluralism being pursued in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Viet Nam is one of the few countries to support Beijing's crack-down on the pro-democracy movement. *Japan*

Times, 27 November 1989, p. 1. On the ascendancy of political conservatism in Hanoi, see Murray Hiebert, "Against the tide", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 September 1989, pp. 28-30; and "Mixed signals", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 October 1989, p. 37.

7 "Cambodia troop pullout may imperil Vietnam moderates", *International Herald Tribune*, 20 September 1989, p. 8.

8 The Soviet Union has also called for the cessation of external assistance to all parties to the conflict and has stated its readiness to cease aid to the PRK immediately upon similar action by the other actors.

9 There have been reports of a Cambodia Working Group based in Thailand which acts as a conduit for all lethal, *matériel* and financial aid to the non-Communist resistance forces. According to these reports, Malaysia and Thailand provide training assistance, Thailand also provides logistics support, Singapore provides weapons, with the United States underwriting the non-lethal assistance, including a part of the operating cost for the resistance groups. See, for example, "Secret U.S. war in Cambodia", *New York Times*, 16 November 1989, p. 22; and Mark Perry and William Scott Malone, "Cambodia: a scandal almost ended a secret aid", *International Herald Tribune*, 1 November 1988, p. 4.

10 Rodney Tasker, "Qualified support", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 November 1989, p. 19.

11 "Bhichai to seek fishery agreement in Hanoi", *Bangkok Post*, 23 November 1989, p. 7.

12 "Siddhi: Khmer issue no more top priority", *Bangkok Post*, 17 November 1989, p. 1.

13 Susumu Awanohara, "Fiscal interdiction", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 September 1989, pp. 22-23.

14 Richard H. Solomon, "Cambodia and Vietnam: trapped in the eddy of history?". Address to the International Symposium on the Future of US-Indochina Relations, Los Angeles, California, 8 September 1989. See United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Current Policy*, No. 1206, Washington, D.C.

15 "Group opposes role for Khmer Rouge", *Bangkok Post*, 2 December 1989.

16 *Bangkok Post*, 16 November 1989, p. 4.

17 "Fear of Khmer Rouge success rising", *The New York Times*, 15 November 1989, p. A6. Also Rodney Tasker, "Another year zero", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 9 November 1989, pp. 12-13.

18 Rodney Tasker, "Qualified support", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 November 1989, p. 19. Washington is trying to dissuade London from sending the diplomat to Phnom Penh.

19 "Australia keen to contact Phnom Penh", *Bangkok Post*, 21 October 1989, p. 1. "Fear of Khmer Rouge success rising", *The New York Times*, 15 November 1989, p. A6.

20 "Canberra against Khmer Rouge in government", *Bangkok Post*, 25 November 1989, p. 3.

21 A report of the United Nations Development Programme on post-war reconstruction in Cambodia states the price tag for rehabilitation and development of water resources alone at $US 662 million. Ted Morello, "Rehabilitation blues", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 November 1989, p. 19.

22 For example, according to one report, a US defence intelligence assessment states that while the Cambodian resistance will make "some gains", the fighting is unlikely to produce a decisive outcome. See "Khmer fighting won't be decisive", *Bangkok Post*, 24 October 1989, p. 7. According to another Pentagon paper, the PRK, despite its development, would not be able to contend with the superior Khmer Rouge forces. See "Hanoi still pulls Phnom Penh strings, says Pentagon", *Bangkok Post*, 29 October 1989, p. 2. See also Timothy W. Wright, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense, "The military situation in Cambodia". Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, House of Representatives, 1 March 1989.

23 The United Nations resolution (General Assembly resolution 44/22), sponsored by 75 countries, was adopted by 124 votes in favour to 17 against, with 12 abstentions, and with 6 not participating. Benin, Guyana, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe were new additions in support of the resolution; Sweden and Finland shifted from in favour to abstaining and the Islamic Republic of Iran from in favour to not participating. Hungary shifted from against to abstaining.

24 "Alatas awaits response from Khmer factions", *Bangkok Post*, 3 November 1989, p. 6.

25 "Vietnam fully supports Chatichai's initiative", *Bangkok Post*, 1 November 1989, p. 1.

26 "China wants different approach to peace talks", *Bangkok Post*, 2 November 1989, p. 7.

27 "US rejects Chatichai's plan to resolve Khmer conflict", *Bangkok Post*, 17 November 1989, p. 6.

28 "PM: make sure aggression doesn't pay", *Straits Times*, Singapore, Weekly overseas edition, 23 September 1989, p. 1.

29 "Sihanouk refuses to meet Hun Sen again", *Bangkok Post*, 22 September 1989, p. 1.

30 "Khmer Rouge: No talks until positive Vietnam signal", *Bangkok Post*, 2 September 1989. "Sihanouk to get Thai pleas to extend truce", *Bangkok Post*, 13 September 1989, p. 1.

31 "Hun Sen: Sihanouk must split with Khmer Rouge", *Bangkok Post*, 25 September 1989, p. 1.

32 "KPNLF set to join meeting", *Bangkok Post*, 10 November 1989, p. 7.

33 "US floats small role for the Khmer Rouge", *Bangkok Post*, 17 October 1989, p. 8.

34 "Solarz proposes new Cambodia plan", *Bangkok Post*, 7 November 1989, p. 1. Also, Susumu Awanohara, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 7 November 1989, p. 13.

35 "Canberra against Khmer Rouge in government", *Bangkok Post*, 25 November 1989, p. 3. See also "Sihanouk backs a UN trusteeship for Cambodia", *The New York Times*, 3 December 1989.

36 *Ibid.*

37 "Siddhi praises Australia's plan", *Bangkok Post*, 28 November 1989, p. 1.

38 "China cool over trusteeship plan for Cambodia", *Bangkok Post*, 1 December 1989.

Security Concerns in South-East Asia and the Pacific: An ASEAN Perspective

J. Soedjati Djiwandono

The great diversity that characterizes the countries of the Pacific region in so many respects is reflected also in the diversity of their perceptions of threats to their security. In terms of security, therefore, the Pacific region is not so clearly divided as Europe, which since the end of the Second World War has been divided primarily between East and West, or roughly between the forces of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact, apart from some traditionally neutral Powers outside either of the two military alliances.

That is not to deny the fact, however, that the East-West relationship of competition or even confrontation over the past four decades has also had its impact on the region, especially since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which marked the beginning of the extension of the United States containment policy against what was then perceived as the world-wide Communist threat from Europe to the Pacific region. This explains the involvement of a certain number of countries in the region such as Japan and South Korea in north-east Asia, the Philippines and Thailand in South-East Asia, and Australia and New Zealand in the South Pacific in security alliances with the United States, whether on a bilateral or a multilateral basis, against the Communist

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threat, be it the Soviet or the Chinese version or, at some stage, both.

On the opposite side, though less intensive, less extensive, and not on a multilateral basis, we may note the Soviet bilateral alliance with North Korea and Viet Nam. While some ASEAN countries have continued to be associated with the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in the five-Power defence arrangement, even though without a well-defined perception of a potential source of external threat, a large majority of the countries in the Pacific have remained uncommitted or have opted for non-alignment in their defence and foreign policy.

Changing alignments, meanwhile, both among Communist Powers and between Communist and non-Communist Powers in the Pacific, have proved such a perception of the world-wide Communist threat to be over-simplistic for the region. They have also helped reinforce the diversity and complexity of the question of threat perception among the countries of the Pacific, especially as far as external forms of threat are concerned. And when it comes to the point, most of the countries in the region would tend to revert to their more "traditional" perceptions of threat shaped by their historical backgrounds, geopolitical set-up, or other social, political, economic and cultural factors.

Thus, in the light of the Sino-Soviet split in the past some countries have come to make a distinction between the Soviet and the Chinese threat, one more or less real or imminent than the other. Indonesia and Malaysia in South-East Asia, for instance, have been generally more concerned over the Chinese threat, however defined, than the Soviet threat. Since the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1978, however, Thailand, as a "front-line State", has felt more threatened by Viet Nam. And the Kampuchean conflict, being in a sense a reflection not only of the Sino-Soviet dispute but, more important, a manifestation of the Chinese-Vietnamese conflict, has encouraged Thailand to seek an alignment with China, whose *rapprochement* with the United States as well as Japan, beginning in the early 1970s, may have helped to make that alignment a lot easier than it would otherwise have been. At the same time, Thailand has considered the Soviet Union a friend of Viet Nam, thus a friend of an enemy, more of a potential external threat than China, a perception that has been shared also by Singapore.

The security concerns of the countries of the Pacific region, therefore, do relate to a large extent to the great Powers. But while the atmosphere of the cold war has had its impact on the security orientation of these countries, their perceptions of threat to their security have not been confined solely to the non-Communist or anti-Communist division of the world. Indeed, China and the Soviet Union both happen to be big and Communist Powers. Even so, some distinction has been made between these two, especially as far as the countries of South-East Asia are concerned, as in the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand referred to earlier. Furthermore, although Japan is an ally of the United States, some countries in east and South-East Asia, including some allies of the United States as well, have continued to be concerned over the possibility of a future threat posed by the re-emergence of Japanese militarism.

Finally, mention must be made of a perception of threat posed by neighbouring countries, Communist or non-Communist, big or small. The case of Thailand's concern with the Vietnamese threat has been made earlier. Because of past experience, however, there may be some lingering suspicions on the part of such countries as Singapore and more recently Papua New Guinea, of a possible threat posed by their giant neighbour, Indonesia.

Thus, as far as external threats are concerned, there is indeed little commonality of threat perception among the countries of the Pacific region, including South-East Asia.

Yet it is interesting to note that the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), now comprising Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, was established more than two decades ago on the primary basis of a common security concern over a certain form of external threat to their national security, as well as to the security of the South-East Asian region as a whole. This was a perception, commonly shared by its member countries, of possible external interference in the domestic or regional affairs of South-East Asia, which would threaten their sovereignty, national independence and integrity, and the peace and stability of the region.

Past experience has shown, however, that external interference, particularly by major Powers, has always been invited or at least made possible by domestic or inter-State conflicts in the region itself. Thus, what was in effect a domestic conflict or a civil war in Viet Nam involved United States intervention that created the Viet Nam War, which, if less directly, in turn involved Soviet and Chinese intervention. Confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia likewise provided room for external intervention by major Powers that came to the aid of their respective protagonists. The most recent case has been that of the Kampuchean conflict, which invited the Vietnamese invasion, and either directly or indirectly Soviet and Chinese intervention.

Thus, ASEAN was established in 1967 out of the awareness on the part of its member countries of their primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and their security from external interference. It was a manifestation of their determination to promote good-neighbourly relations among themselves, and in so doing to prevent inter-State conflicts and thus external interference in the regional affairs of South-East Asia. The Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South-East Asia, which was signed at the first ASEAN summit meeting in Bali in 1976, was to give expression to their renunciation of force in the solution of inter-State disputes and to provide a mechanism for the solution of such disputes by peaceful means.

Indeed, the threat of external interference has been a major preoccupation of the ASEAN countries since the establishment of the Association. The fullest expression of this preoccupation is the ASEAN proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) for South-East Asia.

The promotion of regional co-operation within the framework of ASEAN can therefore be regarded as a confidence-building measure of great significance. Through ASEAN regionalism the member States would not only be able to prevent or at least to minimize regional conflicts and endeavour to solve such conflicts by peaceful means, thereby reducing the possibility of external interference, but they would also be able to use their resources for national development, which would otherwise be allocated for defence purposes. In this sense regional co-operation would also imply some degree of regional disarmament and arms control.

More important, the pursuit of their national development would enhance their national resilience. This would not only reduce their reliance on external major Powers to ensure their security, but it would also help them to cope with domestic threats to their stability in the forms of subversion and rebellions, to which most of the ASEAN countries, and indeed the countries in South-East Asia and beyond in the Pacific, have been continually exposed. Such subversive and rebellious activities have been motivated by an ideological, particularly Communist, background, by religious, particularly Moslem, fanaticism, or by separatist aspirations. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in the ASEAN region, and Burma and Kampuchea in the wider region of South-East Asia, and Papua New Guinea in the South Pacific have all gone through the experience of one form or another of domestic conflict, whatever its motivation. Kampuchea has not been able to solve this kind of problem to the present day. The same is true with Burma. And what has recently happened in Papua New Guinea with the Bougainville affair, as well as the very recent coup attempt in the Philippines against the Aquino Government, has confirmed the common concern among the ASEAN States and other countries of South-East Asia and beyond in the Pacific over the threat to their domestic stability posed by such internal conflicts.

As mentioned previously, not only regional but also domestic conflicts may provide room for external interference. Whether or not they do, of course, would depend on certain factors. One of these is the extent to which a particular country is linked to the strategic calculations of a major Power. Another factor is the developments in the major-Power relationship. The more competitive and antagonistic that relationship becomes, the more strongly the major Powers tend to engage in interference in the domestic or inter-State conflicts among the countries of the region in so far as they are capable of doing so and to the extent that such interference serves their own interests at a given time. Indeed, in the latter case a major Power might not even hesitate to instigate such a domestic or regional conflict, in which it could intervene for its own strategic or political ends. And such interference, given the antagonistic nature of the major-Power relationship, might involve the regional States in a wider great-Power confrontation.

Great-Power détente—particularly the Sino-United States *rapprochement* beginning in the last decade, and the current Soviet-United States and Sino-Soviet détente—does reduce the possibility of external interference, at least in the military sense. Such détente helps create a more peaceful international climate favourable to the national developments of the countries of the Pacific, including South-East Asia. It will reduce the possibility of these countries getting embroiled in a great-Power confrontation. That great-Power détente does reduce such a possibility and the threat of external major-Power interference may be attested to by the fact that the recent conflict situation in Burma, the separatist rebellion in Papua New Guinea, and the conflict situation in the Philippines created by the recently rather frequent coup attempts against the Aquino Government have not indicated any signs of external interference, except in the case of recent events in the Philippines, in which the Aquino Government did invite limited United States intervention, and the continuing conflict in Kampuchea, which has continued to involve the might of external Powers behind the warring factions.

It does not necessarily follow, however, that the kind of security consideration or concern that has motivated the establishment of regional co-operation of ASEAN is no longer relevant. For one thing, in spite of détente the great Powers are likely to continue their competitive, if now less militaristic, relationship. This means that the countries of the Pacific, particularly South-East Asia, may continue to be objects of great-Power rivalry for political or economic influence. It follows that they will continue to be subject to external interference, if less exposed to the danger of entanglement in great-Power armed confrontation.

Indeed, such great Powers as the Soviet Union and China are at the moment preoccupied with their domestic problems, particularly political and economic reforms. But there is still some degree of uncertainty as to their future international behaviour once all these domestic problems are over.

For another, good-neighbourly relations are not something to be taken for granted but to be continuously fostered through the promotion and expansion of regional co-operation and confidence-building measures. Thus, the ASEAN countries, and it is hoped all the countries of South-East Asia and indeed of the Pacific region, should be able to use and benefit from the opportunity provided by the new international climate marked by a reduction of tension through great-Power détente to foster trade and economic relations so as to enhance their national development. In so doing they would enhance their own national, and thus regional, resilience.

The regional co-operation of ASEAN was established, in effect, as an effort on the part of its member States to put their own houses in order. In the light of current developments in international relations, such a motivation continues to be of great relevance, especially now that a greater opportunity has presented itself. It would continue to be a manifestation of their determination to bear the primary responsibility for the creation and maintenance of their peace, security and stability, individually as well as collectively for the region as a whole.

Moreover, given the continued reduction of international tension created by the great-Power détente and, as far as South-East Asia is concerned, given the prospect of the solution of the Kampuchean conflict in the near future, a conflict which has preoccupied the ASEAN and other South-East Asian countries for the past decade, there is no place for complacency inasmuch as another potential source of regional conflicts seems to be looming on the horizon. This is in the South China Sea, where territorial and jurisdictional claims and counter-claims over the islands therein, particularly the Spratleys and the Paracels, involve China and Taiwan, Viet Nam, Malaysia and the Philippines. Indeed, some armed clashes have taken place over the issues between China and Viet Nam. It does not seem inconceivable that a future conflict involving the various claimants may eventually invite external major-Power intervention as well.

The growing institutionalization of confidence-building among the ASEAN member States in the form of continuous interaction, intercommunication and mutual consultations, the renunciation of the use of force, and the employment of peaceful means for the settlement of disputes may be a model for a future pattern by which the possible emergence of conflicts in the South China Sea may be dealt with. Only then will ASEAN and South-East Asia be properly prepared to face the challenges of the Pacific century with the necessary confidence and capability.

Security Concerns

Comprehensive Security Needs in the South-East Asian and Pacific Regions

Carolina G. Hernandez

In many countries in the South-East Asian and Pacific region, security concerns have moved further and further away from the more military and defence-oriented perspective to that of the achievement of political, economic and social stability. In the first few years following the Second World War, when many of these countries remained under colonial rule or some form of tutelage by colonial Powers, security issues were primarily viewed as their colonial mentors viewed them. The domination of international relations by super-Power competition symbolized by the cold war led countries in many parts of the world to view security primarily from this perspective. Consequently, security was equated with defence and military concerns.

Decolonization and the moderation of super-Power competition through limited détente between the United States and the Soviet Union contributed to a change in this perspective of security. As more and more countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and elsewhere emerged from colonial tutelage, they began to realize that their security concerns related primarily to political, economic and social survival and stability. While it is recognized that a stable external

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environment, initially guaranteed by a combination of forces conducive to peace and stability, is necessary in order that they may be able to concentrate their efforts and resources upon the solution of these internal problems, nevertheless their primary security concern lies in the achievement of internal political, economic and social stability.

Thus, in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, the consensus is that their primary security concerns are political stability, economic development and social harmony. A politically stable country would not have the virus of instability to spread to its neighbours. A country that is economically developed would have a high stake in the preservation of a regional order conducive to the sustenance of economic progress and would presumably not engage in military adventurism disruptive of that order. At the same time, social harmony is an important element of political stability.

The same concerns may be said to apply to the mini-States in the Pacific region, States which will never be able to guarantee the security of their population and other resources through military means. Like their ASEAN neighbours they aspire to political stability, economic progress and social harmony as security goals. This does not mean, however, that military and defence concerns no longer enter into their security considerations. They do, but for many of them the primary sources of security concerns remain internal; they are not military or defence in character.

In this consideration of security concerns in South-East Asia and the Pacific, attention is focused on selected countries. These countries may be divided roughly between the less developed and the developed. Among the former are the ASEAN countries, Indochina, Burma and the Pacific island countries, and among the latter are Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The security concerns of the latter group are markedly different from those of the former, because of their size, degree of political stability, level of economic development, extent of social cohesion, and the scope of their regional and global commitments. In a rapidly changing world, the smaller countries in the South-East Asian and Pacific region continue to grapple with fundamental political, economic and social issues, long since resolved by their more advanced neighbours. These fundamental issues continue to dominate their security concerns.

The External Environment: Towards a More Benign Order?

The last half of the decade of the 1980s saw remarkable changes taking place throughout the world. Not only were there significant improvements in super-Power relations in what had been areas of great conflict and tension such as arms reduction, but remarkable internal changes in socialist societies have transformed the context and perhaps even the texture of international politics to the extent that traditional security concerns of even the advanced countries in the region could change. The conclusion of the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—the INF Treaty—in December 1987 provided for the dismantling of all such nuclear missiles and also established the most extensive system of arms inspection ever to be accepted by both States.[1]

There remain, however, several issues that need to be resolved, including the issues of central strategic systems, chemical weapons, conventional weapons and forces, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which the Bush Administration will now have to tackle with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev.

Super-Power détente has been facilitated by the change in Soviet political leadership. With Gorbachev at the political helm, *perestroika* and *glasnost* have become guiding principles of Soviet domestic and foreign policies.[2] These have had spill-over effects throughout the socialist world as old-style political leaders began to be replaced by new ones, either through elections or other processes. These changes were followed by the initiation of more open political and economic systems and wider-ranging foreign relations. A notable exception to this change is China, whose violent suppression of pro-democracy elements in June 1989 led to tighter political control by its conservative leaders.

Super-Power détente influenced the initiation of normalization processes in the relations between the Soviet Union and China, between India and China, and even between ASEAN and Viet Nam. In the Asia-Pacific region, the only major relationship that has, apparently, been little influenced by these general trends is the Soviet-Japanese relationship, which continues to be characterized by caution and suspicion. Part of the reason behind this seems to be the apparent inability of the United States to develop and initiate a creative and meaningful response to the Soviet initiatives, which inability leads its allies in the region to adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude towards these initiatives.

On the whole, however, these developments could mean the emergence of a more benign external environment, in which super-Power competition and confrontation would no longer be the primary characteristics of the international scene, where regional co-operative efforts could be developed or enhanced, and where the maintenance of a lasting regional order could become a shared aspiration on the part of countries which would now be concentrating their efforts and resources on the achievement of internal political, economic and social stability.

Security Concerns of South-East Asia

As noted above, ASEAN countries consider internal stability to be their primary security concern. Whether called "national resilience", "comprehensive security" or "total defence",[3] the ASEAN countries believe that military security is a limited kind of security, that genuine security lies in internal stability and strength, and that this can be achieved through the promotion of economic development and social harmony.

The Indonesian doctrine of national resilience was developed after the institution of the "new order" following the ouster of Sukarno in 1965. It seeks to overcome the inherent weaknesses and vulnerabilities of Indonesia due to the vast archipelagic character of its territory, its location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, its ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity, its vast and rapidly growing population, and its increasing income disparities. These vulnerabilities could lead to fragmentation and could invite foreign intervention. Hence, stress is placed on the need to unite the people through the common ideology of Pancha Shila, a strong political leadership with the military, the father of the nation, playing the dual function of military defence and socio-political agent, and a development-oriented, disciplined, nationalist and politically conscious citizenry.

National resilience stresses self-reliance as the key to national security. Building internal strength rather than relying on external support is the preferred Indonesian option. Hence, it pursues a policy of non-alignment, one that has been described, however, as tilted towards the West.[4]

With respect to external security threats, Indonesia considers China, rather than the Soviet Union, to be the major long-term threat to itself and to the region. Consequently, it has been the most cautious among the ASEAN countries in normalizing its relations with China, and until the Thai initiatives in Indochina, the most benign in its attitude towards Viet Nam.

Malaysia's comprehensive security posits the inseparability of political stability, economic success and social harmony from national security. Military security, accordingly, is viewed as an insufficient basis for the security of the nation. As Malaysia is multiracial, the achievement of social harmony is considered to be a necessary component of national security. Malaysia also views a secure external environment as a requisite of national security. Such an environment is one that is conducive to, and supportive of, its internal political and socio-economic development.[5]

From the Malaysian viewpoint, China also remains a long-term external threat, although to a lesser extent than it is viewed to be by Indonesia. The reason for this is its large and relatively more affluent and better educated Chinese population, whose advantage is being balanced by Malaysian policies in favour of its Malay majority.

This comprehensive, or total, approach to security, as well as its internal focus, is common among the rest of the ASEAN countries. In the Philippines, where the Communist insurgency remains the main security threat, the multifaceted and comprehensive character of security is well recognized. The Philippines approach to counter-insurgency takes this into account as it involves the application not only of military power, but also of political, socio-economic and psychological resources to the insurgency problem.

In terms of political stability, political succession is a security concern shared by ASEAN countries. As their leaders advance in age, the issue becomes all the more pressing, for while succession mechanisms might be in place, the certainty that they will work is open to question. Even for countries with an overwhelming mandate for the return to constitutional rule, such as the Philippines, the political decay of the previous dictatorial régime continues to wreak havoc upon the political system. Disruptive events such as the six attempts made to topple the Government by *coups d'état* have characterized the Philippine political situation since the democratic restoration began in 1986.

The process of political succession is a crucial element in the maintenance of stability. Without effective succession procedures, political stability would be seriously impaired as various groups would manoeuvre to gain political power through violent means the moment a power vacuum formed.

Another concern in ASEAN countries is rapid population growth in the face of uncertain economic development. This is true with regard to Indonesia and still more in the case of the Philippines. Wide disparities between the few rich and the majority poor remain a problem and could trigger or exacerbate social unrest. The revolution of rising expectations could inflict further damage on the social fabric, which is already fragile, especially as regards ethnic communities which perceive the inequalities of the system as being loaded against them.

While there is consensus on the comprehensive character of security, ASEAN countries have divergent views on the sources of external threat.[6] As already noted, Indonesia and Malaysia consider China to be the principal long-term threat to themselves and to the region. On the other hand, Thailand remains close to China even as it has revised its policy towards Indochina, while the Philippines prefers to normalize relations with both China and the Soviet Union. Although committed to ASEAN unity, the continuing problem over Sabah between the Philippines and Malaysia has prevented the two countries from reaching solutions on other issues, such as overlapping exclusive economic zones. It has also blocked the forging of closer ties between them.

On the issue of China, Singapore has moved closer to China faster than either Indonesia or Malaysia, but has maintained its policy of recognizing Taiwan *de facto* as a separate country. These differences in the perception of external threats have been an important obstacle to the emergence, not only of a common policy *vis-á-vis* their more powerful neighbours, but also of a common external security strategy among them.

Last but not least, ASEAN countries continue to aspire after a peaceful and lasting solution to the Cambodian problem. Viet Nam's unilateral decision to withdraw its forces from Cambodia was a welcome move, just as the ASEAN sponsorship of the mechanism of the Jakarta Informal Meetings was an expression of their collective hopes. With the collapse of the Paris talks and the failure of the second Jakarta Informal Meetings, the eventual solution to the Cambodian problem seemed more remote[7] as the Khmer Rouge launched new offensives late in 1989.

Security Concerns of Other South-East Asian Countries

To a large extent, this perspective of comprehensive security is shared by other South-East Asian countries. While external security concerns continue to remain important, the need to achieve political stability, economic development and social harmony is clearly an important component of national security for other countries in South-East Asia. While Viet Nam continues to view China as a principal threat because of the latter's fraternal ties with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, it must nevertheless seek to maintain political stability and economic progress if internal security is to be assured.

To this end, Viet Nam appears to be poised to seek economic ties with the West, Japan and ASEAN once again in order to rehabilitate its economy, which had been ravaged by decades of war. Viet Nam needs to look elsewhere than to its partners in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance because the latter would not be in a position to extend economic support and assistance inasmuch as they are also in the process of internal economic reform and rehabilitation.

Besides, the limiting of economic ties to socialist countries has not led to economic progress in the past. There is also greater security to be had in diversifying economic ties with as many countries in the world as possible.

Thus, Viet Nam welcomed the invitation of the Prime Minister of Thailand to turn Indochina "from a battlefield into a market-place". Viet Nam seems prepared to allow the intrusion of free market forces into Laos and Cambodia as well, so long as the process in these two countries does not proceed ahead of that in Viet Nam.

In Burma,[8] the immediate task of the military government which succeeded U Ne Win in 1988 was to hold the country together amid political turmoil and violence, a bankrupt official economy and unabated ethnic insurgency. The immediate and main security concerns of the country could only consist of those related to political survival.

The military government has allowed a certain amount of economic liberalization in order to ease the burdens of a bankrupt economy. It has also allowed the entry of foreign private capital in the exploitation of its natural resources, particularly Thai participation in teak logging and fishing, joint ventures with foreign groups in export and import trading, and oil exploration and regularization of counter-trade with China.[9]

Whether or not these economic measures would provide a modicum of economic stability to Burma remains uncertain. Equally uncertain is the future of political stability where continued military rule may not be conducive to political reforms, including the holding of fair and honest elections in May 1990. Aung San Suu Kyi, perhaps the most popular opposition figure, noted that the real issue of free and fair elections was whether political and human rights would exist prior to the elections, permitting the free conduct of the campaigns, rather than at the time of the elections.

Ethnic insurgency has also been a security concern since 1949 when the Karens started their revolt. Meaningful sharing of power could be the key to the resolution of the problem of minorities, one which no government of Burma has so far seriously considered. Ethnic insurgency is complicated by the drug trade, reportedly the means of financing these revolts. Their persistence does not augur well for economic development inasmuch as defence expenditures would continue to be high as military power continues to be the enforcer of national unity in Burma.

Security Concerns in the Pacific Region

Japan

While Japan subscribes to the doctrine of comprehensive security, its external security concerns command a great deal of its attention.[10] The primary source of external threat remains the Soviet Union, largely because of its continuing occupation of the northern territories and its fortification of some of them. However, historic rivalry with China remains an important consideration in Japanese calculations of security. The Middle Kingdom syndrome is thought to be only temporarily dormant, and likely to be revived once Chinese modernization plans have been achieved.

Because South-East Asia remains one of the most important sources of raw materials and cheap labour, Japan considers the stability of this region to be important to its own security. This region also controls the vital sea lanes of communication through which its oil supplies from the Middle East pass—energy supplies that fuel Japanese industries. Hence, it has maintained an active interest in the economic development and political stability of the region. To this end, Japan has been a major contributor not only to investments, but also to official development assistance and trade for ASEAN and, to a lesser extent, for the other countries in South-East Asia.

A beneficiary of the security umbrella of the United States in the region, Japan seeks continued American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, especially because of its assessment that Soviet military strength in the region remains a force for instability. It is generally believed to be likely that the reduction or withdrawal of American military presence would be followed by Japanese rearmament, a development largely unwelcome in South-East Asia and in the south-west Pacific.

Australia

Contrary to laymen's perceptions, Australia has had security concerns because of its isolation from Western Europe, the place of its cultural and social origins. Japan, China and the Soviet Union had figured, at one time or another, as sources of security threats: Japan owing to its aggressive actions during the Second World War, China because of the fear of communist contagion, and the Soviet Union because of its competition and rivalry with Australia's American super-Power ally.[11]

Among its immediate neighbours, Indonesia was perceived by Australian extremists as a threat, especially after the latter's invasion of East Timor. Australia also views the destabilization of relations between or among its South-East Asian neighbours as a security threat to itself. The unresolved Cambodian issue continues to be part of its security concerns.[12]

Australia is also concerned about the well-being of its small neighbours in the South Pacific. Lacking in human, economic and material resources, they could be susceptible to big-Power manipulation and exploitation. Consequently, it has developed interrelated surveillance systems to protect island nations from predatory distant water fishing fleets; it has concluded an agreement with Papua New Guinea to consult and act to repel external armed attack; and it has increased ship visits to island countries to demonstrate its good will and credibility.[13]

A drastic change in the correlation of forces between East and West is also an Australian security concern. The future of the United States military facilities in the Philippine bases could be perceived as affecting this correlation of forces, where the removal of those facilities could tilt the correlation in favour of the East. Similarly, the alliance with the United States and New Zealand (ANZUS) is viewed as a major component of its security, the New Zealand policy of no nuclear ship visits notwithstanding.

New Zealand

Located between Australia and Antarctica, New Zealand has the luxury of not being faced by any threat of invasion or armed attack in the foreseeable future. As only the two super-Powers are considered to have the capability of launching such an attack, and as the probability of such an attack by either of them is very low, if it exists at all, New Zealand's security concerns lie rather in low-level threats and in drastic changes in its external security environment.

The more credible security concerns are terrorism and hijacking, harassment of its sea and air lanes of communication and trade, infringements of its exclusive economic zone, and threats to its agricultural exports.[14]

New Zealand has also adopted a hard-line policy on the issue of nuclear weapons, for which it incurred American displeasure. The effectiveness and viability of ANZUS became open to question as a consequence of this policy.

The South Pacific Island Countries

Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa lie strategically at the geographical crossroads of major ocean routes. Their value lies in this geostrategic location. Although small in area and population and underdeveloped in their economies, their bigger neighbours in the South Pacific have accorded them the status of equals in the South Pacific Forum, the region's symbol and instrument of regional decision-making.

As already noted, they are small States with small populations, territories and resources. Their inability to protect themselves from predatory distant water fishing fleets and from overt armed attack by hostile external Powers have made them extremely vulnerable and have prompted co-operative action from their larger neighbours. Particularly important is the need to protect their resources from more powerful fishing interests. Many of these States do not possess major resources apart from those derived from the ocean. Hence, they cannot permit the loss of, or injury to, these resources without serious and dire consequences for their people. The most pressing of their concerns is, therefore, in the area of economic security.

One of these concerns is the use of drift-net fishing by foreign fishermen.[15] Involving several vessels in co-operative action, long nets are laid in long lines across the ocean. In many cases they cover thousands of kilometres of ocean where indiscriminate fishing takes place. All kinds of living creatures coming in contact with these nets are trapped and killed, not only depleting fisheries resources, but also depriving small island fishermen of their catch.

At the meeting of the South Pacific Heads of Government held at Tarawa, the members of the South Pacific Forum unanimously rejected this technology in its July 1989 Declaration condemning large-scale drift-net fishing. Many Pacific States have also outlawed this practice in their domestic jurisdiction, including that of their exclusive economic zones.

Another of their security concerns is the need to forge national harmony in their societies divided by racial and ethnic differences. The case of Fiji is illustrative of the difficulty of creating such harmony in a society with substantial ethnic diversity with broad participation in the political and social systems being necessary to achieve political stability. Another example is that of New Caledonia, for which Forum countries are seeking independence. A satisfactory arrangement under which Kanaks, French settlers and others could live together in harmony remains elusive[16] for that Territory.

On the more traditional side of the security issue, the South Pacific has traditionally been considered a Western body of water and island countries generally tend to be pro-Western and anti-Soviet. Global deterrence is an acceptable security doctrine inasmuch as it has preserved regional tranquillity in the past. China's presence in the region has not been perceived as threatening. China has set up embassies in Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Western Samoa.

The South Pacific has been a site for nuclear testing, and consequently, countries in the region have become sensitized to this issue. In response to this concern, they adopted the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty on 6 August 1985,[17] coinciding with the anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The Treaty of Rarotonga, as it came to be known, is binding for its members in a vast area bordering in the east on the area covered by the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone and to the south on the demilitarized area of the Antarctic Treaty. Under the Treaty each party undertakes not to manufacture, or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device; not to assist or encourage the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any State; to prevent the stationing or testing of nuclear explosive devices on its territory; not to dump radioactive wastes at sea anywhere within the Zone and to prevent such dumping by anyone in its territorial sea.

The Treaty also calls upon the members of the Forum to support the conclusion of a global convention prohibiting the dumping of nuclear waste at sea. Through one of its protocols it also prohibits nuclear testing anywhere in the South Pacific zone.

Further attempts to protect the region's natural resources and the environment included the adoption of the South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme on 25 November 1986.[18] The Programme covers the exclusive economic zones of all Pacific island countries and territories and those areas of the high seas enclosed on all sides by these Pacific exclusive economic zones.

The aim of the agreement is to protect the marine environment from pollution from land-based sources, seabed activities, and the storage of toxic, radioactive and other hazardous wastes. Forbidden substances are listed, and in no circumstance are they allowed to be put into the sea. Although the agreement is not applicable to Powers that carry out nuclear testing, its parties are obligated to adopt sound environmental management with regard to the consequences of such testing.[18] No doubt the co-operation of major Powers such as France, the Soviet Union, the United States, China, Japan and others is a requisite for successful implementation of the provisions of this agreement.[19]

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion suggests that countries in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions have varying security concerns ranging from defence and military matters to political, economic and social stability. The focus of concern might be due to the country's level of political, economic and social development, which means that advanced countries tend to stress military and defence concerns while less developed countries tend to stress the importance of the political, economic and social aspects of security.

There appears to be no consensus on the probable sources of external threat among these countries, where the Soviet Union, China and Japan are viewed with varying levels of concern. The development and adoption of a common security strategy would therefore be difficult, if not improbable, at this time.

Dramatic changes taking place within socialist societies and the moderation of super-Power rivalry could lead to the evolution of a more stable global and regional order conducive to the pursuit of the security goals of these countries. To this end, a more creative response to changes in Eastern Europe is required from the West, a response which should take into account the views and concerns of pro-Western countries in the region.

Notes

1 Marshall D. Shulman, "The superpowers: dance of the dinosaurs", *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1987/88, pp. 512-513.

2 Soviet "New thinking" and implications for the Asia-Pacific are discussed in Bilveer Singh, "From Vladivostok to Krasnoyarsk: promise and peril of Gorbachev's Asia-Pacific diplomacy in the era of 'New Thinking'". Paper prepared for the Final Conference of the Fifth Phase of The ASEAN-Japan Dialogue organized by the Japan Centre for International Exchange, Bangkok Hilton Hotel, 10-12 February 1989.

3 For an extensive discussion of these concepts, see Muthiah Alagappa, "Comprehensive security: interpretations in ASEAN countries", *in* Robert A. Scalapino et al (eds.), *Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988), pp. 50-78.

4 The concept of "tilted non-alignment" was coined and popularized by Robert A. Scalapino.

5 Alagappa, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

6 See the ASEAN country papers *in* Charles E. Morrison (ed.), *Threats to Security in East Asia-Pacific: National and Regional Perspectives* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Company, 1983) for an in-depth analysis of external security concerns in ASEAN.

7 A comprehensive discussion of the process of resolution of the Cambodian issue may be found in Carlyle A. Thayer, "The peace

process and reconstruction in Cambodia''. Paper presented to the Regional Security Conference organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Institute of Security and International Studies, Chiang Mai, Thailand, July 1989.

8 David Steinberg, ''Crisis in Burma: stasis and change in a political economy in turmoil''. Paper presented to the Regional Security Conference organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Institute of Security and International Studies, Chiang Mai, Thailand, July 1989.

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 35-40.

10 From summary of ''Defense of Japan, 1988'', Japan Defense Agency.

11 Robert J. O'Neill, ''Australians' perceptions of threats to their security'', Morrison, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-187.

12 *Ibid.*, pp. 187-188.

13 Ramesh Thakur, ''Confidence building and conflict reduction in the South Pacific''. Paper presented at the Second Asia Pacific Roundtable, ISIS, Kuala Lumpur, 2-4 July 1988, p. 5.

14 *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

15 Gordon R. Munro, ''International cooperation for resource management: fisheries'', *Foreign Relations Journal*, vol. IV, No. 4 (January 1990).

16 Thakur, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-18.

17 *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (third edition: 1987) (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.88.IX.5 and corrigendum), pp. 169 ff.

18 Thakur, *op cit.*, p. 24.

19 For the position of major Powers on this issue, see Thakur, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-54.

Security Concerns

Changes in the Diplomatic and Strategic Environment in the South-East Asian and Pacific Regions

Takehiko Kamo

There has been significant progress in détente and in arms control and disarmament throughout Europe and between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, there is no evidence of a parallel development in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions. Even if there is a time lag between Europe and the South-East Asian and Pacific regions, we could see hopeful signs of a change in the diplomatic and strategic environment into a more secure international régime if there was a shared political will and a decision to enhance international security in these regions.

Why is this so? First of all, there is a fundamental structural change in world politics at the present time, with the ending of the long-drawn-out cold war. Most important, both the United States and the Soviet Union have seriously embarked on efforts towards nuclear arms control and disarmament, however embryonic the efforts may appear or however limited the present results may be. Consequently, the two super-Powers have sought further détente to reduce tensions, which will result in an epoch-making change in the rules of the diplomatic game. This new type of détente is what we call "strategic interdependence".

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The motivation for the new games of strategic interdependence has not been, or will not be, identical for the two super-Powers. However, strategic realism can be observed among the political leaders and policy-forming groups in both of the super-Powers. On the one hand, strategic realism comes from domestic vulnerability, particularly in terms of economics. Because of this domestic vulnerability, the two super-Powers seem to be declining, though only relatively, and to some extent also in power and influence. The United States no longer seems to be a hegemonic State as it was in the decades following the Second World War. Nor is the Soviet Union: it cannot afford those hegemonic or imperial costs. Confronted with the need for strategic realism, both the United States and the Soviet Union must overcome their domestic vulnerability by reducing the costs of the nuclear arms race, by restructuring their economies because of current internal dislocation, and/or by recovering international technological advantages. These aims can be achieved through policy innovations and burden-sharing with their allies. The two super-Powers must deal with each other as legitimate actors: they must co-operate with each other, secure in the knowledge that there is little or no risk of nuclear or conventional war. It is indeed surprising to learn how much the top decision-makers in both nations are going to change their earlier images and perceptions with respect to each other.[1]

The latest United States-Soviet summit meeting was held on the island of Malta in the Mediterranean in December 1989. It appears to be more than a mere historical co-incidence that the summit meeting took place at Malta, where the British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff met in 1945.[2]

In considering the security of the South-East Asian and Pacific regions, it is very important to look at the change in strategic and diplomatic relations between the United

States and the Soviet Union. The change will affect the political climate in these regions, albeit with a time lag. It took time for the cold war in Europe to spread to the South-East Asian and Pacific regions: in 1945 we saw the beginning of the United States-Soviet conflict in Europe; the United States-Chinese conflict began in 1948-1949; and the Korean War broke out in 1950. The current change in the strategic and diplomatic relations between the two super-Powers is quite new. In an article entitled "Détente", Professor Stanley Hoffman said:

> "the international structural change toward a new détente is not part of a cycle from détente to tension or vice versa".[3]

The new détente is clearly different in a number of ways. The first change is that an improvement in communications and dialogue between political leaders has been evident in American-Soviet strategic and diplomatic relations since the middle of the 1980s. These improvements in communication and dialogue relate to strong policy concerns about the revival of détente—particularly since Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and began to re-evaluate Soviet foreign and defence policies.

The most important change in American-Soviet relationships seems to be, however, that both sides are now making efforts to move away from the so-called "prisoners' dilemma", thereby making mutual co-operation one of the rules of the game, instead of making deep mutual distrust, mutual deceit and mutual confrontation the normal behaviour. According to the rules of the game, the "prisoners' dilemma" shows how people (including the leaders of nations in world politics) can be trapped into self-defeating acts. The "prisoners' dilemma" is played by two persons who either remain incommunicado or are in a situation of false or significantly distorted communication. The theory of this game is basically, if not entirely, analogous to the arms race and crisis management behaviour in American-Soviet strategic and diplomatic relations during the era of the cold war. In a situation of non-communication and distrust, there is no rational reason or incentive to co-operate. The two actors will attempt to deceive each other and both will end up with rather bad results (a constantly unstable world situation and a costly arms race).

As noted earlier, the new approach of the super-Powers is based on strategic realism. Particular importance should be placed on the Soviet Union's "new thinking" in the strategic and diplomatic fields. As Richard H. Ullman recently argued,

> ". . . under Gorbachev the Soviet Union is approaching something of a historic turning-point . . . . Gorbachev's Soviet Union, unlike that of his predecessors, seems in significant ways to be on the way to becoming an 'ordinary state' . . . . Perhaps the most important characteristic of an ordinary state is its legitimacy."[4]

Regardless of the uncertainty and unknown factors in regard to the prospects for *perestroika* in all areas of Soviet policy and practice, it seems that it will most likely continue to influence the Soviet Union's strategic and diplomatic policies, if only in order to lessen the economic costs involved in being a super-Power under the old rules. The United States has recently decided to support *perestroika*. This is in keeping with the Bush Administration's foreign policy of supporting political and economic reforms, which are in fact occurring not only in the Soviet Union but also in Hungary and Poland, in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. We know also that other Western industrialized nations, members of the summit group of seven, including Japan, are making similar efforts to support the domestic reform movements in the Eastern European countries through economic assistance.

Let us try to describe diplomatic and strategic characteristics in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions in the period from the 1980s to the present. First, we should emphasize the ambiguity of the current international system caused by the continuance of the cold war at the same time as a gradual change towards détente is taking place. The diplomatic and strategic environment was, in our view, increasingly complex in the late 1980s. The cold war structure still remains today. Such systemic characteristics as the distinction between "friends" and "foes" in diplomatic terms has long been continued as a reflection of United States-Soviet Union confrontational politics. This is, in part, well illustrated by the military alliance system, in which countries allied with the United States are against countries allied with the Soviet Union. For instance, we have seen a series of bilateral alliances in the United States-Japan, the United States-South Korea (Republic of Korea), the United States-Philippines security arrangements, and also a series of bilateral alliances in the security arrangements between the Soviet Union and Viet Nam, and the Soviet Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Such alliance networks are not as symmetrical as those found in Europe. However, the cold-war type of military alliance is still functioning in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions.

Another important point in characterizing the cold-war diplomatic and strategic structure is the pattern of arms transfers from each super-Power to its allies. Who is getting the most in major arms from whom? According to the data in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986*, there is an interesting pattern in these regions.[5] For the period 1981-1985, Japan imported 98.6 per cent of its major weapons from the United States. South Korea imported 96.9 per cent of its major weapons from the United States. Thailand imported 69.3 per cent of its major weapons from the United

States. In Singapore, 61.4 per cent came from the United States. On the other hand, Viet Nam bought 96.0 per cent of its major weapons from the Soviet Union. Laos bought 94.1 per cent of its major weapons from the Soviet Union. Mongolia bought 100 per cent of its major weapons from the Soviet Union. In North Korea, 39.3 per cent came from the Soviet Union, 21.2 per cent from China, and 10.1 per cent from Poland. Therefore, the cold-war system is still operating in the pattern of arms transfers among major countries in these regions.

However, in the past few decades, there have also been signs of a gradual transformation in the cold-war system in these regions towards a relaxation of tension. As is well known, the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) has been defunct since June 1977. The United States and China achieved a *rapprochement* beginning in the early 1970s. Despite the Tienanmen incidents the basic framework of *rapprochement* seems to be a constant factor in the strategic and diplomatic relations between the United States and China. We must not underestimate the importance of the Soviet Union's efforts to reduce tensions with the United States and with its allies. The development of a trading relationship between the Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union is a good case in point. Although there is no substantial change in the diplomatic relationship between North Korea and the United States, there appears to be a change in the strategic environment towards a gradual relaxation of tensions.

Why do we think so? First, the Republic of Korea's economic performance as an Asian newly industrializing country has been remarkable. The same is true of Taiwan and Hong Kong. Also, trade is increasing between the Republic of Korea and Taiwan and other Asian newly industrializing countries. Thus, there is good reason for the Republic of Korea to strengthen the economic interdependent system in the Asia-Pacific region in order to further its strategic interests, regardless of the continued division and tension in the Korean peninsula.

The Soviet Union's diplomatic and strategic initiatives are important in any consideration of the possibility of a change in the international system in these regions. In July 1986 at Vladivostock, General Secretary Gorbachev announced the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw part of its troops deployed in Afghanistan and Mongolia, and its readiness to discuss measures for confidence building, arms control and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region. In September 1988, Mr. Gorbachev announced at Krasnoyarsk another set of proposals in favour of no increase in regional nuclear weapons and no increase in regional naval forces, coupled with naval confidence-building measures. Further, in May of 1989, at the time of his historic visit to Beijing, Mr. Gorbachev stated that the Soviet Union would unilaterally remove 120,000 men in the Far East and 16 vessels of its Pacific fleet and would reduce its forces deployed on the Sino-Soviet border, with a view to making it a demilitarized zone in the future. It is true that American decision-makers, particularly in the military field, are still sceptical as to the extent to which Soviet military doctrine and policy have been changed, in fact, towards a defensive defence mode of operations and the development of forces. For instance, in *Soviet Military Power 1989* it says:

> "Despite public avowals that nuclear war is unwinnable and that strategic arms must be dismantled, the Soviets continue deploying new generations of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and manned strategic bombers."[6]

Therefore, on the part of military planners in the United States, the interpretation of the new Soviet military doctrine based on principles such as "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive defence" has not been fully accepted. They tend to see these principles and changes as uncertain and debatable. However, it may be said that the Soviet diplomatic and strategic initiatives towards détente and arms reduction are important enough to change the nature of the so-called Soviet threat, and that as a consequence of this there may well be a gradual change in diplomatic and strategic environments towards the collapse of the cold-war system. The change of intentions on the part of the Soviet Union is just as important as the change in military capability. Gorbachev's unilateral initiatives seem to be related to the possible change of strategic intentions. Again, it is true that the Soviet Union is still trying to continue to modernize its strategic naval forces, for example by building huge aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, opinion seems to be divided among top decision-makers in the Soviet Union as to whether the current naval policy should be continued. Recently, a top policy planner is reported to have said that he disagreed with the Soviet naval policy, and considered it wrong that the Soviet Union should follow the United States in the military strategic field.

However, the United States has not shown a similar active interest in talks on naval and nuclear arms control and disarmament in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions. The United States has had little incentive to expedite arms control and disarmament there. The United States is cautious in its assessment of the prospects for naval and nuclear disarmament and arms control in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions, for several measures.

First, unlike the Soviet Union, the United States is not actively interested in the banning of the sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). It seems that in the area of SLCMs the United States has clearly maintained a lead over the Soviet Union in the Pacific. Therefore, the United States does not want to lose an important area of superiority *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union.

Secondly, there is the difficulty of verification in regard to SLCMs. In the case of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, there is to be no more production of certain weapons which have been deployed on land. However, in the reduction of nuclear strategic weapons, namely in the case of the 50 per cent reduction discussed in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), weapon systems continue to be produced.

Thirdly, the United States would like its allies, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, to benefit from the American nuclear umbrella over the Pacific Ocean area. The United States is still keenly concerned with the cold-war type of international regional system in terms of its own legitimacy in these regions.

It would, of course, be unfair for us to be critical only of the American intentions and of the United States' reasons for being inactive or insensitive in regard to the arms control and disarmament talks for these regions. Unlike the case in Europe, where détente and arms reduction talks have been prominent, the diplomatic and strategic environment in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions has not been positive enough to be transformed into the new régime that is beginning to take hold in Europe. That, however, is not a persuasive reason. The crucial question is whether or not there is the political will to change relationships in the Pacific-Asia region from the confrontational to co-operative. No matter how suspicious or cautious American decision-makers tend to be in looking at Soviet behaviour in these regions, there is a need to change the system. If we consider how important these regions have become economically as well as politically, and if we consider how interdependent newly industrializing countries, countries members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations, and Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States are in economic terms, the security régime in these regions should not become wedded to the idea of the cold war.

As regards the diplomatic and strategic environment in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions, there are two further considerations. First, there is the possibility of a change in the nature of the threat in these regions. We may assume that the threats of today are no longer purely the Soviet threat. Because of the Soviet initiatives and actions described above, the old images of the Soviet threat may be changed into the images of détente in the perceptions of the countries in these regions. The Soviet Union could and should attenuate the deep-seated negative images of its threat among the newly industrializing countries, the ASEAN countries, and the highly industrialized countries such as the United States and Japan, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Although there is still uncertainty about the change in Soviet military doctrine and policy, the Soviet Union could demonstrate by positive action a real change of naval doctrine and policy in the Pacific. This may lead American decision-makers to be more confident about the change in the nature of the Soviet threat.

Secondly, the South-East Asian and Pacific regions are increasingly more complex than before. In other words, these regions are going to be multipolarized further. Therefore politics in the middle and small countries, whether developed or developing, could find more room for foreign-policy activities which would not be influenced only by the super-Powers or even only by the big Powers. If we calculate how power understood in terms of resources has been concentrated or diversified in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions, using the CONCENTRATION index for the period 1974-1985, it is true that multipolarization in gross national product, military expenditures, and arms transfers has not, evidently, taken place. The CONCENTRATION index shows that there is rather a bipolar characteristic of the structure because the index is relatively high—from 0.51 to 0.70. However, if we look at power in terms of influence in these regions, the distribution of influence is coming nearer to the multipolarization model. In other words, even the super-Powers and the other big Powers cannot control as effectively as they might want to. Democratization processes are in fact progressing in these regions.

We must ask ourselves how the political climate could be changed in order to reduce tensions in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions and to establish a new international security system.

First, we find it extremely important that the United States and the Soviet Union should make efforts to open talks on arms control and disarmament on sea-launched ballistic missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions. No matter how difficult such issues appear, negotiations on nuclear naval force reductions would help reduce tensions in these regions and materially help to end the cold war there.

Secondly—and this point is related to the first—we should seriously consider the importance of establishing confidence-building measures in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions. The Helsinki Document adopted in 1975 may serve as a model for any consideration of confidence-building measures in the South-East Asian and Pacific regions. Such measures are very important in transforming the cold war system into real détente and a true international system. In these regions, we should ask not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but also China and the Korean nations to make efforts to establish confidence-building measures as soon as possible, for example by institutionalizing international security conferences and arms-control talks in these regions. Of course, Japan should be included in these diplomatic efforts. Confidence-building measures should be considered first in East Asia and the Pacific regions. Then they should be expanded to the much broader international security network of ASEAN and the South Pacific region.

Through the institutionalization of security conferences, the countries concerned could talk and co-operate with one another on the issues of global environmental protection and economic assistance, as well as on military strategic security. This sort of international network has been lacking in these regions for four decades. In order for the cold war structure to be transformed into the more interdependent security structure, confidence-building measures are required.

Thirdly, it is important to develop transnational, non-governmental relationships between the countries concerned in these regions. Of course, government-to-government diplomacy is crucial in creating peace and prosperity in these regions. However, non-governmental transnational links—for instance city-to-city, economic, social, cultural, educational and media transnational links—are becoming increasingly important in establishing the new international security régime. Transnational actors in non-governmental areas are likely to pursue other than national interests, by which the policy of governmental actors is often exclusively motivated. We would like to place emphasis on the emergence of an international society or transnational society. Without fear of war or international violence, people can and should live together to enhance interdependence and mutual trust.

Notes

1 For instance, on 12 May 1989, President George Bush stated:

> "In sum, the United States now has as its goal much more than simply containing Soviet expansionism—we seek the integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations. Ultimately, our objective is to welcome the Soviet Union back into the world order."

Also, Secretary of State Mr. James Baker's address in San Francisco on 23 October 1989 was quite impressive in revealing the fundamental change in perception by each super-Power of the other between the time of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the present time.

The same kind of change in perceptions is increasingly clearer on the part of the Soviet leaders. The Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, in an address at the United Nations General Assembly on 26 September 1989, said:

> "In our view, by the time the summit meeting is held next year, in late spring or early summer, we may have passed the last turn on the road towards a treaty reducing strategic offensive arms. This is a real prospect." (A/44/PV.6)

2 Forty-five years ago, in February 1945, the British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff met at Malta a few days before the negotiations with the Soviet leaders at Yalta. The United States and the United Kingdom tried to co-ordinate their respective diplomatic strategies *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. Therefore Malta was the place, together with Yalta, where the cold war began within the Grand Alliance. See, for example, Lawrence Arousen and Martin Kitchen, *The Origins of the Cold War in Cooperative Perspective: American, British and Canadian Relations with the Soviet Union 1941-48* (London, Macmillan Press, 1988), pp. 28-29.

3 Stanley Hoffmann, "Détente", *in* Joseph S. Nye, ed., *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1984), pp.231-263.

4 Richard H. Ullman, "Ending the cold war", *Foreign Policy*, No. 72 (Fall 1988), pp.132-133.

5 United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986* (ACDA publication 127 (1987)), p.144.

6 United States Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1989* (1989).

Security Concerns

New Stability in the East, South-East Asian and Pacific Regions

Gary Klintworth

The Asia-Pacific region is more peaceful now, at the beginning of the 1990s, than at any other time since 1945. There are no great-Power tensions; there are no dangerous flash-points and there are only a few relatively minor territorial disputes. The war in Cambodia is close to settlement. The Korean peninsula is relatively quiet.

The Asia-Pacific region is, however, undergoing enormous changes. It is one of the most dynamic regions in the world. The economic and technological achievements of many countries in the region are the envy of the rest of the world. But economic development—sometimes because it is lacking and sometimes because it is too uneven—has generated considerable domestic social and political flux with consequences for external strategic priorities. The most dramatic example of this may be seen in the case of China. Its domestic turmoil has affected the conduct of Chinese foreign policy and regional perceptions of China's strategic reliability.

The strategic, economic, financial, technological and historical interests of China, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan interweave

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and overlap in the Asia-Pacific region but today do not directly conflict. India, a South Asian Power, is showing increased interest in South-East Asia but has no substantive relationships. The nuclear Powers have bilateral security relations with several of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. The USSR has security treaties with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Viet Nam. China has a security treaty with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and an "understanding" with Thailand. The United States has security ties with the Republic of Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia and tacit agreements with Taiwan and with China. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland retains a connection with Hong Kong. Australia has defence co-operation agreements with Malaysia and Singapore, with New Zealand and with several of the small South Pacific island States.

The security element in most of these relationships is being increasingly overshadowed by the process of economic and social change and the pattern of regional economic integration. Tension and suspicion generated directly or indirectly by super-Power confrontation have been replaced by greater understanding, co-operation and an appreciation of the importance of, and mutual benefit to be derived from, trade, investment and the exchange of technology and information. Former enemies have become friends and allies.

Governments and societies are more resilient, affluent and confident in their handling of intercommunal, religious and economic issues. Defence expenditure is under downward pressure in the USSR, the United States, China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Viet Nam. There is strong pressure for political and economic reform in the Communist States. They share a common desire to join the region-wide trend towards greater economic co-operation and commercial consultation amongst the trading nations of the Pacific rim. There are outcrops of resistance to these positive currents in the Philippines, Myanmar and the Republic of Korea and there are deep systemic and infrastructural problems in the way of progress in China, the USSR and Viet Nam. And there are strains on national unity and social stability in many of the small South Pacific island countries. On the whole, however, change in the Asia-Pacific region has contributed to a less-threatening regional security environment.

As well, any security assessment of the Asia-Pacific region must take account of the uncertainties arising from leadership and generational change. In the Soviet Union the Communist Party is being swept by such strong winds of political and economic reform unleashed by Mikhail Gorbachev that the stability of the Communist Party and the tenure of Gorbachev himself for more than one or two years cannot be guaranteed. In China an aging conservative leadership has apparently lost its direction and faces a legitimacy crisis of major proportions. The leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is also at a crossroads and the outcome of the leadership succession to Kim Ilsung will have important security implications for the Republic of Korea and countries with strategic interests in north-east Asia.

The leadership in Taiwan and in the Republic of Korea can point to remarkable economic progress but both face the problem of satisfying demands for more political freedom. This could have serious consequences in Taipei because it raises the sensitive issue of Taiwanese independence. In the Philippines, Mrs. Aquino's hold on power continues to look tenuous; many issues, including the future of the United States bases and hence the existing regional security framework, could be affected if she were overthrown. Generational change elsewhere in South-East Asia seems less uncertain with preparations for the succession to Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore and President Suharto in Indonesia well in hand. Prime Minister Mahathir seems to have consolidated his position in Malaysia after his recent troubles. In Japan Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and the Liberal-Democratic Party seem to have regained control of political affairs after a year of scandal and leadership resignations.

Leadership instability in the South Pacific island States is likely to continue and, while marginal to the primary security interests of most countries in the Asia-Pacific region, it will be closely monitored by such countries as Australia, New Zealand, France, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia. India has an interest in the welfare of the Indian community in Fiji but is too distant from the South Pacific for any significant security role.

The Soviet Union stlll figures prominently in the threat analysis of defence planners in Tokyo, Beijing and Washington. From bases in the Soviet Far East, the Soviet Union can threaten Japan, China, most of America, most Pacific sea-lines of communication, much of South-East Asia and United States bases in Guam, Hawaii, the Philippines and Australia. The Soviet Union also seeks to maintain sufficient nuclear and conventional forces in the Soviet Far East to deter China from taking advantage of Soviet involvement elsewhere. The most likely threat for Japan is perceived to come from the Soviet Union with China a possibility—if it can successfully modernize—in the mid-twenty-first century. Japan's security is tied to the United States, with the not insubstantial Japanese Self-Defence Forces providing a shield to the sword of the American carrier forces. China too has long feared the Soviet Union. Over the last decade, however, through its modest but credible nuclear capability, great-Power diplomacy and large conventional forces, China has reached a point where it feels secure from the likelihood of attack from the Soviet Union and indeed from any other major Power.

The United States has its most powerful military force outside the continental United States forward-deployed in the

Pacific. In a global war scenario, United States maritime strategy aims to protect Western Europe, Japan and the Republic of Korea by eliminating or at least threatening to eliminate the Soviet Union as a Pacific Power with early offensive operations against Soviet forces and infrastructure in the Soviet Far East, particularly the Soviet Union's fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic submarines (SSBNs). Their survival is essential for the credibility of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear retaliatory capability. For Washington, the success of the strategy depends on the correlation of a number of factors, including Japanese military support, United States naval and nuclear access on a neither-confirm-nor-deny basis to facilities throughout the Western Pacific and perhaps, in due course, China's naval modernization.

Such a strategy is still important for Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, China, the ASEAN countries and Australia. It is, however, a less pressing priority with the current mood of relaxation, trade and dialogue in the Pacific community. If the United States forward strategy is becoming obsolete it is because, to all intents and purposes, the contest between centrally planned communism and Western democratic capitalism has been won by the West. The events unfolding in Eastern Europe and the phenomenal economic performance of many of the newly industrializing Pacific countries are testimony in this regard. Socialism as an economic model has lost its appeal. Countries in the Asia-Pacific region do not look to Moscow or Beijing; their inclination is rather to learn from Japan and the other newly industrializing market economies of east Asia.

The end of bipolar confrontation between the super-Powers has reduced the general level of tension in the Asia-Pacific region. The Soviet Union is less worried about NATO and China than it is about its inability to produce consumer goods and curb unrest in the Baltic States and amongst its ethnic minorities. The Sino-Soviet border is now the scene of rapidly expanding barter trade and Sino-Soviet economic co-operation on a scale unprecedented since the 1950s. China is relaxed about both the United States presence in the Western Pacific and the Soviet presence in Viet Nam. The Soviet Union in any event is likely to withdraw from Camb Ranh Bay. The removal of a sense of threat on China's northern borders has reverberated southwards to the Sino-Vietnamese border—where cross-border trade has also resumed—and to Cambodia. China does not expect to be attacked by the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Gorbachev-Deng summit in May 1989 and Sino-Western disenchantment after the events in Tiananmen Square have temporarily strengthened the Sino-Soviet relationship. Viet Nam for its part does not expect to be attacked by China again, at least in the next decade or so, except perhaps in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

Taiwan is reducing its defence expenditure and does not expect to be attacked by Chinese mainland forces. The Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea still fear a surprise attack each from the other but much of the heat has gone out of that once unremittingly hostile relationship.

These trends have been conducive to peace in the Pacific region although as far as the big Powers are concerned, they may also have less promising long-term security implications. In general, however, the concerns of countries in the region are problems of economic growth, trade rivalries, protectionism, market access, resource diplomacy, trading blocs, technology competition, economic readjustment and the demands of a rising middle class seeking more political freedom. Few countries have a perception that they are about to be attacked or invaded by a country inside or outside the region. There seems little doubt—even in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea—that the strongest political current in the Asia-Pacific region is towards a progressive lessening of ideological differences and greater economic interdependence and co-operation. Security is less about orders of battle and more about technology and trade. Economic development has become the fundamental goal of all countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Those countries that do perform best have—among other attributes—a global marketing mentality. They are not burdened by heavy defence expenditure and, instead, spend their resources on education and technological research and development.

Japan is universally recognized and admired as a successful economic Power, with the investment capital and technology that most countries want. Its emergence as a great Power is one of the most important strategic developments in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan, however, is entering a new phase of political influence and industrial maturity. With its accumulated wealth, diplomatic prestige and the transformation of its economy towards a high-technology structure, Japan has less need for Soviet resources and American protection. Japan's rise to great economic power has led to a relative decline in the regional importance of the United States. The Japan–United States relationship none the less remains among the most important in the world. Defence relations have in fact been strengthened although there have been tensions over trade competition and the sharing of technology. If the United States continues to press Japan to increase substantially its military budget and play a larger security role in east Asia, other regional countries will be disconcerted. They prefer a Japan that does not shift away from the reassuring predictability that is, they perceive, provided by Japan's subordinate security relationship with the United States.

China and the USSR retain a residual core of distrust about Japan but on the whole they seem to have moved towards the ASEAN position, that is, acceptance of Japan's right to have a modest military force and acknowledgement of Japan's status as a wealthy banker and investor, as a leader in advanced technologies and as the world's largest giver of aid.

Japan's primary concern is the maintenance of its economic prosperity. Japan's sense of comprehensive national security goes beyond narrow concepts of military security. It is using methods similar to those applied by the United States in Europe after 1945. Japan is expanding its regional aid and investment programme throughout the Asia-Pacific region from China in the north to the island countries of the South Pacific in a burden-sharing approach that complements the United States military contribution. Japan has, for example, offered to fund the cost of a political settlement and peace-keeping operations in Cambodia. It is likely to use its economic influence in Manila to encourage the Philippines to continue hosting the United States bases. It supports efforts to create an OECD-type of arrangement in the Pacific through the Pacific Economic Co-operation Community and the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum.

Perhaps the greatest uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region has been presented by the crisis in China. China is still emerging as a major actor in the Pacific region in a variety of roles. Optimistic expectations about China's ability to become a modernized State and a responsible member of the Asia-Pacific community were thrown into doubt by developments in Beijing in June 1989. The killings in Tiananmen Square precipitated a profound crisis of confidence in Hong Kong with the political effects rippling throughout the region. Many Western analysts believe China's hopes for modernization have been set back by several years. Others are even more pessimistic. If China's reform processes remain stymied by a conservative central leadership, persistent economic problems could stoke social and political unrest well into the 1990s.

On the other hand, a too rapid decentralization of political and economic control would have equally disastrous consequences. It was not long, moreover, before Hong Kong's stock market recovered all the ground lost in June 1989. Although there will continue to be lingering suspicion about China's domestic agenda and the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to govern a capitalist enclave such as Hong Kong in the lead up to 1997, it seems likely that Hong Kong will survive the many pessimistic assessments currently floating around. This is provided, of course, that a satisfactory formula balancing the authoritarian nature of the Chinese Communist Party and the social, economic and political demands of the Chinese people can be achieved in the next one or two years.

Equally important for regional security will be the outcome of reform in other Communist States, particularly the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea's economic indicators show impressive economic gains. Together with the Republic of Korea's growing military strength, these have compounded the problems of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Pyongyang's political, social and economic system and its foreign policy approach are unique but outmoded. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea suffers from all the disadvantages of an autarkic central command economy. Productivity and per capita income are one fifth of that in the Republic of Korea. Most consumer goods are in scarce supply. Many factories are simply obsolescent. Foreign exchange is lacking; international debts cannot be paid and there is little foreign investment. Tension in the Korean peninsula has none the less declined sharply in the last few years, primarily because of the rapid improvement in relations between China, the USSR and the United States. This has forced the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to re-examine its policies towards Seoul and to contemplate some, albeit cautious, domestic political and economic reforms of its own.

In South-East Asia no country is threatened with direct aggression by any other country. Thailand is not threatened by Viet Nam, now chastened and impoverished and, until its withdrawal from Cambodia, a regional pariah. Thailand in fact is regarded as a candidate for status as one of the newly industrializing economies of Asia; it has security guarantees from both China and the United States and has been a beneficiary of the war in Cambodia. Singapore has a sense of vulnerability owing to its position as a small rich Chinese island State surrounded by the large States of Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore has made much of threats to ASEAN by the Soviet Union and Viet Nam, partly in order to focus ASEAN attention on an external threat. Singapore wants to preserve a United States military presence in the Philippines or, if necessary, in Singapore.

The Philippines has been preoccupied with problems of income inequality, poverty, underdevelopment, deteriorating terms of trade, a heavy external debt and accompanying domestic insurgencies and leadership instability. Manila's external security interests have been protected by the United States. The substantial United States military presence in the Philippines has, however, contributed directly to the internal social and political problems of the Philippines.

Neither Malaysia nor Indonesia perceives a direct or immediate threat to its security. Both find themselves in a relatively secure environment. Both have developed close bilateral military ties and hold regular joint exercises for their three armed services. Malaysian and Indonesian concerns are with the coherence and unity of ASEAN policies, the activities of foreign navies and regional trading blocs, a resolution of the Cambodia war and such regional issues as the security problems in Irian Jaya and in East Timor, but these are not of compelling national importance. Indonesia has worked hard to establish a considerably improved relationship with Australia and Papua New Guinea.

An area of diminishing concern is the war in Cambodia. That war is almost over as far as Thailand's Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan is concerned. He wants Thailand to take advantage of the commercial opportunities in Indochina ahead of competitors from Taiwan, Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea. Viet Nam's conflict with China has eased and it seems poised to break out of its isolation in the region since the completion of its troop withdrawals in September 1989. The war inside Cambodia may continue at a low level, but provided that the Hun Sen Government can survive the present onslaught by the Khmer Rouge and their non-Communist allies, it will probably be accorded diplomatic recognition with the passage of time. Several European countries and the European Parliament have manifested an inclination to accept the reality of the Hun Sen Government in Phnom Penh and cut their support for the fiction that a fractious Thailand-based coalition led by the Khmer Rouge can in any way represent the Government of Cambodia. They are also embarrassed by the Khmer Rouge, whose dismal human rights record has been compared with that of the Nazis of the Second World War. Cambodia, in other words, is no longer the dominant security issue for countries in South-East Asia that it once was.

This, not unnaturally, has implications for ASEAN as an organization. ASEAN was formed in 1967 largely because of security considerations. Much of what held it together in the 1970s and 1980s came from the concern of member countries about the situation in Cambodia and the perception of a threat from Viet Nam. These concerns have now largely dissipated. There is a question whether in the future there will be challenges as serious as the Cambodian issue that will be sufficient to transcend ASEAN racial, cultural, political and economic differences. The ASEAN countries no longer perceive a threat from China or from any other external Power. Indonesia is proceeding towards a resumption of diplomatic relations with China although there is still suspicion of Chinese regional ambitions and fear about renewed contact between Beijing and the several hundred thousand overseas Chinese resident in Indonesia.

Each ASEAN country has its own internal political and foreign policy agenda, and ambitions. There is limited intra-regional trade and most of the ASEAN countries have trade links outside ASEAN. There is no ASEAN defence co-operation as such: the Philippines and Thailand have defence arrangements with the United States and/or China. Singapore and Malaysia are members of the Five Power Defence Arrangement with the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. There are other anomalies. Thailand's close relations with China are looked at askance by Indonesia; Singapore and Indonesia have different attitudes on ASEAN's approach to Viet Nam; and Malaysia and Indonesia have objected to Singapore's unilateral offer to host United States military facilities.

However, the ASEAN States have become accustomed to the operational structure of ASEAN as a regional forum. They have enjoyed the prestige and influence of their collective membership in ASEAN in the wider regional and global context. ASEAN is a successful formula. Moreover, the ASEAN States share a common interest in balancing the presence and pressures of the big outside Powers and, as a regional group of developing non-Communist economies, they have a common interest in challenging Japan, the European Community and the United States. They have many different points of view but nevertheless the ASEAN States will be forced to combine their economic bargaining power as much as possible if they hope to deal effectively with the rest of the world. If ASEAN is joined by other South-East Asian countries, it will be an even stronger regional economic and political group. The solidarity of ASEAN on agricultural protectionism and at the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Forum in Canberra are instances of the way this new co-operation is already working.

The fact that super-Power tension has eased has led many countries in the Asia-Pacific region to argue for more, not less, defence expenditure. They want more modern defence technology and equipment on the grounds that the withdrawal of the super-Powers from more direct military competition in the Asia-Pacific region leaves the way open for regional Powers to vie for influence in the ensuing vacuum. This kind of assessment has reinforced tendencies for regional military build-up as countries in the region follow the lead of neighbouring States.

Chinese military forces on the Spratly Islands are effectively stationed in the very centre of the South-East Asian land/sea environment. The numbers involved are small but they are perceived as representing a bridgehead for China's plans to consolidate its claims in the South China Sea and build up its presence in South-East Asia.

Indian strategists cite China's naval expansion into the South China Sea as one of the key reasons for the development of Indian naval facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar islands at the western entrance to the Malacca Strait.

Japan, meanwhile, is a major military Power. Despite the relatively low percentage of its GNP spent on defence, the amount is increasing in real terms to the point where Japan has the third highest defence expenditure in the world and the world's fifth largest navy. The amount spent on defence is to be increased by 6 per cent in the coming year. Japan has a force structure suitable for rapid expansion and it clearly could support much larger and longer-range armed forces than it does today. There has been some discussion in Japan of defensive aircraft carriers that could be used to protect Japanese sea-lines of communication.

Singapore has expressed regional concerns about these trends by its recent offer to host some of the American facilities currently located in the Philippines. Singapore fears that other great Powers as well as perhaps Japan would feel obliged or tempted to fill the gap left by the United States. Malaysia and Indonesia have expressed concern about the ability of China to project naval power into the South China Sea. They are also concerned about India's naval expansion and the development of its ability to project tridimensional naval forces in a maritime arc that stretches from the west coast of the Horn of Africa to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands adjacent to South-East Asia. Malaysian officials have suggested that Kuala Lumpur could follow the Thai example and lean towards China in the face of any substantially increased Indian naval activity in South-East Asia.

Economically, it is forecast that the Asia-Pacific region will expand more rapidly than most other parts of the world. The newly industrializing economies of Asia are growing fast. They see new market and investment opportunities in the reformist Communist economies. The insurgencies which once plagued many countries in South-East Asia have been eclipsed by the problems of rapid economic growth. Chin Peng, former Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Malaya, is the most recent Communist in South-East Asia to publicly renounce armed struggle in favour of the parliamentary road to socialism. Assured of domestic political and social stability and, in relative terms, with more money to spend, the nations of Asia are expanding their military capabilities. In particular, as they exercise their national sovereignty over offshore resources delineated by the International Convention on the Law of the Sea, they are putting more effort into acquiring high-technology air and maritime forces.

A regional naval build-up could gain momentum from developments in the Philippines, currently host country to the biggest forward-based American military presence in the

Pacific. Those developments are designed to support United States military operations in the Western Pacific, north-east Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. The bases help preserve the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region. The agreement concerning the bases expires in September 1991, A continued United States military presence in the Philippines is considered to be of major importance to the security of the United States, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand.

But several ASEAN States, particularly Indonesia, do not perceive the prospective loss of the United States bases as catastrophic for regional security. They even suggest that a United States withdrawal could be followed by a Soviet pull-out and thereby improve the chances for ASEAN to achieve its goal of a South-East Asian zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN). Some would argue that the removal of the bases at a time of their decreasing strategic importance would contribute to greater stability in the Philippines and hence to greater regional security.

As well as opposition to the American presence in the Philippines, there is an expectation of a reduced United States naval and military presence in the Western Pacific in the face of domestic United States constraints on defence expenditure, growing nationalism in Japan and the Republic of Korea and the decline in Soviet naval deployments in the Pacific. On the other hand, many countries fear that a declining United States presence will contribute to a competition for influence by other ascending great Powers, such as India, China, Japan and perhaps Indonesia.

Interestingly, there is today little reference to the Soviet Union as a menacing contender for power and influence in the region. Few States now mention the threat allegedly posed by the Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang in Viet Nam. The much more relaxed regional attitude towards the Soviet Union is due in no small part to the positive diplomacy of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. He has achieved *rapprochement* with China and détente with the United States, opened up access to the Republic of Korea and Taiwan and preserved Soviet relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Indochinese countries. He has hinted at concessions on Japan's Northern Territories claim and plans to visit Tokyo in 1991. Moscow has also made a major effort to improve Soviet relations with the ASEAN States through its mediation efforts on the Cambodian issue, various bilateral exchanges, particularly with Indonesia and Thailand, and tacit endorsement of the ASEAN ZOPFAN concept.

Developments in the island countries of the South Pacific are, although relatively volatile, of little direct security concern to countries in the Asia-Pacific region apart from Australia, New Zealand and Indonesia. The suddenly volatile politics of the South Pacific were nowhere more apparent than in the coups in Fiji in 1987 and signs of a disregard for law and order and constitutional government in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Palau.

Tension in decolonizing New Caledonia has been defused somewhat with the signing of the Matignon accords and the promise of self-determination in 10 years' time. The longer political devolution is delayed, however, the more likely it is that a more militant and radicalized independence movement and accompanying civil strife will re-emerge.

The Pacific island States all suffer from one or more of the following problems: limited employment opportunities for an increasingly educated population; deteriorating terms of trade and limited export potential; exposure to the consumer-society values of the West; a narrow, stagnant economic base; negative growth rates; dependence on external financial assistance; growing income inequality; politicization of the security forces; a breakdown in the customary village social support system; a decline in traditional authority; the problems associated with a growing drug trade; and divisive ethnicity and racial factors. These factors have contributed to problems of unemployment, social unrest, racial tension and separatist movements. The inability of the political system to deal with the social and economic problems of change in Pacific island communities is reflected in the situation in Fiji and the almost endemic instability in Papua New Guinea and secessionist tendencies in Bougainville. The fishery agreements between Kiribati and Vanuatu similarly reflect the sometimes desperate economic circumstances of many of the small island States of the South Pacific.

The general prospect is for continued uncertainty and the constant fear of intervention by outside influences. The solution lies in economic development and increased foreign aid. Australia is playing a more active role and has increased its defence ties in the region. France and the United States have tried to improve their respective regional images, with some success. Japan has shown an increasing interest in bolstering the Western presence in the South Pacific with economic aid and investment. The ASEAN States, led by Indonesia, also seek to contribute to stability in the South Pacific by developing closer political relations with Pacific island States, particularly Papua New Guinea and Fiji.

For Western Powers, such as the United States and Australia, earlier concerns about an intrusive Soviet presence have now eased with the retreat of Soviet naval activities to the North Pacific and the positive impact of Gorbachev's Pacific diplomacy since his 1986 speech at Vladivostock. United States concern about New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy and the implications of the Treaty of Rarotonga, which established the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, is now much reduced as neither development has proved significant as far as United States naval activities in the Pacific are concerned.

Throughout the Asia-Pacific region there is general concern about the proliferation of chemical weapons and the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile technology. Ballistic-missile technology is more and more freely available. Several States in east Asia and south Asia have a short-range ballistic-missile capability. These systems, armed with conventional warheads or, more disturbing, equipped with chemical weapons or nuclear weapons, could upset existing regional balances. They could contribute to regional arms races that would be difficult to control because of problems of verification, especially with regard to chemical weapons. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is building a nuclear weapons research capability according to American intelligence reports based on satellite photographs of a nuclear reactor, a plutonium extraction plant and other facilities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Fears have been expressed about the consequences of a possible nuclear arms race in south Asia.

Another regional concern is the proliferation of weapons producers and competition for arms sales from a range of countries.

But generally the security outlook for the Asia-Pacific region at the beginning of the 1990s would have to be described as reasonably good. Threat assessments are, frequently, vaguely defined forecasts which, while acknowledging the current optimism, also warn of unforeseeable threats arising in the future from rapid social and economic change and great-Power re-alignments. For individual countries the outlook is generally favourable, with a few exceptions, including China, the Philippines, Myanmar and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Their problems are not problems of military security as such. They are, rather, problems of poverty and the struggle for economic development.

In conclusion, however, it is as well to recognize that the central aim of the economic renovation, reform and development under way in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region is to strengthen national power, prestige and regional influence relative to other States. This means perhaps that the present Asian preoccupation with domestic economic development—or orderly regional economic development—may have its limits.

At the great-Power level, much will depend on the role that Japan plays. Japan's position in turn will depend on the state of its relations with the United States and its perceptions of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Of equal importance will be the progress or failure of reform in China and the Soviet Union, the role of India and the resilience and strength of regional economic and political groups such as ASEAN.

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Security Concerns in the East, South-East Asian and Pacific Regions: A View from the South Pacific

Lelei LeLaulu

The South Pacific has been described as the most over-colonized and the most ignored region on the planet. This combination of colonialism and neglect often leaves the countries of the region puzzled as to what is expected of them by their metropolitan benefactors. Conversely, the ignoring of what islanders themselves consider to be of paramount strategic importance has often proved costly for the aspirations of policy-makers in the West.

Changing strategic considerations have reduced the value of the islands as stepping-stones for the extension of power across the Pacific, but the region remains one of the most heavily armed in the world. Its remoteness has also made it an attractive area for weapons testing.

Decolonization is far from complete in the Oceanic region, a fact that may very well influence security concerns in the area for years to come. Of the 21 political entities in the region served by the South Pacific Commission (set up by the six Western Powers in 1947 to co-ordinate development in their respective island colonies), 4 are self-governing but in free association with two of the metropolitan Powers,

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and 8 are still tied to their colonizers. Only 9 are sovereign independent nations. Over one third of the Pacific island political entities remain colonial dependencies—a fact which is little known outside the region. Colonial situations invite a wide array of destabilizing influences, which even the most well-intentioned of metropolitan Powers may find it difficult to handle.

Nuclear Test Zone

While the horrors of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima at the end of the Second World War are embedded in the international consciousness, little attention is paid to the fact that hundreds of nuclear devices have been exploded in the Pacific since then.

Many islands of the Pacific have been adversely affected by these nuclear tests. Some islands have had to be evacuated because of radiation fall-out. In addition to the rise in cancer cases recorded in former United States testing sites and current French experimentation zones, the clean-up costs for such islands as Rongelap and Bikini atolls are staggering. The mental and cultural costs for the people are incalculable.

Although two nuclear Powers no longer use the area for their experiments, France persists in carrying out nuclear tests in the Pacific. The efforts by France to define a role for itself in the international nuclear equation have been made at the expense of the people of the Pacific. Following on earlier British and United States test explosions, largely in Micronesia, the French nuclear experimentation has been based in the Polynesian islands of Tahiti.

Despite individual pleas from countries of the region, and resolutions passed in international forums such as the United Nations, France continues, through successive administrations, to detonate test after test. In its determination to counteract the widespread opposition to its testing programme, French government agents in 1985 bombed the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior*, at Auckland, New Zealand, killing a crew member. Notwithstanding the international outcry which followed this act, Paris stated categorically that the nuclear experimentation would continue. Since the peoples of French Polynesia do not yet have their own independent nation, there is nothing they can do to stop the tests on their soil and in their waters.

Another metropolitan Power in the region, the United States, tells Oceanic States that they maintain forces in a high state of readiness in the Pacific to ensure that democratic or friendly nations in Oceania are covered by the United States "nuclear umbrella". Pacific leaders often ponder the effectiveness of a nuclear umbrella which allows scores of nuclear tests in Oceania by a United States NATO ally.

Fishy Business and Dubious Catches

Meanwhile, the traditional NATO adversaries in Europe present a non-martial face to most of Oceania. For the islands of the South Pacific the Soviet Union is seen as just another Power trying to net a piece of the lucrative fishing catch. It offers island governments fees to fish in Pacific waters. The sums are not high by international standards but $1.5 million for a year's fishing access is considerable for Solomon Islands, with a population of just over 280,000. Fees paid by Moscow to Kiribati, for example, amounted to 10 per cent of that island democracy's budget.

This was seen as a rather novel approach by many island nations, which for years had looked on helplessly as trawling fleets from the friendly nations of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States, many of them unhampered by licences and fees, helped themselves to the region's marine resources.

Receptivity to Soviet entreaties was based on economic concerns. Nevertheless, Soviet proposals to the Kingdom of

Tonga to expand an airport in exchange for fishing rights worried the Australia/New Zealand/United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty ministers in 1976 and they started talking of limiting Moscow's penetration of the South Pacific through a policy of "strategic denial". With the reservoir of good will the Western Powers felt they enjoyed in Oceania, it was considered that adequate economic aid would be sufficient to counter Eastern bloc initiatives with strategic implications in the area. Through "burden sharing", Australia and New Zealand were invited to pick up most of the financial burden of the policy.

In the meanwhile, Pacific island leaders charged that the United States had turned its back on its friends in the Pacific while granting large aid allocations to other, far less friendly developing countries. Speaking at the Conference on Strategic Cooperation and Competition in the Pacific Islands in May 1989, Paul J. Gardner, a former United States Ambassador to Papua New Guinea, pointed out that five African nations with one-party, authoritarian régimes, most of which adhered to Marxist-Leninist principles, and all of which voted against the United States in the United Nations at least 88 per cent of the time, received much higher aid per capita than Pacific island countries.

For the United States, the major interests are mainly strategic ones centred on the desire to keep the Soviets out of Oceania through strategic denial. For the Oceanic States, however, the security concerns focus on the need to keep their resource-poor island developing nations from sinking in a sea of red ink. These two perceptions of security clashed dramatically in 1984. In June of that year, the Solomon Islands Government, irked by continued unlicensed trawling in its waters, arrested the American super-seiner *Jeanette Diana*. For the Solomon Islanders, such plundering of their basic resource was felt to be a direct threat to their economic security.

By Washington, however, the seizure was interpreted as a direct contravention of the Magnuson Act, adopted by Congress years earlier as a weapon in an earlier fight with Peru over continental shelves. The Act provided for punitive sanctions to be lowered on the imports to the United States of any of the offending country's products. In spite of the fact that it had reacted mildly when mineral-rich Papua New Guinea had seized one of its trawlers a couple of years earlier, the United States delivered a stinging blow to the fragile Solomon Islands economy by imposing an embargo on its exports to America.

Reacting quickly to this gap in perceived strategic interests between a metropolitan Power and a "friendly" micro-State, the Soviet Union offered island States money for fishing access. Solomon Islands declined at the time, but tiny Kiribati accepted what for it meant 10 per cent of its budget. So, with little effort and a very small amount of money, the Soviet Union was able to skirt strategic denial, gain access to a bountiful tuna field—while siding with Oceanic nations unified in their disapproval of the heavy-handed American reaction to a small island nation's attempt to protect its most valuable resource.

It was a simple case of a major Power neglecting to consult with a tiny ally on what was, strategically, really important for both. By ignoring the strategic concerns of Pacific islanders, a major Power lost some of the moral high ground in the fight for the hearts and minds of Oceanic peoples and their Governments. The fishing tussle with the Solomon Islands Government may also have contributed to a loss on the ground for the United States policy-makers, because the 1980s saw an erosion of the ideological fear many Oceanic nations experienced in their dealings with the Soviet Union. As a consequence, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviets, whose initiatives were greeted with hostility and suspicion by the islanders in the mid-1970s, now have commercial ties with Vanuatu, Fiji and Kiribati and have negotiated an agreement with Papua New Guinea to establish the first resident Soviet mission in an independent Oceanic nation.

The Soviet inroads made into the South Pacific on the heels of the *Jeanette Diana* affair also largely obscured the generous United States terms offered Oceanic States in the regional fisheries agreement signed in June 1988, an agreement now used as a model in other regions of the world.

Sino-Soviets Split Region

Competition with a strategic adversary was presumably also behind another major Power's fast entry to the South Pacific diplomatic circuit. Concerned about the Soviet Union's growing ties with the Oceanic nations and, perhaps, the prospect of encirclement in the Asia-Pacific region, China began a policy of cultivating warmer relations with island States in the 1970s.

This was shortly after the United States opened diplomatic contacts with Beijing. Very swiftly, euphoria in the United States at its diplomatic success spread through the West and led to the acceptance of China as an instant strategic ally in the continuing global competition between the two super-Powers. Chinese support was important to those who advocated the containing of expansionist Soviet designs in the Pacific by strategic denial, and there was little opposition to Chinese foreign-policy initiatives in the area.

In very short order, Beijing set up diplomatic relations with Western Samoa in 1975, and with Papua New Guinea in 1976. By the end of the decade there were resident missions in those two countries, all achieved with little fanfare. Thus it was not surprising that the Chinese decision to cordon off an area to the west of Hawaii to conduct intercontinental missile tests in 1980 was met with very little international or intra-regional opposition. Contrast this with the hue and cry which followed the Soviet expanded-airport-for-fishing-access proposal to Tonga in 1976.

South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone

The inability of Pacific island nations to have their basic strategic concerns heeded by their major-Power friends is clearly illustrated by the efforts of Oceanic governments to enlist metropolitan government adherence to the region's single most dramatic expression of security concerns, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

The Treaty was the result of years of intra-regional negotiation between the South Pacific nations and international consultations with nuclear-weapon States aimed at forging the world's second treaty requiring military denuclearization of an inhabited region in perpetuity.

The Treaty of Rarotonga—adopted by the South Pacific Forum in Rarotonga, the Cook Islands, on 6 August 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the destruction of Hiroshima by an atomic weapon—is similar in some ways to the 1968 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which set up a nuclear-weapon-free Latin America and the Caribbean. The zone covers an enormous area of the world, from the meridian of longitude 115° west, which is the border of the Tlatelolco Treaty, to the west coast of Australia at 115° east, north to the Equator and south to the demilitarized Antarctica. Unlike the Latin American Treaty, however, the South Pacific Treaty explicitly states the right of every nation to decide for itself whether or not to accept visits and transit by nuclear-armed or nuclear-propelled vessels in order to take into account the strategic concerns of the nuclear-weapon State allies of the fourteen members of the South Pacific Forum, primarily the United States. Nevertheless, the United States, the United Kingdom and France have chosen, at least for the time being, not to adhere to the additional protocols of the Treaty, by which they would have undertaken to apply its key provisions to territories over which it has jurisdiction, not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any party to the Treaty, and to refrain from nuclear testing within the zone. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and China have signed the Protocols relevant to them but the Soviet Union has made certain reservations concerning its commitment.

More Arms on the Way

Pacific island States are also concerned with major-Power initiatives in other parts of the Pacific basin. The growing military capabilities of Japan, largely accompanied by highly-publicized urgings from Washington for Tokyo to pick up more of the defence tabs in the Pacific, make some island nations more than a little nervous. However, islander leaders do take comfort in the declaration by Japanese Foreign Minister Kurunari, in 1987, that Tokyo intended to strengthen its assistance to the region. Because of its sheer economic strength and size, however, a larger Japanese presence, according to the 1988 Pacific Aid Initiative report produced by the Tokyo-based Foundation for Advanced Information and Research, "could have a large and irremediably negative effect on the Pacific islands", if it is not carefully mapped out in advance. In that sense, it added, "Pacific island policy will become a touchstone for Japanese diplomatic policy in general".

As the newly-independent and democratic island States grapple with economic survival and the mending of frayed relations with the metropolitan Powers, the prospect of dealing with yet another military presence in the region is an unwelcome one.

Concerns for the 1990s

In the subregion itself, there are enough problems to cope with. Thanks to the Matignon accords, which among other things allow for independence in ten years, there is peace in New Caledonia, but it is a fragile one in a volatile atmosphere already highly charged with tensions generated by too much bloodshed and a lingering intercommunal mistrust.

While New Caledonia is quiet for the moment, indications are that, to the east, calls for independence in Tahiti may ignite French Polynesia. It will probably become increasingly difficult for France to applaud democratic changes in Eastern Europe while dampening similar calls for freedom in its own territories. Insurrection in both New Caledonia and French Polynesia would place France in very difficult straits indeed.

Other newer actors have bowed onto the Pacific stage as the 1990s begin, sometimes bringing with them conflicts far removed from Oceania. The much-publicized presence of Libyans in Vanuatu and New Caledonia caused an outcry in Australia—which has its own office in Tripoli—and New Zealand. Apart from some training for a small number of Melanesians, however, this relationship has not blossomed.

The Libyan connection, however, may have drawn yet another outsider into the region, Israel. The Israelis came late but they made their mark felt very quickly by setting up an embassy in Fiji accredited to eight other Oceanic States as well. The Israeli President even made the long trek south to Fiji and Tonga.

Indonesia is playing a bigger role in the region, particularly with Papua New Guinea, which lies just a border away from Irian Jaya. Also from the north-west comes Malaysia with offers of military and other assistance to the Government of Fiji, which is reeling from cooled relations with its traditional suppliers, Australia and New Zealand. India was also quick to increase its interest in Fiji following the military coup there which, among other things, curtailed the rights of Fiji's ethnic Indian population.

The Government of Taiwan is an assiduous cultivator of ties with the Pacific States and has succeeded in setting up trade and diplomatic presences in island nations where in some cases functioning offices representing the People's Republic of China are also established—a very rare occurrence in other parts of the world but made possible in the Pacific islands by the fact that many of the island Chinese communities, with their commercial clout, retain strong ties with Taipei.

Thus, the Pacific island States, whether they like it or not, are being drawn inexorably into a volatile diplomatic scene featuring their traditional friends and metropolitan associates and newer outsiders, whose real intentions have yet to be made clear. The metropolitan Powers applauding the fresh breezes of change in Eastern Europe will have to realize that these currents will be felt in Oceania too, and they will feel the need to redefine the meaning of being a great Power. Those major Powers will need to resist the temptation to supply arms to island States, as such strategies inevitably produce more costs than profits. Strategic concerns in the Pacific have been formulated mainly with a view to avoiding war: perhaps it is time to re-focus and look for ways to strengthen the prospects for prolonged peace in the region.

What is clear is that the basis for Pacific security in the next decade lies in independent island nations with strong economies containing productive and engaged societies invigorated by democratic institutions. Now, more than ever, it is important for all players on the Pacific scene to identify and harmonize their shared values and common goals, and to work harder to reconcile, or live with, their differences. Failure to match their various security concerns will result in the metamorphosing of the current, eminently manageable, differences into conflicts with reverberations well outside the region.

Security Concerns

The Asian-Pacific World in Transition

Denis McLean

As the post-war crust crumbles in Eastern Europe, other issues loom into view. The transformation of Marxist systems in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe reveals once again the force of nationalism, so often the root cause of war in this destructive and tumultuous century. The old order changes: intractable and complex problems remain. Many are as ancient as human society itself: recourse to violence in pursuit of national objectives; the persistence of poverty, famine, disease, injustice, racial and religious intolerance. Others are more recent and the direct consequence of the pace of developments in the modern industrialized world: the weakness of many, perhaps most, modern nation States; the challenges of global climatic change, over-population, industrial pollution and the destruction of the natural environment. Others again are old challenges, made more devastating by modern technology: terrorism, civil strife and revolutionary struggle. Above all, there remains--as what should be the overwhelming preoccupation of the international system—the need to do so much more to achieve a fair and easier life for the vast majority of people.

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The Pacific Basin: the Challenge of Diversity

Along the western rim of the Pacific there is no equivalent of the regional fault that has divided east and west in Europe since 1945. The security equation is dominated by two very different factors. The first, and most potent, factor is the intersection, in the northern part of the region, of great-Power interests and strategic concerns on the part of the four most powerful countries in the world—China, Japan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. The second factor is the perpetuation, in different parts of the region, of ancient enmities, linked sometimes with religious or ideological fervour, or exacerbated by differences between rich and poor and—often enough—by the intervention of outside Powers.

The mosaic of Asian-Pacific nations is made up of many nationalities and cultures; the geography is disparate and difficult; most significant of all, in terms of the security preoccupations of the region, power is unevenly spread. The single most striking feature is diversity.

Population Density

In terms of population density, compare, for example, China itself with what is in effect an offshoot of China: Singapore. China has an area of 9,561,000 square kilometres, and in 1986 recorded a population of over a billion people, the equivalent of 110.5 per square kilometre. The city-State of Singapore is 600 square kilometres in area and has a population of 2,613,000; at 4,355 persons per square kilometre, Singapore is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. In the Pacific, New Zealand by contrast is 269,000 square kilometres in area, with a population of 3.4 million (12.6 persons per square kilometre). Japan, with a land area of 370,000 square kilometres and a population of 122.27 million (1987), has a population density of

330.4 persons per square kilometre, almost three times that of the People's Republic of China, 26 times that of New Zealand.

Of another order again in the region, at least in terms of population density, is Australia; the island continent is the fifth largest country in the world in terms of area and one of the least populated: 16.4 million persons live in 7,680,000 square kilometres, or just over 2 per square kilometre. Again, at another extreme in the Asian-Pacific region are the small island States of the Pacific Ocean. The phosphate island of Nauru has an area of 22 square kilometres and a population of 8,000; smaller again are Niue, with a population of no more than 4,000, and the Tokelau Islands, with a population of 2,000.

Per Capita Wealth

In terms of per capita wealth, another perspective emerges. Nauru is one of the wealthiest countries in the world, with a gross domestic product per head of $A 21,400. In Singapore, wealth per capita was $US 12,626. Such statistics are hardly a satisfactory measure of relative weight or of the security issues within the Asian-Pacific region. They certainly cannot measure quality of life or other major factors involved in the security equations. They do no more than underscore the diversity of the Western Pacific and the wide range of national entities which must be taken into account in any attempt to come to terms with the concerns of individual countries.

Recent Events

What is more, this year's events in the region have taken, in some respects, the opposite course from that charted in Europe. The miserable struggle of the Cambodian people for internal order and decency goes on and on. Refugees from Indochina, whether displaced by war or in hope of some relief from a harsh and threadbare existence, continue to flood the resettlement camps. In Burma, repression and the restoration of military power have followed the high expectations of reform generated in 1988. In the Philippines, the Government of President Aquino has been assailed by a further military coup. The framework for authority in Manila is now weak and the Government must proceed with caution. In attempting to bring guerrilla insurgency under control it is challenged by anti-communist forces, ostensibly because it is dealing with the terrorists.

Regional Groupings

As regards groupings, the Asian-Pacific world is in transition. There is no long history of regionalism and there are no institutions capable of bringing together the many-sided elements in the regional equation. Few now recall the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), an initiative taken by a grouping of nine countries of the region during the 1960s to meet regularly to try to develop a (generally anti-communist) focus on matters of common political and security concern. With neither a strong sense of homogeneity nor experience of working together the participants found that such an arrangement lacked the necessary strength to cope with the intricacies of the region. It was evident also that at that time, with the Viet Nam War the major issue, major-Power preoccupations were dominant. At a subregional level, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has become, in the course of almost twenty years, a principal element in the foreign policies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand—with Brunei Darussalam a more recent member. ASEAN has served as a means of concerting national points of view and promoting common interests, particularly in matters of economic collaboration and development assistance. Most important perhaps, the

Association has served as a sounding-board for many of the concerns of the region, particularly in respect of Indochina. It is a measure of the respect that ASEAN has attained that major external Powers—the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the European Community—attach importance to their status as dialogue partners of the ASEAN group—so much so that they are almost invariably represented by senior ministers at the annual discussion meetings of ASEAN.

The South Pacific Forum, established in 1971, is another important subregional grouping, comprising the island States of the Pacific plus Australia and New Zealand. Annual meetings are held to consider the issues facing the region and to plan regional co-operative programmes to meet some of the particular difficulties in trade, transport and communications, and matters relating to fishing and the law of the sea, which face the often small Pacific Island countries.

In recent years, the questions of decolonization and nuclear testing within the region, and the onset of marked instability in some parts of the Pacific, have also claimed the attention of Forum countries. The Forum has established specialist secretariats, for example the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation and the Forum Fisheries Agency, to co-ordinate efforts in certain fields. The Forum also provides a focus for outside Powers with interests in the region, which have now been invited to an annual discussion meeting.

In 1989 an initiative of the Australian Prime Minister to promote a wider association of Pacific rim countries for the purpose of co-ordinating economic and development interests began to bear fruit. A meeting was held at Canberra early in November, at which it was agreed to proceed further with exploring practical measures of economic co-operation. The new grouping has been tentatively called Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

In other regions of the world—Africa and Latin America—there are single institutions capable of providing a focus for the concerns of regional States. No such concentration of interests has yet been possible in Asia and the Pacific. The contrast with Europe is even more marked. While the coherence of Eastern Europe is changing, its economies still have much in common. In Western Europe, the European Community derives strength from its political institutions, legal processes, and far-reaching programmes of economic and agricultural co-operation. The Asian Development Bank is one regional agency in the Western Pacific that has a mandate to promote economic progress; however, in the absence of the Soviet Union, Viet Nam and China, its membership is hardly representative of the region. Business/governmental organizations such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council provide some further coherence for economic interests.

The World Economy

In view of the phenomenon which is present-day Japan and the associated rapid economic progress of the Asian new industrial countries—the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, with Thailand generally reckoned to be the most recent addition—the region is a driving force in the world economy. It appears too that the success of these countries is contagious. Indonesia and Malaysia follow close behind the leading members of the group of so-called Asian "tigers". What were regarded, not so long ago, as developing countries are showing the way to solid economic progress associated with noteworthy political stability and a growing sense of national confidence. Within the space of 12 to 15 years this process had dramatically changed the geopolitical map. The archipelagos and islands of the Western Pacific are no longer an uninterrupted zone of instability and underdevelopment. Sources of insecurity deriving from political discontent and ideological struggle are gradually vanishing. There has been no territorial aggrandizement or assertion of military power behind the startling economic progress of the region. Nor has the leap forward of these remarkable countries been a consequence of the exploitation of their own sources of mineral wealth. Rather they have achieved spectacular economic growth by harnessing the industrial techniques of the modern age to the opportunities of an increasingly free international industrial trading system.

Regional Security Issues

There remain serious regional security issues and challenges. In Indo-China, the fighting has flowed across international borders. Even there, however, the Soviet Union has exercised influence in achieving the withdrawal from Cambodia of Vietnamese forces. However, inability to agree at an international level on a régime acceptable to all contending parties has meant that the long and bitter travail of the Khmer people continues. Territorial disputes over the islands and reefs in the South China Sea have led to military confrontation between China and Viet Nam; Malaysia and the Philippines are also claimants with strong interests. The dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union over Soviet occupation, in the last days of the Second World War, of four small islands to the north of Hokkaido continues to be a major impediment to constructive relations between these two major regional Powers. The border between China and Viet Nam has been the cause of major fighting in recent years, while that between China and the Soviet Union along the Amur River has periodically raised levels of tension in the region. In South-East Asia, Thailand has been in military confrontation with Laos over border alignments; while Malaysia and the Philippines have, it seems, resolved long-standing differences about their respective boundary lines to the north of Sabah. The border between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia is in effect a major global boundary between the Pacific and the Asian worlds. As such it has been the scene of military activity on both sides to keep a check on the flow of people across what is an ill-defined line in difficult country. The presence of foreign military bases and/or other military installations is an irritant to sectors of political opinion in several countries. In the changed relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States, the continuation of their bases in Viet Nam and the Philippines has become increasingly uncertain. Direct super-Power involvement in South-East Asia may well come to be seen, sooner rather than later, as no longer required or appropriate. All of the ASEAN countries now have their own effective military capabilities; all maintain an intense interest in the strategic waterway which bisects the region.

The strategic relationship of the United States with Japan is however far from being a thing of the past. Any abrupt, unplanned changes in the present subtle balance of interests would be a cause for global concern. Change can nevertheless be expected as the global alliance system is reconsidered in the light of shifts in the strategic balance elsewhere. In this context, the interactions between the major Powers—in the north-west of the region—remain delicately poised. There is nothing immutable about the respective positions of the Powers involved—particularly when set against the forces of regionalism and nationalism now at work in the Soviet Union and, it seems, in China.

The same considerations apply to the animus that marks the relationship between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea at the 38th parallel. The new-found wealth of Taiwan and the recent tragic failure to find a political balance in the People's Republic of China decrease the chances for peaceful settlement of the burning issue of reconciliation between the two. Political stability in the Philippines has proved elusive and insurgency remains a serious threat. The sorry civil strife in Burma has locked that country back in on itself. Indonesian reconciliation with independence movements in East Timor and Irian Jaya is, to say the least, incomplete. In the South Pacific, military coups in Fiji, riots in Vanuatu, threats of secession in Papua New Guinea, violent confrontations in New Caledonia, an act of terrorism by French officials in New Zealand, and concerns about external meddling in some small island States have shattered illusions of a calm and sequestered part of the world.

The picture is therefore dominated by the dynamic economic advance of several countries, but this must be balanced against the many challenging and all too often tragic manifestations of political and social pressures which cannot yet be accommodated. There is no reason however for concern about major challenges to the existing balance of power in the region, such as occurred before and during the Second World War. There is nothing to suggest that one or other of the major Powers involved in the region intends to mount direct military action in support of its interests. While there remain powerful military forces capable of being brought to bear should the strategic balance be broken, there appears to be little likelihood that this will occur.

While the overall picture in Asia and the Pacific is now encouraging, the recent history has been one of deep divisions and painful struggle. The anti-colonial impetus has largely been removed. It is nevertheless clear that many security concerns are not superficial and will not readily be smoothed over. The region has been, for a number of years, the arena for the contest between conflicting ideologies. Regional revolutionary struggle thus became enmeshed in the larger confrontation between major global interests, so much so that the South-East Asian region became a by-word for instability and dislocation. Around the entire rimlands of the Eurasian continent, struggles for national self-determination against established colonial régimes broke out at the conclusion of the Second World War.

The travails of the South-East Asian and wider Asian regions have been many and costly. For many years it appeared that the region would, for a long time to come, be beset by tumult and political instability. Concerns about security extended beyond the immediate region to influence the attitudes and policies of Australia and New Zealand, both countries with vested interests in stability and constructive development in the whole broad zone of the western Pacific. Great-Power preoccupations focused not only on the outcome of the ideological struggle in the area, but on the strategic importance of preserving a balance of power, particularly in relation to the vital trade routes traversing the region. Against the evidence of a turbulent recent history, there will clearly continue to be widespread and continuing sensitivity to the complexity and inherent difficulties of this part of the world.

The Scope for Disarmament and Arms Control

In the circumstances it is difficult to be optimistic about the prospects for meaningful disarmament or arms-control negotiations in the region. The political and military backcloth to the successful disarmament initiatives taken in Europe is simply not present in Asia. So far it has been possible to achieve some limited progress only by way of an adjunct to the agreements on major weapons systems in the European theatre. Thus the Western side sought to ensure that intermediate-range missiles would not just be transferred to Asian targets when a global limit of 100 missiles was set for each side in the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles adopted in 1987. Further development of that agreement to eliminate these classes of weapons entirely has of course removed this question from super-Power calculations in Asia. China and the Soviet

Union have succeeded in reaching agreement on major reductions in ground forces deployed along their common border. For both parties the issue has been less the attainment of balanced security at lower levels of forces than a response to other pressing domestic considerations. China in particular is making impressive reductions in overall troop strengths. The aim however has been to reshape the People's Liberation Army as a more modern and leaner force, better equipped and more mobile than the previous mass army. The Soviet Union for its part has seen redeployment away from the Chinese border as an important means of reducing defence costs.

In Eastern Europe an entirely new strategic perspective is beginning to open up in which the old presumptions of imminent danger have become redundant. The interests of the principal Asian-Pacific actors are also changing, so that strategic confrontation is being blurred. Japan has become the major economic partner of China; the United States is concerned to preserve the openness of China to the West; the Soviet Union has staked its irrefutable claims as a Pacific Power; there are powerful interests in Soviet Asia in the promotion of economic linkages with Japan; the interest of the Soviet Union in rebuilding constructive relations with China was made manifest by the historic visit which Mikhail Gorbachev paid to Beijing in May 1989. There is no longer any clear demarcation of ideology, let alone of strategic or economic interests. In the absence of effective regional institutions, careful and balanced statecraft is required and that in turn calls for openness and understanding, qualities which are, it seems, difficult to develop after many years of suspicion and hostility. Arms control in the Asian-Pacific region must also start from the fact of a notable increase in the acquisition of modern weapons systems by South-East Asian countries. Policies of self-reliance and independence demand nothing less.

Regional and subregional approaches certainly offer possibilities. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty is predicated on this principle. The Treaty has given South Pacific countries the opportunity to declare their commitment to renunciation of the acquisition, manufacture, stationing, or testing of nuclear explosive devices. The area of the Treaty joins to the east the zone of application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. To the south the Treaty area abuts on that of the Antarctic Treaty, which has long provided for exclusion of nuclear testing and the banning of military activity. The concept of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia has been given earnest consideration by the ASEAN members. Australia has taken an important initiative in focusing international attention on the need to reinforce and bring up to date existing international provisions for banning chemical weapons. There are hopes in the international community that it will prove possible for the super-Powers to extend their agreements about intermediate-range nuclear missiles on land to similar sea-borne weapons systems. So far however there is little incentive to promote such concepts in the Asian-Pacific region. The strategic issues are perhaps less pressing than the regional. At that level too, however, history is against rapid progress.

Conclusion

The Asian-Pacific region has its own dynamism. It is plainly not immune to the sweeping changes in the global order that have had their origins in recent events in Europe. At the same time, it is itself rapidly developing and moving away from a recent turbulent history. Security concerns for all the countries of the region are nevertheless bound to be shaped to a large extent by experience of that stormy past. Above all, it will be recalled that the catastrophe of all-out war in the Asian-Pacific region during the years from 1935 to 1945 was not confined to the immediate area of Japan. The maritime character of much of the region, together with the interpenetration of interests of most if not all of its member countries, ensures a wide sharing of strategic concerns.

The most pervasive danger would plainly arise should the complex balance of forces of the region again be disturbed by one of the major Powers seeking to pursue its objectives by military means. There is however no such prospect in view. Moreover, intra-regional challenges to the established order appear to be lessening. There remain many sources of tension. Fighting goes on and many lives are continuing to be blighted in the process. The fact that the struggles of the region—however regrettable in themselves—are now mainly at the lower end of the military spectrum offers hope, at least, that it will be possible to bring such tragedies as Cambodia under control, perhaps by collective action under the auspices of the United Nations. That in itself would be a new step for the region and a cause for further optimism for the future.

Peace and Security in Asia and the Pacific— A Vietnamese Approach

Trinh Xuan Lang

The region of Asia and the Pacific is most impressive in size. It accounts for two thirds of the world population and three fifths of the area of the planet (including land and sea). The characteristics of the region play a central role in the peace and security concerns of the Asian and Pacific nations.

In the era after the Second World War, thinking has been dominated by the bipolar confrontation between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its effects on global security or on the national security of individual States. The stress on the role of the major Powers has also led to neglect of the security concerns of medium and small States, except with regard to their importance in the larger strategic context. The security concerns of the States of the Asia and Pacific region can be analysed only in the global strategic context, which, in turn, provides a basis for a regional approach to the settlement of peace and security issues of the region.

Asia and the Pacific

The problem of peace and security in Asia and the Pacific is similar to that in Europe and the whole world.

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However, this region has special characteristics of its own. Forty-five years ago, all countries in this region—except the Soviet Union, the United States and Japan—were colonies or semi-colonies of Western Powers. The most striking feature of the situation was and is the struggle for freedom of all peoples in the area and their achievement of political independence through different means, peaceful or military. The coming into existence of the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China, the victorious armed struggle of the peoples of Indonesia, Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, among others, have added glorious pages to the history of national liberation movements and have altered the political map of this region. It is noteworthy that during the same period there has been no modification whatsoever of the map of Europe. In spite of a bitter cold war, a state of peaceful co-existence between the two groupings of nations with different political and social systems has, in fact, prevailed.

In 1954, India and China advanced the five principles of peaceful co-existence, the Pancha Shila. The 1955 Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung, Indonesia, laid the foundation of solidarity among Asian, African and Latin American peoples in their struggle for independence and freedom and led to the founding of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in 1961. The rising tide of peace, national independence and non-alignment in the region paralysed and then wiped out such military alliances as the South-East Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization.

Today, peace and development have characterized the prevailing trends in the Asian and Pacific area. Mongolia's proposal for the establishment of a mechanism for the non-use of force in relations among countries in Asia and the Pacific has been widely supported. The increasing endeavours of the hinterland and littoral States to convene the International Conference on the Indian Ocean heralds their contribution to the promotion of peace and security in the region. The Soviet statement at Vladivostok and the Indo-Soviet New Delhi statement have expressed the desire of the Asian-Pacific nations for peace and have charted a practical way to attain regional peace and security.

As the first victims of the atomic bomb, the people of Asia and the Pacific are also among the fiercest opponents of the use of nuclear weapons in their region or elsewhere in the world. In this respect, Japan has proposed three nuclear-free principles, and thousands of cities and towns in that country have declared themselves nuclear-free. With the Treaty of Rarotonga, the South Pacific has become a nuclear-free zone and there is now a growing tendency among South-East Asian countries to follow suit. Of the three nuclear Powers in Asia and the Pacific, the Soviet Union and China have committed themselves never to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

At the same time, most countries in Asia and the Pacific are making every effort to get rid of poverty and backwardness, and are striving for economic development; this is one of the main factors motivating them to safeguard peace, security and stability in the region together with their own independence and freedom. According to data provided by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, there are as many as 510 million people in this region living in poverty—89 per cent of the poverty-stricken population of the world. The demand for economic development is now a driving force making this region the most dynamic in the world. This dynamism reveals itself in the high rate of progress recorded by India, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and some other countries. The new stage of the scientific and technological revolution that began in the 1970s will bring about achievements of decisive significance in different fields in decades to come.

South-East Asia

South-East Asia has been the scene of greatest tension in Asia and the Pacific since the end of the Second World War. Three major wars, involving many world Powers, have been unleashed in this region in the past four decades. This area was also the scene of dozens of lesser wars and conflicts, in which hundreds of thousands of armed men participated. Millions of people in Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma and other countries rose against foreign invaders for freedom and democracy. As the result of their struggle, all of the countries in South-East Asia have regained their national independence. A radical change occurred in this area in the sense that, in the past, the destinies of South-East Asian nations were decided in Western capitals, whereas now they are in the hands of the South-East Asian peoples, who have become the real masters of their lands.

The change in South-East Asia is due mainly to the incentive created by the struggle of peoples in the area for political and economic independence and against colonialism and foreign aggression. Nevertheless, two other factors come into play, rendering the situation in this part of the world more explosive and complicated than in many other regions.

The first factor is the tendency of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia to follow the path to socialism, contrary to the will of certain colonial and major Powers and their followers in the area. All forms of opposition have been raised against those three countries, from crude intervention and intimidation, political isolation and economic embargo to protracted and bloody wars of aggression, with devastating consequences in terms of human lives and resources. However, these three peoples are determined to follow their chosen way. As a result, there has emerged in South-East Asia the same phenomenon as in Europe after the Second World War—the existence of the two main groupings of nations with different political and social systems—the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Indochina—whose relationship can best be maintained through peaceful co-existence.

Another important factor lies in the strategic interests of great Powers in South-East Asia—namely the United States, China and the Soviet Union, more particularly the United States and China—and their triangular relationship to this area. In view of the changes in their strategic interests during the past forty-odd years, that complex relationship has undergone radical changes decade after decade. In the 1950s China allied itself with the Soviet Union against the United States, but in the 1960s it switched to opposition to both the Soviet Union and the United States, while in those two decades the United States was strongly against both China and the Soviet Union. In the 1970s China went along with the United States against the Soviet Union and this fully accorded with the intentions of the United States to take advantage of its relationship with China in order to contain its main enemy in the world—the Soviet Union. In the 1980s efforts were made by those three countries to improve and normalize their dual and triangular relations.

Needless to say, the relationship—and the changing mood—among the three big Powers has greatly affected the situation in South-East Asia. The conflict or convergence of interests of the three big Powers always brings with it an alignment of smaller regional Powers opposing each other, causing instability and disharmony in the region.

Faced with that situation, after the end of the Viet Nam war, many South-East Asian countries tried to embark upon a policy of peace and peaceful co-existence among the nations in the area and to resist the interference of big Powers in the affairs of the region. In this respect, we might mention Indonesian President Suharto's concept of national and regional resilience, by which we understand that nations in the area and South-East Asia as a whole should be strong enough to oppose foreign influence and intervention. In February 1976, following the concept of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) put forward in the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration, the ASEAN summit meeting held at Bali, Indonesia, adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South-East Asia, both of which are open to all countries in the region. In 1984, ASEAN again proposed that South-East Asia become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The major principles of these proposals, if implemented, would undoubtedly promote regional peace and security.

In July 1976—right after national reunification—the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam made public its four-point policy towards its neighbours in South-East Asia:

a Respect for one another's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-intervention in one another's affairs, equality and mutual benefit;

b Solution of all disputes among countries in the area through peaceful means, without foreign interference;

c Non-participation in any military alliance and refusal to allow its territory to be used against neighbouring countries in the region;

d Co-existence with one another in peace, friendship and co-operation, and the conversion of South-East Asia into a zone of peace, independence and neutrality.

We fully share President Suharto's concept of national and regional resilience and hold the view that all regional matters must be solved by the countries of the region without interference from outside. In the mid-1980s, Viet Nam declared its readiness to adhere to ZOPFAN and the Bali Treaty and favoured the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in our region. In 1988, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, on its own behalf and on behalf of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Viet

Nam proposed establishing a zone of peace, freedom, neutrality, friendship and co-operation in South-East Asia.

With détente and the normalization of relations among the United States, China and the Soviet Union, and in the present circumstances in South-East Asia where the burning issue of Cambodia is in the process of being solved peacefully, conditions are now favourable for the realization of all these lofty initiatives and proposals for peace, security, stability and co-operation in this long-suffering region. Attainment of these common goals still requires the concerted endeavours of all the countries and peoples in the region.

The Problem of Cambodia

Cambodia has long been an area of tension in South-East Asia, a fact that has been attributed by some to the presence of Vietnamese volunteer troops in Cambodia. Unless the subject is clearly understood, no real solution will be possible.

The Cambodian question goes back to the extermination in the "killing fields" of 3 million Cambodians at the hands of the genocidal Pol Pot régime. At that time, worldwide indignation at the atrocities reached its climax. Public opinion and many statesmen joined in recommending that troops from the third world be dispatched urgently to Cambodia to overthrow the genocidal régime and save the Cambodian people, as had been done in the case of certain other brutal régimes.

In 1979 the Vietnamese volunteer troops were sent to Cambodia to fight alongside the Cambodian people against the genocidal clique. Three years later, as the rebirth of the Cambodian people was making progress, Viet Nam began withdrawing part of its forces on a yearly basis, until they were pulled out completely by 26 September 1989.

The two Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM), held in July 1988 and February 1989 respectively, have created the necessary conditions, internationally, for the Cambodian parties to enter into talks with a view to finding a solution to the internal aspect. On the basis of the talks between the two sides in Cambodia and of the conclusions of the two Jakarta Informal Meetings, the International Conference on Cambodia was held in Paris from 30 July to 30 August 1989 under the co-presidency of France and Indonesia. Although a few substantial differences still remain, the Paris Conference agreed on many important issues and laid the groundwork for an early, comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem. It is generally accepted that the momentum generated by the Paris Conference must be maintained and that the initial results must be built upon further if lasting peace and stability in Cambodia and in all of South-East Asia are to be restored in the near future.

The Paris Conference did in fact reach an agreement on all the fundamental and long-term issues of an over-all solution to the Cambodian problem, namely: total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia; non-return to power of the genocidal régime in Cambodia; cessation of foreign military aid to the Cambodian parties; respect for the independence, sovereignty, neutrality and non-alignment of Cambodia; implementation of the Cambodian people's right to self-determination through free, fair and democratic general elections; an international guarantee of the agreements and the setting up of a body, the International Control Mechanism (ICM), for supervision of the implementation of the agreements.

Two issues remain outstanding. The first is the setting up of a provisional authority with the task of holding general elections in the transitional period between the total pull-out of Vietnamese troops and the general elections. The second is the United Nations role in the International Control Mechanism.

As the question of an interim authority during the transition period in Cambodia relates to Cambodia's internal affairs, it is to be decided by the Cambodians, free from outside interference. No one has the right to force the Cambodian people to share power with the perpetrators of genocide and to take the risk of testing co-existence with them. Jeane Kirkpatrick, former Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, wrote in an article for the *Washington Post* of 13 October 1989:

> "The Vietnamese army, which was the only important obstacle to the Khmer Rouge return to power, has been removed. The Cambodian people are now confronted with re-establishment of the genocide that symbolized Pol Pot's rule. The Khmer Rouge say they will behave differently should they return to power. They say they have revised their beliefs and goals and changed their leadership. But refugees report that in the border communities controlled by the Khmer Rouge they rule as they ruled Cambodia—by terror—and that no matter who has the title, Pol Pot still has the power."

On the other hand, merely leaving the power struggle in Cambodia to the Cambodian parties to resolve by themselves while foreign countries continue to supply military aid to the warring parties and oppose each other over Cambodia's internal affairs would be dangerous and might turn Cambodia's internal dispute into an international conflict. In our view, the best option would be to encourage the Cambodian parties to sit down together and settle their internal affairs while ensuring that the settlement would in no way be detrimental to any country. Any future Cambodian government should pursue a policy of neutrality and friendly relations with all other countries, and with neighbouring countries in particular. This would be fully in conformity with the principles of respect for Cambodia's sovereignty, with the long-term peace and security interests of Cambodia as well as other countries in the region, and with the agreements reached at the Jakarta Informal Meetings, the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the summits meetings of the non-aligned countries.

As for the role of the United Nations, there is a point that needs to be spelt out here. Viet Nam does not object to—indeed it even welcomes—a United Nations role in a Cambodian settlement and in an international control mechanism in Cambodia, provided however that the United Nations takes a fair and impartial attitude towards the Cambodian issue.

Viet Nam has more,than once expressed its appreciation of the personal efforts made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to encourage dialogue aimed at a political solution to the Cambodian question. At the Paris Conference, Cambodia and Viet Nam approved from the very beginning the Secretary-General's proposal with regard to dispatching a fact-finding mission to Cambodia.

It is our hope that the United Nations will adopt such a fair and impartial stand in keeping with the positive developments embodied in the JIMs, the talks between the two Cambodian sides, the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the summit meetings of the non-aligned countries and will therefore play a major role in this regard.

After the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in September 1989, the upsurge of the fighting among the Cambodian parties has given rise to general concern all over the world regarding the threat of a return to power of the Khmer Rouge. Many initiatives and proposals have been set forth in an attempt to prevent civil war and the recurrence of the genocidal Pol Pot régime and to promote the search for a solution. Among those initiatives are the proposal made on 23 September 1989 by the Prime Minister of Thailand, His Excellency Mr. Chatichai Choonhavan, for a cease-fire in Cambodia and the convening of an informal meeting to discuss the setting up of an international mechanism with a mandate to verify Vietnamese troop withdrawal and to supervise the cease-fire and the cessation of all foreign arms supply to all parties in Cambodia; and the joint statement of 23 September 1989 by the United States and the Soviet Union regarding a moratorium on military assistance to all Cambodian factions. Most recently, the Australian Foreign Minister, His Excellency Mr. Gareth Evans, made a proposal regarding a United Nations-controlled interim administration in Cambodia during the transition period between the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the holding of free, fair and democratic general elections. This would necessarily involve having the Cambodian seat in the United Nations currently occupied by Democratic Kampuchea left vacant.

Viet Nam and the State of Cambodia greatly appreciate all those initiatives and are prepared to participate in any meeting with other parties and countries concerned in order to find a political solution to the Cambodian problem. They are also ready to take the recent Australian initiative into serious consideration. It is our firm belief that with the good will and reasonableness of all parties concerned, in particular the parties directly involved, a satisfactory solution to the Cambodian issue will soon be achieved.

Today international relations are entering a new stage and differ substantially from those of the past. The new situation requires of us a new way of thinking. Many old concepts and approaches which were valid for decades and deeply affected international relations in the past are today losing their significance and cannot be applied to restructuring international relations. The renewal of thinking is not an easy process. For all nations of the world, and for all South-East Asian nations in particular, this is a struggle between the new and the old.

South-East Asia is on the threshold of a new era, an era of peace, security, friendship and co-operation. In harmony with the present general trend in world politics, the new and realistic approach to peace and security should be applicable to our region also.

Issues on Conversion

International Dialogue and the Conversion of the Armaments Industry

Fabrizio Battistelli and
Alberto Castagnola

The 1990s and the New International Scenario

After reaching a low point in the first half of the 1980s, East-West relations have undergone a gradual improvement, which culminated in December 1989 in the summit meeting between General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President George Bush in Malta. From the tone and substance of the discussions between the two leaders, it is possible to deduce that this new phase in international relations will be accompanied by a process of détente in the military sphere as well.

It is no coincidence that Mr. Gorbachev's new strategic thought on the shared character of security issues has received such keen attention in the West. In fact, while bearing the mark of Mr. Gorbachev's innovative personality, it may be viewed as the putting into practice of a theoretical approach, deeply rooted in the last two decades of Western culture, a systematic approach, based on consideration of the limits on

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the growth and the interdependence of the various subsystems. These considerations spring from a whole series of critical events, ranging from the 1973 oil crisis to the Chernobyl catastrophe. The opinion has become widespread in the public at large, in scientific circles, and even among politicians, that the survival and well-being of each separate part are closely linked to the survival and well-being of all the other parts of the world system. If this is the case in the economic and environmental spheres, it is difficult to imagine that it would not be so in the field of security also.

Above and beyond the outcome of current negotiations on arms control (conventional forces in Vienna, strategic weapons in Geneva), concerning which there is in any case reason to feel optimistic, the path to disarmament appears to be cleared, at least as far as the North is concerned. Without underestimating the dramatic nature of hot spots still remaining in the South, the North has up till now had the dubious distinction of bearing the greatest responsibility for, and suffering the highest exposure to, the risks of a generalized conflict—the consequences of which would be apocalyptic.

This does not mean, of course, that disarmament represents a path of no return for either the North or the South. Even setting aside the political dimension and concentrating solely on the socio-economic aspect, which is the object of this paper, one can see forces that are in favour of, and others which are opposed to, such a process. A look at the two systems—the socialist and the market economy, represented by the USSR and the United States—reveals both analogies and differences as far as conversion factors are concerned. In the USSR, public proprietorship of the means of production renders the relocation of investment priorities from military to civilian sectors relatively simple. Were the political leadership of that country to become aware (as it appears today to have done) of the unbearable cost of competing militarily with the West, there would be no private capital capable of opposing the new directives. The case is not problem-free, however. The military-industrial complex is not, in fact, an exclusively economic phenomenon but rather a point of intersection of economic, political and social phenomena. Even at a favourable political conjuncture such as the present one, the inertia of social and institutional factors involved in the military apparatus in the USSR should not be underestimated. Apart from professional military men, whose support of the new course may well be conditioned by their identification with the institutions to which they belong, some workers may attempt to resist the erosion of privileges and guarantees heretofore associated with the military production industries.

In the United States, conversion is destined to encounter obstacles that are at least as serious. There, where the labour market is very dynamic, social constraints will be fewer but difficulties of an economic order will be greater because many private companies participate in military production and obtain exceptionally good technological and financial rewards from it. Federal funds allotted to defence, furthermore, have up to now played the part of a Keynesian multiplier, which it will be possible to replace with public expenditure in the civilian sphere only after major social and political innovations.

Conversion Hypotheses

The idea that military industries should be transformed into firms producing civilian goods is not a new one. In the mid-1970s, peace movements in both the United Kingdom and the United States and independent research centres formulated such a hypothesis in terms of its political possibilities and technical feasibility. It must be remembered, furthermore, that at the end of the Second World War (two years earlier, even, in the United States), industries involved in military types of production rapidly transformed their structures to meet the new demand for civilian products.

What is more, modern firms have been organized in such a way as to allow for the rapid identification of new product types, and for the adoption of whatever steps are necessary to produce them; this is particularly true of multinational companies, especially if they operate in more than one sector (conglomerates), and of large national industrial groups, but it is also characteristic of many firms of average size.

The problems encountered by proposals for converting military industries must be examined, therefore, on several different levels, and it is there that the meaning and practicality of the hypotheses discussed in this paper should be assessed.

In the past, studies on the conversion of specific military industries and bases were carried out with a view to countering State and company plans to restructure them so as to increase their efficiency in the performance of activities of military interest. It was, in other words, a matter of concentrating production and installations and of eliminating what was deemed to be superfluous manpower; not of reducing activities of a military nature or of diversifying them towards civilian uses. In these cases, conversion hypotheses were aimed above all at saving jobs, and their main political merit—judging in retrospect—was that they suggested some civilian products which could have been made to avoid the firing of employees and the shutting-down of installations.

A second level of analysis concerns the indication that "disarmament/development" is a coupling of concepts which enjoys the favour of a large majority of the Members of the United Nations. From the beginning of the 1960s the United Nations began preparing analyses showing that significant and essential advantages would accrue to the development policies of the countries of the so-called third world from the reduction in military expenses which would follow in the wake of disarmament agreements. Despite the interest in such analyses, it is obvious that difficulties in communication between the great Powers and a spiralling tendency towards rearmament turned these numerous studies into academic exercises, almost entirely lacking in political effect. It is worth recalling that Sweden alone developed a plan for the conversion of the national war industry, despite the fact that the United Nations had invited all producer countries to do so. Even in this case, therefore, conversion hypotheses were validated only by external conditions, that is, by the state of negotiations on disarmament between the two super-Powers and by trends in the international weapons market.

Finally, even when conversion hypotheses were outlined by the peace movement, considered in all the multiplicity of its aspects, it was difficult to deny that more often than not they were only statements of principle based on a strongly negative opinion of arms production in general (and of arms exportation in particular). In reality, the economic importance of the war industry, the role it plays in the industrial policies of the major producer countries, the nationalistic value which it has for many countries that are in many ways underdeveloped: all those factors have often been underestimated. If this is the picture that can be drawn of the last thirty years, what has changed in recent times? Are the changes that have occurred great enough to render proposals for the conversion of military industries worthy of realistic and urgent consideration?

Conversion Constraints and Perspectives

The turning-point in the international situation occurred in 1987 with the signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—the INF Treaty—because it was then that the two super-Powers finally gave a clear indication that their military relations could be organized in a new way. From the economic point of view, furthermore, it should be recalled that for the first time there was an agreement to dismantle missiles and warheads, and a part of the market was then closed to the industries in that sector. On the other hand, in a realistic appraisal of the agreement the fact should not be overlooked that the warheads (which were to be eliminated over a period of several years) represent less than 3 per cent of the operative arsenal; that the labour forces and industries involved in the nuclear sphere represent but a small part of the war industry as a whole; that the introduction of new weapons systems and only a few upgradings could easily compensate for any "loss of power" entailed by the INF Treaty. In succeeding months, however, the arms reduction process did not lose impetus; on the contrary, unequivocal signs continue to come from the great Powers. In particular, the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact have announced considerable reductions in their armed forces stationed in Europe; at present, statistics are insufficient to allow an estimate of the immediate and important negative effects in market terms (spare parts, replacements, upgradings, reparations) suffered by industries, but it is clear that market perspectives are changing.

On the diplomatic bargaining level, furthermore, the process of defining an agreement for the reduction of conventional (non-nuclear) weapons is going ahead; the proposals of the two parties for fixing the ceilings for each type of arms and for delimiting the areas within which approved units could be deployed, are well known. Forecasts of the nature of possible agreements are still uncertain: what is certain is that surplus weapons systems will have to be destroyed; and that only from that moment on will industries be able to evaluate the new sizes of the markets.

It must not be forgotten, on the other hand, that it is precisely in this phase that there is increasing pressure from military firms to speed up the upgrading processes and to adapt weapons systems to highly sophisticated technologies. Unless modified by political constraints, the foreseeable strategy of firms will be to compensate for quantitative reductions with increases of a qualitative nature in research and development and to produce weapons systems which, though perhaps "smaller", are more invulnerable and precise.

The other factor that must be taken into consideration is the question of demand in the underdeveloped countries, which has drastically diminished in recent years, largely because of the increasing burden resulting from the accumulation of their foreign debt. It is in fact well known that about one third of the credits those countries have received was approved in order to enable them to purchase weapons from the industrialized countries, and up until the eve of the first efforts to apply the so-called Brady plan—the plan proposed by United States Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady for the alleviation of the debt problem of developing countries—very little else was done to reduce their debt. It is difficult to imagine there being a demand for weapons, in the coming years, of similar proportions to that which existed in the 1970s and 1980s; moreover, the end of certain "regional wars" (in particular the war between Iran and Iraq) has undoubtedly reduced the demand for complete systems, ammunition, spare parts, and the like. Obviously, however, some of the countries which have just emerged from a conflict will try to rebuild their stockpiles, both in order to guarantee their own security and in order not to find themselves unarmed if conflict should resume.

One Nation's Case: Italy

In a context of East-West détente and the saturation of the markets of the South, how will arms industries react? It may be interesting to try to answer that question by examining the case of a country such as Italy.

Italy is, in fact, an industrialized nation, one which has in recent years been a not-insignificant producer and exporter of weapons, and yet it is not burdened with great responsibilities in the field of military politics. Unlike its European partners, furthermore, Italy does not seem to have concentrated its production in the same way as the French, British or German military industries. Italy therefore appears relatively open to innovative solutions in the field of conversion.

In 1989 the Italian Parliament began discussing measures for the conversion of Italian military production facilities, and a committee was set up in the Ministero delle Partecipazioni Statali to study the applicability of such a conversion process to publicly owned industries. The labour unions, for their part, have drawn up a joint document in which they express their position in favour of such a process; there is the risk, however, that some factory councils will not adhere fully to the strategy the unions have adopted.

Even if it is evident by now that it will be negotiations on the international level that will set both the schedule for the process and the political deadlines for conversion, it is hard to deny that the drawing up of a "national plan" for the diversification and conversion of military industries might constitute a valid contribution to the "new course" taken in relations between the United States and USSR. Even if the "plan"—like the one drawn up by Sweden—were only a detailed projection of possible government choices and envisaged a lengthy timetable for reductions in the size of the sector, it would undoubtedly send out a clear signal with regard to the nature of Italy's position.

Even if its enactment were subordinated to analogous and reciprocal commitments on the part of other producer countries and if it were aimed first and foremost at protecting patrimonies of technological know-how, company organizations and jobs, its existence would enable the government, political parties and labour unions to define their choices and actions in the sector without the precipitate action created by emergency situations.

The first phase of a research programme being carried out by Archivio Disarmo, a non-governmental organization specializing in research into peace and disarmament issues, was completed in 1989, ahead of official schedule.

The study pertained to five firms located in the industrial district of Rome and had as its object the identification of civilian products which could be manufactured instead of military ones. The study ascertained the technological and organizational capacities required for the production of certain specific types of products, and identified a series of products which, by virtue of their characteristics, constituted valid alternatives to the military productions of Selenia, Elmer, Mes, Elettronica and Sistel, five firms operating in the electronics sector.

More specifically, products falling into the following categories were identified:

—Civilian products that had in the past been manufactured or investigated by the firms in question; especially detailed evaluations should indicate the real causes of the interruption of their production and investigation;

—Military products that can easily be transformed into products for civilian use, excluding those already widely marketed by the firms and those whose applications could only be military;

—Civilian products in the process of being designed or already produced by the war industries, which could sustain a rapid increase in production, given adequate incentives, or even public support for their marketing;

—Products for civilian use which could be manufactured without special modification of existing installations and equipment, even if they might require specific changes in the commercial structure;

—Products for civilian use requiring special machinery and new, substantial investments, but where the firms already possessed the technical-organizational capacity for the new industrial-scale production.

In brief, the investigation was oriented towards other possibilities which are very close to the current reality of the firms in question. Products whose social utility is very great but which are very far from the organizational and executive experience and the know-how already possessed by the firms were not given preference. On the contrary, conversion was understood to be a process of gradual utilization, in the civilian sphere, of the greatest possible part of the technologies already possessed by the industries and, therefore, as a form of diversification, involving also a reduction of military production and an increase in the share civilian production would play in the overall revenue.

It should also be noted that most of the ideas for products came from the factories, that is they were suggested by technicians, workers, and representatives of firms, whereas the analytical dossiers were drawn-up by outside experts. These methods, in addition to guaranteeing a close connection between conversion hypotheses and those who might carry them out in the future, open the doors to analogous studies performed in other regions with high concentrations of military industries. In particular, it could be used by those observers who wish to give high priority to conversion problems in their work programmes.

Over forty products, largely related to the teledetection and electromedical sectors, have been identified so far; for each product there is a series of dossiers describing its technical characteristics and offering some preliminary estimates of its market possibilities. Naturally, the dossiers do not go so far as to provide a real evaluation of markets or define a commercial strategy; such activities are the task of those companies that choose to adopt conversion policies, since the final responsibility for a decision belongs to them and no one else can guarantee sales or profit levels.

In addition to identifying alternative products, the study succeeded in defining, even if only as a first approximation, a "zone programme". The decision was made not to develop diversification and conversion plans for the individual firms, since their lack of support would in effect have nullified the purpose of the study. Rather, what is presented is a programme of alternative production ideas which the firms can carry out either individually or in collaboration with others. Industries other than those considered could therefore contribute to the programme, and this possibility opens considerable opportunities for contact with programmes for other regional zones with high arms-industry concentrations. The programme also indicates possibilities that exist for public, financial and supportive intervention. The choice made by the researchers to envisage the firms receiving assistance during the phase of transition from military to civilian production may undoubtedly raise some criticism. It cannot be denied that, in this way, further financing and concessions would be given to the very war industry that had elicited so much criticism and opposition. Yet, in a realistic sense one should not forget that it is difficult to pass from protected products offering extremely high profits to products that have to be placed on markets that are open to competitors and about which little is known.

Conclusion

There is one thing, however, that must not be overlooked: financing and concessions will be granted only in exchange for a more-than-verbal commitment not to return to military production. The idea, in other words, is that the collectivity can assume such a burden only if it is guaranteeing for itself the progressive conversion of war industries, and especially the cutting down to size of those economic power centres which up to now have stimulated and supported the arms race and provided fuel to conflicts.

Issues on Conversion

Economic Conversion: Preparing for Peace

Lloyd J. Dumas

Introduction

The twentieth century has seen more than its share of economic trauma and devastating war. In much of the world, actual progress in improving broad-based economic well-being has fallen far short of aspirations. An international arms race of staggering proportions has captured the attention and a considerable amount of the critical economic resources of many of the world's nations.

Yet as we enter the last decade of this century, the prospects for improving this state of affairs have become dramatically better. Political shifts and a wider readiness to consider new economic possibilities have created a climate in which the centuries-old dream of converting "swords into plowshares" has met with the hard realities of unattained economic goals to create a compelling force for positive change. Still, it will take a great deal of careful, pragmatic action to capitalize on this opportunity.

Nowhere do the vision of a more peaceful and prosperous world and the practical business of getting from here to there come together more strongly than in the issue of economic conversion; for no matter how desirable the shift away from the dangers of the international arms race may

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be, the transition of people and facilities from military to civilian activity is not a simple matter. If not properly attended to, the period of transition will be fraught with difficulty and filled with opposition from those whose livelihoods and status are at present derived from their participation in military-oriented activity.

The United Nations has been deeply involved in trying to bring about progress in both disarmament and development, and it has been a leader in making clear the vital connection between these two critical goals. The enormous military diversion of productive resources in the world in general and in the third world in particular has greatly dimmed the prospects for sharply raising standards of living in the less developed countries. At the same time, establishing a stable and just peace in a disarmed and demilitarized world will remain an elusive goal unless there is real progress in development. In furtherance of these dual objectives, the United Nations now has a key role to play in moving conversion to the centre of the world stage, for while conversion does not in itself establish peace or achieve development, it stands as a critical transition strategy for smoothing the path to both these goals.

What Is to Be Converted?

Before it is possible to prepare any concrete plans for conversion, it is necessary to have sufficient data to fully understand what is to be converted. Data on the numbers, skills, location and other key characteristics of personnel in military forces and in the sectors of the economy that directly serve the military are indispensable to those planning conversion. So are data on the location, age, layout, capacities and other key charactertistics of the physical equipment and facilities involved (other than the weapons systems themselves). However, the need for these data runs up against the reluctance of Governments to disclose such information. In part, this is due to legitimate security concerns; in part, it is merely the result of entrenched habits and patterns of secrecy that sensitivity to these issues has created over time. In any case, this conflict seems to create a basic problem. How is it to be handled?

Actually, the conflict may not be as severe as it appears to be. We must first consider exactly who needs what specific information in order for conversion to succeed. There are some broad elements of conversion in any country that need to be taken into account by those responsible for the overall economic planning (in socialist countries) or regulatory policy (in market economies). The national Government may desire to direct special assistance to particular sectors of the economy or regions of the country that will be seriously affected by a shift from military to civilian activity. Or it may simply wish to avoid policy actions that appear to be called for by other domestic considerations (such as the nation's short-run general economic situation) but will impede successful conversion.

The kinds of data needed for these purposes are quite general—overall numbers of personnel involved by broad categories (how many engineers and scientists, production workers, managers, clerical workers etc. will be affected); overall data on physical facilities (how much of the nation's metalworking machinery, how much of its electronics industry etc. will be involved); and the general geographical pattern of military dependency. In the first place, these data can be kept general enough to avoid being of any great value to other nations or subnational groups viewed as a serious security threat. And perhaps more important, it may be desirable, though not critical, that they be circulated to the general public. The key economic decision-makers within the non-military agencies of the national Government itself are those for whom these data are most crucial. Thus it should be possible to maintain a degree of confidentiality, should that be considered necessary.

This is somewhat complicated by the fact that regional and local levels of government would be much more effective in helping to mitigate the negative and maximize the positive impact of conversion if they had sufficient information to know what was likely to be happening within their own jurisdiction. Local levels of government—or local representatives of national Government—are after all more likely to be involved in direct delivery of conversion-related services and support. They should at least know how much demand will be placed on their capacities.

But those who are actually going to plan and carry out what could be called the "factory-level" conversion of facilities and work-forces cannot hope to be successful without a great deal of very specific information about the characteristics of the labour force, equipment and facilities they are attempting to convert. At this critical level, conversion plans must be tailored to these specifics, or they will have little chance of success. Setting aside the issue of military-base conversions for the moment, this is a strong argument for a highly decentralized planning process.

In economies in which the bulk of military-serving production is done by privately operated companies, the companies themselves—particularly the managements and work-forces of each given military-oriented factory, laboratory or "think-tank"—are aware of these details as they apply to their own labour force and facilities. It is only necessary for the personnel within the company assigned the task of developing and implementing the conversion plan to have access to that information. It need never be made available to anyone outside the company. Thus, if a highly decentralized model of conversion planning and implementation is pursued, it is not only more likely to be done well, but it is also possible to avoid spreading sensitive data around. It is not necessary to release such information to anyone who is not a part of the organization that already has the data.

Highly decentralized planning may also achieve similar objectives in economies structured along a socialist model. The level of detail necessary for successfully blueprinting the conversion process is enormous. Requiring that flood of information to be gathered locally and transmitted to the centre is not only time-consuming at the periphery, but overwhelming at the centre. Unless the country is quite small, it is a prescription for inefficiency. And it results in an unduly large number of people having access to potentially sensitive information. Decentralized conversion planning makes a great deal more sense.

Whether an economy is socialist or market-oriented, the system of military bases is always government-operated. Depending on whether or not the facility is to stay in the control of the Government, the kind of detailed information required to convert it may be held internal to the Government or may need to be made more public. This disclosure problem may actually be more sensitive than that involved with production facilities and the like, since some details of the layout and facilities of military bases are much more revealing of their military mission.

The issue of converting foreign military bases raises some additional questions. Should the Government that operates the military base provide detailed information not otherwise available to the host country well in advance of its withdrawal from the facility? How much of the non-weapons equipment at the base should be transferred to the control of the host country on withdrawal? To what extent is it necessary or desirable for the country operating the base and the host country to co-operate in jointly planning the conversion? It may be that these questions can only really be answered by bilateral negotiation, on a case-by-case basis.

At any rate, the conversion of foreign military bases raises important additional issues that deserve separate attention.

One final point about data. Making available more of the data that describe at least the general outlines of a nation's military system (for example, overall military budget, number of uniformed military personnel, numbers of engineers and scientists engaged in military research) is not only useful for conversion planning, but may also be an important confidence-building measure. In addition, it will permit a wider debate as to the alternative civilian-oriented uses of the resources involved, a debate that is likely to be very useful in generating support for the movement towards a less militarized world.

How Does the Operation of the Military Sector Differ from the Operation of the Civilian Sector within Each Nation's Economy?

By its very nature, the military-serving sector of the economy tends to operate by other rules than does the civilian-oriented sector. This is perhaps most striking in market economies. Rather than facing strong competitive pressures to hold costs down in multi-customer markets, military firms face a single (and often very well funded) government customer whose primary interest is in maximizing product performance rather than minimizing cost. Even when the firms are privately owned, the operational structure of the military-oriented sector in market economies often resembles that of an outpost of the Government itself more than it resembles private commercial, market-oriented business.

The military-oriented sector of planned economies—especially highly militarized planned economies—tends to have privileged access to productive resources. As one of the key instruments of the Government, the military typically has high status, which it in turn conveys to the research, development and production system that serves it. Such preferential treatment leads to a different mode of operation from that which is common in the civilian sector.

Whatever the precise differences may be in any particular country, the point is that the operating environment of research, development and production in the military sector will be very different from that of civilian research, development and production. It is absolutely crucial to effective conversion to have the clearest and most thorough understanding of these differences possible. After all, it is difficult to carry out any transition well without a thorough knowledge of both the origin and the destination.

Those who stand at a distance—say in the central Government—often tend to underestimate the differences between the military and civilian sectors, and therefore the magnitude of the problem of transferring from one to the other. Those at the "factory level" are less likely to do so. Still, they may not understand the detailed operational differences as well as they must in order to plan and implement conversion. Something must therefore be done to convey a full and detailed appreciation of these differences to those who will be planning and implementing conversion.

The simplest way to achieve this is to establish some sort of institutional mechanism that will bring together those who must blueprint the conversion and those who are already operating successfully in the civilian sphere. The most appropriate way to do so in any particular country will depend on political and cultural factors as well as on the nature of the economic system. It would also seem useful to develop a cadre of consultants specializing in these precise problems. In some cases, those responsible for the conversion of a particular facility or work-force might wish to bring in experienced technical consultants from other nations or from trusted international organizations, such as the United Nations. But, however it is done, it is critical to make those in positions of responsibility and influence far more sensitive to, and informed about, these crucial operational differences than they now appear to be.

Convert to What?

Conversion is an inherently proscriptive issue. It is not possible to talk intelligently about it without raising the question of where the process is headed. It is not enough to have general ideas about the good things that could be done with the resources released from military activity. There must be specific alternative civilian activities developed for those people and facilities now servicing the armed forces.

Whether an economy is planned or market-oriented, it would be useful for the nation to develop an explicit agenda of national needs—civilian areas of activity that address what that nation perceives to be the critical civilian problems that it faces. The national needs agenda should be wide-ranging, including not only traditional public works projects (such as road-building or sewage treatment) but also projects aimed at attacking key social problems (such as alcoholism or crime). The Government involved could then determine the kinds of specific projects in which it could and should be involved that will address those problems. Next, the resource requirements of these projects could be compared with the supply of resources released as a result of conversion. A subset of projects could then be selected that would both address the needs and serve as reasonable alternative activities for the facilities and work-forces to be converted.

In a planned economy, these projects could be directly integrated into the planning process. In a market economy, the Government might undertake to award contracts for the projects for which direct government involvement is politically acceptable. It might encourage other projects, either by preferential tax treatment (such as targeted investment tax credits) or special financing. And it might seek to build interest in others by bringing the issue persuasively to public attention. However, it is highly likely in market economies that the private sector will generate many of its own alternatives in the process of seeking profitable markets. This is as it should be. As mentioned earlier, privately owned enterprises that service the military branch of government have little in common with private, commercially-oriented firms that form the basis of a market economy. There is no particular reason to continue to protect them from the discipline of the competitive market-place. Doing so will only retard their full integration into the underlying economic system.

The development of *international* needs agendas, on a regional and global basis, could also be encouraged. There is little doubt that some of the most critical problems facing the world are best solved co-operatively. Many of these also present alternative agendas of useful economic opportunities for the resources that are being converted. Technical fixes will certainly not solve problems of global pollution or stagnated development. But the most pragmatic solutions to these problems may have components that could usefully employ scientific and technical skills now focused on military R & D. The productive capacity of other forms of labour and capital released from military activities could likewise play a role in producing a range of goods (such as pollution-control devices and equipment for more environmentally benign forms of power generation) that would also further these objectives. It would certainly be within the purview and historical role of the United Nations to help instigate a process of developing such needs agendas, along with practical projects that would move them forward.

These large-scope projects might be divided into subprojects that are co-ordinated internationally but funded independently by each of the nations that undertakes responsibility to carry them out. Alternatively, an international fund to support key global infrastructure and environmental projects could be established. The fund could be created with financing provided by contributions equal to an agreed fraction of the money saved as each member nation's military expenditures are reduced. Access to the fund could also be made dependent on the extent to which the nations involved had cut back on their arms expenditure.

A sufficient number of civilian options must be found if conversion is to be successful. To be sure, each nation will approach the search for these options in a different way, but it would be desirable to have a degree of international co-operation so that the gains from conversion might be turned most effectively to the benefit of the largest possible fraction of the world's population.

An Action Agenda for Conversion

In this crucial time of change, the United Nations can make a major contribution in helping to educate, to encourage and to co-ordinate some of the activities so vital to smooth and successful conversion. There are those actions which the United Nations itself could initiate, and those which the United Nations can press its Members to undertake. The following list is intended to be illustrative; it is certainly not comprehensive.

Actions by the United Nations

The United Nations could take the following actions:

1 Create a cadre of conversion experts available to assist any national Government upon request. There may be experts on the United Nations staff, or lists of "certified" consultants that the United Nations will make available. This may be achieved in part by setting up a training programme under the auspices of the United Nations or perhaps by providing dissertation fellowships and other similar educational assistance to persons interested in pursuing this area of work in their studies at existing educational institutions.

2 Publish a conversion guidelines handbook, designed to assist anyone in the public or private sector of any nation charged with or interested in conversion planning, providing guidance through the key issues involved in detailed "blueprinting" of conversion.

3 Urge all Member States to set up conversion mechanisms within their countries.

4 Publish a "Conversion Worldbook", describing each country's conversion plans and giving names, addresses and telephone numbers of contact persons within each country who can provide further information.

5 With the co-operation of national Governments, gather data on, and publish estimates of, the extent of diversion of the world's economic resources of military-oriented activity—perhaps especially of scientists and engineers, by discipline and general area of activity.

6 Develop a "world technology needs agenda" specifically designed to absorb the mix of engineers and scientists estimated above into civilian activities that address pressing international issues of disarmament (for example, verification technologies), development, environment and the like.

Actions by National Governments

National Governments could take the following actions:

1 Create and institutionalize economic conversion planning mechanisms capable of handling the economic transition required by any level of reduction in military forces, down to and including the level of national police forces. These mechanisms will surely be different for market and planned economies, and may entail varying degrees of direct government involvement. A market economy may, for example, want to develop mechanisms which emphasize decentralized private-sector (for example, corporate) planning, with little

government involvement, or may opt for some sort of market/government planning mix (for example, as the United States did after the Second World War). Similarly, a planned economy may opt for creating mechanisms that would inseminate a new private sector with the resources released from military activity, or may opt for direct government planning for the shift to civilian activities, with those activities remaining under government control.

2 Adopt specific legislation to encourage economic conversion planning on an ongoing "contingency" basis. This could be particularly useful. Such legislation should include specific funding mechanisms, public or private, to be used to finance both the planning and the implementation of economic conversion.

3 Ensure that all international arms-control agreements specify conversion plans as part of their verification procedures. Specifying what facilities and work-forces are to be removed from military activity and redirected to civilian use in an arms-control agreement has two important functions. First of all, it helps to make clear whether or not the agreement does in fact involve a real reduction of military activity. Thus, agreements made more for the purpose of public relations than for serious arms reduction would be more obviously labelled as such. If it is not possible to show real conversion as a result of the agreement, then clearly the agreement does not involve a net reduction in military-oriented activity. Secondly, it simplifies and strengthens verification. For example, say a given factory has been making missiles now banned under a new agreement, and the nation involved specifies that the facility and its work-force will be converted to making mass-transit vehicles: if the amount of mass-transit vehicles being produced is consistent with the full-capacity utilization of the factory and its work-force, it cannot also be producing missiles covertly. Further, it is also possible to place inspectors in the converted facility. As it

is now civilian, there should be no breach of security involved in having the inspectors present.

4 Publicly commit a specified fraction of the savings in military expenditure resulting from unilateral reductions or from any international arms-reduction agreement to finance projects aimed at creating greater security through non-military means, for example, increased international economic development, reduced resources depletion, or reduced environmental pollution.

Conclusion

In the early decades of this century, humanity was introduced to the terror of mechanized war, as the brilliant achievements of the industrial revolution came to the battlefield with horrifying results. In the middle of this century, the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki introduced us to the nuclear age, as the brilliant achievements of science were turned to the purpose of mass destruction on a hitherto unimaginable scale. Now at the end of this century, we are entering a decade of great challenge and unprecedented opportunity. We can never make right all the horror this century has known, but we have a better chance than ever before to learn from what we have done, to concentrate the brilliance of our industry and our science on the enhancement of human dignity and the improvement of human well-being. In the final analysis, that is what economic conversion is all about.

We have a better chance today than we may see for a very long time to make this dream a reality. If we act decisively now, we can set the stage for a better, less fearful future. We cannot afford to miss this opportunity.

Conversion: The Hungarian Case Prospects and Problems in the Late 1980s and Early 1990s

Tibor Palánkai

Reforms and Conversion

Fulfilment of the Biblical prophecy that "they shall beat their swords into plowshares" seems possible in our era. The recent dramatic changes in Eastern Europe indicate that such hopes are by no means unfounded. In parallel with large-scale political democratization and economic reforms, foreign policies and defence strategies are also undergoing radical revision. More than 40 years of confrontation and hostility between East and West could be replaced by friendly relations and co-operation. As a result of these processes it seems highly possible that the size of armies and armaments could be cut substantially and that the status and the role of the two military alliances could be changed. There is even a possibility that both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) alliances could be dissolved in the future. Hungary welcomes these developments and, as a small Central European country, is particularly interested in peaceful co-operation in every field.

In recent years the Soviet *perestroika* has not been limited to revolutionary domestic changes; it has led also to

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a strategic re-evaluation of some of their basic principles of foreign policy and military doctrines. The Stalinist concept of class struggle in international relations has been replaced by a recognition of growing interdependence, the tremendous advantages of international economic co-operation, and the urgent need for a common solution to the global problems threatening the world.

In the past few years, several arms-control proposals have been put forward and the concept of "sufficient defence" has emerged as one of the basic military doctrines of the Soviet Union. The new Soviet foreign and military policy was welcomed and supported by most of the Warsaw Treaty countries. In May 1987 the Political Consultative Committee of WTO committed itself to a new defensive military doctrine for the whole alliance. The asymmetries in conventional arms were admitted on the side of WTO and beginning in December 1988 the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland announced unilateral cuts in that field. This created a better atmosphere and prospects, not only for the Vienna negotiations, but also in other fields.

Hungary has fully supported the Helsinki process from the beginning and has not only maintained but managed to improve its relations with the Western countries, even in the years of a revival of the cold war. This provided a good foundation for rapidly and fully exploiting the possibilities of improvement in international relations from the mid-1980s, and Hungary was one of the first to join the new direction in defence and foreign policy initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev. In January 1989 the Government of Hungary announced unilateral cuts of 9 per cent in forces and armaments for the years 1989 and 1990. The cuts affect 9,300 soldiers. As regards armaments, 250 tanks, 250 artillery pieces and mine-throwers, 9 MiG-21 fighter interceptors, 6 launch pads and 30 armoured personnel carriers will be withdrawn. As a first step, a tank brigade was disbanded in Szabadszállás on 11 August 1989 and another will be transformed into a motorized rifle brigade. In November 1989 a new army reform was announced by the Hungarian Government and further unilateral cuts of 20 to 25 per cent were decided on. As a result of these measures, the number of the Hungarian troops will be decreased from 106,000 to 70,000 by the end of 1991. Compulsory military service will be reduced from 18 to 12 months in 1991.

In parallel with its democratization process, Hungarian security and defence strategy and policy became subjects of discussion. Besides the Government, the opposition parties are also working out their security and defence concepts. The different political parties agree for the most part that Hungary needs, basically, a "defensive" defence strategy, which also reflects the national security interests, the geopolitical position and the economic capacities of the country, while taking into account the security interests of our allies, particularly the Soviet Union. As István Földesi, the former adviser to the General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, puts it:

> "In the current international situation, where military priorities are tending to decline due to the balance of power and the enormous financial burden of armaments costs, defence policies are determined by considerations of national security; foreign policy; national economy; and social conditions."

He proposes the adoption of the "defence concept of rational sufficiency", which "wishes to strike a balance between adequate defence requirements for national security and economic capability".[1]

The new military doctrine, approved by the Hungarian Government in November 1989, is built on the principle of "satisfactory and secure defence" and states that "Hungary needs a national defence force which is able to secure the boundaries of the country, to preserve national sovereignty, and to avert a possible external attack". In order to change to an armed force of a defensive character, it was decided that "the offensive organization and armaments will be reduced".[2] It is generally believed that a smaller, but more modern, army with improved armaments and with better trained and paid personnel would better meet our defence requirements.

There are, however, great differences among the parties, particularly concerning the size of the possible cuts and also our status in WTO. According to Károly Janza, the former deputy chief commander of the Hungarian army, the armed forces can be cut by about 30 to 40 per cent, while our defence capacities can still be qualitatively improved.[3] Some of the opposition parties, however, urge even larger cuts and the reform of WTO is also foreseen. István Kriston, in an independent monthly journal, proposed a three-stage reform of WTO and of the Hungarian defence policy—depoliticization of WTO; acceptance of military independence of members; and emergence of conflict-averting military co-operation among the "inhabitants of the common European home" some time after 1992—and he visualizes:

> "the European countries turning to the military doctrine of minimal defence, which allows only defensive land-based and airborne categories. The armed forces would be frozen at a level which is still sufficient for defence of the borders and maintenance of internal order, but no longer threatens other States."[4]

As a result of political democratization and open media in the country, the relations of civilian politics to military affairs have also been greatly changed. Local political forces are becoming active concerning military issues, and a dialogue has opened on several problems. Typical examples are complaints and protests concerning certain inconveniences and damage caused by the military (aircraft noise near the city of Debrecen and some of the holiday resorts on the north shore of Lake Balaton). These issues are widely discussed. There are complaints against the military also for environmental reasons. These were often related to local issues such as the protection of national parks and a wish to reduce army activity in certain regions. The army was receptive to these complaints and, in most cases, immediate measures were taken. The army not only welcomed, but in fact initiated, discussions about its new military doctrines and in some cases accepted budgetary cuts even though these had a negative effect on its status. The army has been trying to adjust to the new situation for many years, and in order to improve their own financial position, several army units have ventured into enterpreneurial activities (a sort of "internal conversion"). Although about 80 per cent of the officers were members of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, the army was among the first institutions to accept the depoliticization of public services. In fact, it must be stressed—and indeed it was stressed by the army several times—that the armed forces fully support the economic reforms and the political democratization of the country. In this respect, it was of especial political importance that the delegates of the armed forces to the Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party felt it necessary to declare in a joint statement early in October 1989 that:

> "they are convinced that the armed forces and bodies cannot be used for solving any internal political disputes; they are interested in fulfilling their duties in the framework of a democratic legal State, respecting the constitution, the laws and other public regulations, and accepting the scrutiny of the armed forces to community control and publicity."[5]

The economic difficulties, due to growing structural weaknesses, the shortcomings of planning and management systems and increasing indebtedness, are leading to serious budgetary deficits in many Eastern European countries. Therefore in recent years most of the WTO countries have made either smaller or greater cuts in their military expenditures.

The Hungarian army, as a result of budgetary problems, had to face budgetary restraints as early as 1986. Since then, in fact, the military expenditures of the country have been frozen. Originally, a gradual increase in military expenditures was foreseen in the five-year plan for 1986-1990, but owing to worsening budgetary conditions it was postponed each year. According to army sources, these proposed increases amounted to about 47 billion Hungarian forint, which, as a result of annual revisions, were simply deleted from the budget. Furthermore, owing to cumulative budgetary deficits, the Hungarian Government was compelled to make actual cuts as early as 1989. According to government decisions in the summer of 1989, these cuts will amount to about 5.5 billion forint for the years 1989-1990. For 1990 the parliament approved a budget of 40.4 billion forint for the military, which it is estimated represents about a 30 per cent reduction in real terms as compared with 1989. The Soviet Union announced a 14.2 per cent reduction in military expenditures for 1989 and some other WTO countries have made similar budgetary cuts.

In the circumstances outlined above it seems no exaggeration to state that Hungary is facing probably the greatest conversion of its economy in its peacetime history. This time the question does not arise simply as a result of political proposals or decisions: the call for conversion is based on deep-rooted and fundamental political, social and economic changes in the region and in the international environment. The conversion may be wide-ranging and substantial in size and will probably go on for many years. It will then have wide-ranging effects on society and on the economy and it raises the question of the need for adjustment in government policy, institutions, companies and of course individuals.

It is beyond the purpose of this article to analyse all of the micro- and macro-economic aspects of conversion facing Hungary in recent years. From the point of view of government policies I will mention only certain budgetary and employment aspects, and concentrate on some structural (alternative use of capacities or alternative products), marketing, financial and employment problems of Hungarian companies connected with recent cuts. I shall try to draw some conclusions, particularly concerning the need for long-term planning and consistent comprehensive government policies.

Conversion—Budget—Employment

Conversion is a complex process and may be conceived of as an adjustment in different fields. The agents of economic life face new challenges and changing conditions from time to time and they need always to react to them in order to avoid problems and maintain normal and efficient operations. In most cases, this means not only changing policies, but also transforming internal structures and organization. This organic approach also applies to conversion, and the structural and policy aspects need equal attention.

According to economic theories, whether Marxist or non-Marxist, the reduction or elimination of military expenditures is always taken as a welcome development.

> "Military expenditure is an economic burden for a nation's economy. Such expenditures represent a government allocation of national resources for a military product that flows neither into consumption, which increases the general standard of living, nor into investment, which benefits society's future productive capacity. Military expenditures are both economically unproductive and socially wasteful. Indeed, military goods and services are unique in that this output leaves

> the economic cycle almost entirely. If all United States military equipment purchased and produced in a given year were thrown into the sea it would have no significance either for the standard of living of the American people or for the productive capacity of American industry."[6]

Though Keynes' theory, assuming insufficient aggregate demand, became the basis for government intervention in the economy, it must be noted that, despite references to "military Keynesianism", Keynes personally was not specifically in favour of military spending either.

The uses of resources for other than military expenditures are widely analysed in terms of opportunity costs. The typical approach to budgetary opportunity costs is that, when the costs of a certain number of tanks or submarines are calculated and compared to the number of hospitals or power-plants that could be built with the same amount of money, these productive investments for consumption are often defined as the "peace dividends" of conversion. Of course it is generally recognized that national security and defence are important and indispensable but the relation between the actual military potential and the real national security needs of a given country, as a function basically of political factors, usually remains highly controversial and difficult to identify.

The recent cuts in Hungarian military expenditures were directly enforced by the serious and cumulative deficits in the budget. These deficit- and debt-financing military cuts, however, are considered with some reservation in the conversion literature, particularly because it is assumed that the "peace dividends" of conversion do not accrue in such cases. Of course, the opportunity cost analysis of the cuts can still be applied, but these cuts must be put in special perspectives.

In a difficult economic situation such as that in Hungary, the military spending cuts may be seen as the least bad solution. One of the possibilities other than not touching military expenditures would have been to increase taxes. There is however wide agreement among the experts that owing to the servicing of the country's heavy indebtedness the Hungarian economy is already overtaxed. Therefore a further increase in profit or other corporate taxes could reduce or worsen those investment possibilities, which are desperately needed for the structural and technological modernization of the economy. A rise in income taxes would have no less negative effects and would contradict the Government's reform philosophy of putting greater emphasis on rewarding individuals and companies for better performance.

Another possibility would have been cuts in health, education or other social services, but this was considered a no less undesirable option inasmuch as these fields had already been the subject of budgetary freezes and cuts in earlier years. In certain fields further cuts would endanger even the mere functioning of the services (such as the supply of necessary medicine or the operation of schools).

Direct cuts in military expenditures however do not mean equal budgetary savings. In fact, the net savings achieved tend to be much less in many respects, and simplistic calculations often raise controversies and problems. First of all, the State can suffer losses in tax revenues, and because of the relatively high volume and profitability of military production, these reduced tax incomes may be substantial. According to some expert estimates, about 50 to 60 per cent of Hungarian military budgetary cuts may be lost because of these missed tax revenues.[7] Sometimes there are unfounded expectations about the extent of possible direct savings in expenditures. It is however increasingly realized that the costs of conversion are far from negligible, and that a certain part of them must be directly financed from the central budget.

The question of conversion, in physical terms, arises first of all with regard to armaments and equipment used by the military. Some of the equipment and products can be used in civilian sectors and their sale could be a direct contribution to the budget. In other cases, it is difficult to find markets and users for them because they are usually technically outdated and physically outworn. This applies especially to military equipment and armaments, which in most cases have no value for civilian use, and therefore cannot be sold at all or can only be utilized as spare parts or components. Such arms and equipment have to be disassembled and at best sold as junk, and even in that case the cost may far exceed the possible revenue. According to army sources, for example, the cost of disassembling a tank is about 250,000-750,000 forint, which at the present official rate of exchange means about $US 4,000-12,000, and only after that can they be refounded.[3] For 250 tanks that is already a substantial amount of money. The storage of these products or materials may also be costly and must be covered by the budget.

The conversion of buildings and other military property is also not without problems. Many buildings were designed and built for special military functions and their "conversion" to some other use is either physically impossible or expensive. They require functional rebuilding, and as they are often in very bad condition, they would also require costly restoration. The simplest case is that of apartments, which can be directly transferred to local councils and used to ease otherwise serious housing problems. The question of reconstruction and renovation arises mostly with regard to military barracks and other buildings which in most cases are beyond the capacities of local councils, to which they are usually transferred.

Sudden budgetary cuts usually lead to difficulties for companies and institutions, and only part of the costs of conversion can be transferred to them. In many respects, they need a new and different form of support (often unforeseen) from the central budget. These costs may arise in connection either with conversion investments or with the retraining of personnel.

The army has often taken different welfare and communal functions upon itself in the areas near which troops are stationed. This was of great benefit to the local community and could ease the budget of the local council. As the President of the City Council of Szabadszállás said at the farewell ceremony for the tank brigade:

> "It is impossible not to remember them, because they by their support and presence greatly contributed to the development of our city. They helped us to build water and gas supplies, roads and a culture house."[8]

This could be conceived of as a sort of "hidden conversion" of certain resources and human effort. On the whole, this type of "conversion" has been marginal, but for the budget of some of the local communities it may be irreplaceable and taken as the cost of military cuts.

The military cuts raise conversion problems as regards employment both in the army and in the arms industries.

The first planned cuts of 9 per cent in the army do not seem to cause any substantial danger of unemployment. They affect mainly the conscripts, who can return to their families and their jobs. In the future, fewer people will be drafted. This is a very positive development in both human and economic terms. The possibilities of "conversion" have been long taken into account in the training of officers, and therefore in military colleges and academies so-called "dual diplomas" are issued, acceptable also in civilian professions (as engineers, teachers or economists). In fact, there is a shortage of trained officers in the country, therefore those who want to stay in the army are simply transferred from the units that have been eliminated to others where they are needed. Taking into account the possible future cuts, the number of persons enrolled in military colleges has already been reduced to about half. This makes it possible to improve at the same time the selection and, eventually, the quality of the new students. The new defence doctrines and strategies envisage new concepts in training and also the need for retraining of the existing army officers. At the same time, a great many officers are near retirement age. For the most part, the structural changes in the army cause only some redistribution of functions, and the overall effects on employment are still marginal. The de-politicization and de-ideologization of the army, for example, will mean the elimination of the post of political officers. Recently there have been about 200 of them in the Hungarian army, and according to army sources, they can easily be transferred to other jobs (social, education or welfare). The number of border guards will be reduced by 60 per cent by 1995. This will affect only the recruitment of new guards. Hungary introduced the possibility of "alternative" military service in the summer of 1989. According to army sources more than 600 persons applied for that possibility and most of them will be called for non-military public service. These people will work mainly in social services, which can be conceived of also as a form of "conversion".

Difficulties have arisen so far only with respect to civilian employees of the army. It is difficult to find jobs for them in nearby areas, and owing to serious housing problems it is almost impossible for them to move elsewhere. If however there is substantial unemployment, the army cuts could have but little effect. According to estimates, the cuts in next year's budget, particularly the elimination of subsidies to some inefficient companies, could cause the loss of about 50,000 jobs. The possible future reduction of military service from 18 to 12 months will in any case increase the supply on the labour market, and may affect the employment situation.

For those employed in weapons industries the problems are different. In view of the present difficulties and "conversions" in companies the jobs of about 5,000 to 6,000 persons are in jeopardy. This number does not, in itself, seem too high, and according to official views, the present central unemployment facilities introduced in 1989 (compensation payments, unemployment benefits and retraining) can cope with their problem. It is not surprising that the press and public opinion are not so optimistic. Changing products implies the need for retraining for employees who remain. Large numbers of highly specialized workers or technicians not only have to be retrained but may suffer a loss in salary and face the difficulty of moving from one place to another. These personal problems can be met only through planned and comprehensive measures. It must be noted, however, that conversion does not necessarily cause unemployment. On the contrary, the transfer of development and investment resources from the military to the civilian sectors may create more jobs because of the generally higher labour intensity of the latter. The present employment problems are mainly due to deficit financing cuts, and in many cases to a lack of satisfactory conversion and adjustment policies and efforts on the part of specific companies.

Conversion and Companies

There are 10 large Hungarian companies responsible for the bulk of the country's military production and they are the ones most affected by the cuts in military budgets. Contrary to some other WTO countries, Hungary has no closed military industry and the companies are primarily involved in civilian activities. The military cuts have really been felt only since 1988. They became severe in 1989. The first public admission of trouble was given by the general director of Videoton, János Kazsmer, in a radio interview in December of 1988. He revealed that his company might suffer a loss of about 2 billion-3 billion forint because of military cuts in 1989. Other companies then voiced similar problems. In fact, the most affected was the Hungarian electronics industry, which was the main supplier of military products, mostly to Soviet markets.

Of course, the companies are not only affected in different ways: they also face different conversion problems. In some cases the products are strictly for military use and the companies have to try to find a completely different kind of production. Some specialized machinery cannot be "converted" to civilian use, and in some cases very expensive machines have to be put out of service. The same may apply to certain materials, which were sometimes stocked in large quantities. Even the shift to similar products requires new developments, reconstruction, and retraining of the labour force. Not only must the capacities and products be "converted", but in parallel, new markets have to be sought and the products have to be sold at profitable prices. The shift may be particularly difficult when a company has to turn from undemanding East European partners to competitive Western markets. In this case, the conversion may be helped by international co-operation or joint-venture agreements with Western firms. Some companies are in fact involved in promising negotiations.

The very different performance of companies indicates that the inventiveness and the flexibility of management are important both in changing to new products and in changing to new markets, and also in solving employment problems. The following examples are illustrative.

Videoton, as one of the leading manufacturing companies of the country, produced for the most part computers and radio equipment for the military, with a great share of its products going to Soviet markets. In 1988 the value of military production was about 7 billion forint, which, according to estimates, will be reduced to about 4.5 billion forint by 1991. Videoton is one of the enterprises most badly affected by military cuts. Besides consumer electronics (colour television sets and radios), in which the company has a long tradition, it is turning to telecommunications (telephone exchanges), and some of the machinery may be used for manufacturing car components, either for prospective Hungarian car assembly plants or for major vehicle manufacturers based in Western Europe. Videoton has already begun to manufacture compact discs in co-operation with Thomson and VCRs with Japanese companies. The company is, however, facing serious financial and employment problems, and of the 7,000 employees in militar[illegible]roduction, about 3,000 may not be retained. The company was modernized and transformed into a joint stock company, giving substantial managerial autonomy to its 10 independent branches.

FEG, which has been making guns for about a hundred years, managed to maintain normal utilization of its capacities throughout 1988. It is thought that there will be sufficient demand for this type of product in the future also. On the whole, however, according to the estimates, the company may be forced to cut its military production to one third in the next two years. The company decided to develop and manufacture gas apparatus and it hopes that the products will be marketable in Western Europe. So far no personnel have had to be laid off.

The Machine Factory of Gödöllö is a military company, involved mainly in the production of parts and components and in the repair of military vehicles. The orders from domestic sources dropped by 30 per cent in 1989 and exports shrank even more. In 1990 a further 10 per cent reduction of orders is expected. One of the options for conversion is manufacturing tractors or heavy machinery. Among other things, the company produces mobile army service cars, which can be easily transformed for civilian use on highways or for mobile repair service for agricultural machines in remote places. The company has contacts with Citroën and there are some possibilities of co-operation or participation in assembling ambulances in Hungary. The company has so far managed to avoid laying off any personnel.

In many companies, the conversion problems are complicated by serious financial difficulties. Under the assumption of favourable future market possibilities between 1982 and 1988, most of the companies in military fields made substantial investments in research and development and in new production capacities. These investments were based on miscalculation of future military needs and were also viewed as compensation for bleak market prospects in civilian fields. The ratio of investment of a company's own resources to the State investment subsidies (credits and also free transfer of government funds) was about 1:2, but a considerable amount of credits was also drawn from commercial banks. The government funds were for the most part extended by the State Development Institute, but some commercial banks also found it attractive to join in giving credit for military developments and investments. Now, with shrinking sales, many companies are facing serious difficulties in servicing these debts. As most of the companies now also need further funds for conversion, the situation is particularly difficult and complicated.

These financial problems are further aggravated by difficulties in the civilian sections of these companies. In fact, along with military production, which was for the most part lucrative, numerous inefficient and unprofitable civilian activities were often maintained. They could be "subsidized" from the high military profits, and the company management often did not care too much about improving them. The secure military markets allowed monopolistic attitudes towards civilian fields and in closed national economies there was no challenge of external competition. Now, with the military cuts, these problems have to be faced and an overall adjustment can hardly be avoided. Owing to similar difficulties in civilian sectors, the problems relating to debt servicing and the need for new development funds arise in many cases and have to be tackled in parallel in both sectors. The negative "symbiosis" of military and civilian sectors has long been pointed out, and several Hungarian economists considered the "militarization" of some leading companies to be an obstacle to reforms.

Planning and Conversion

It is almost axiomatic that conversion must be based on comprehensive advance planning.

> "Despite the fact that persistent, high levels of military spending tend to be fearsomely damaging to any economy, a simple-minded policy of sharply cutting back military expenditures would create considerable economic distress. Not only would the workers who lose their jobs in military industry suffer, but their loss of income would cause a drop in consumer spending that would also generate further job loss in industries supplying consumer goods. Similarly, reduced purchases of equipment and the like by the military industrial firms whose projects are cut back would generate job loss in producer goods industries. Advanced planning for conversion on a contingency basis can avoid such problems by preparing military-serving facilities and their workforces to move efficiently into productive and profitable civilian-oriented activity."[9]

Professor Seymour Melman of Columbia University is even more specific and categorical in regard to conversion problems in the United States:

> "Without a highly decentralized and mandatory two-year planning requirement, conversion to a civilian economy will fail."[10]

In fact, in a message to the United Nations International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in 1987, Soviet President Gorbachev proposed that every country should work out a national conversion plan.

In Hungary a conversion policy has emerged and was worked out under the Miklos Németh Government in the summer of 1989. The Economic Consultative Council of the Government discussed the possibilities of a conversion programme and made several proposals. On the basis of these proposals, the Government took several decisions and measures, and closer co-operation between the authorities and the companies seems to be developing. The government measures concentrate on the financial difficulties of companies but try strategically to compromise between the defence interests and the economic capacities of the country.

From the point of view of easing financial difficulties, the most important step was that the companies were granted a moratorium for 1989 on repayment of credits drawn from the State Development Institute for military developments and the transfer of some State funds was not excluded. Similar arrangements were suggested with the commercial banks. The export credit schemes promoting hard-currency export can now be extended to these companies. The commercial banks are encouraged to give development credits to these companies, but strictly on commercial grounds. In fact, one of the basic principles of these government measures is that the former special preferences to military projects have to be abolished, and the arrangements have to be similar to those relating to the civilian sectors of the economy.

As a condition of the above-mentioned financial support, the companies are obliged to work out their own development plans. The companies may join government programmes, and this may help their adjustment. Under certain conditions a part of the cumulated stocks could be transferred to central State reserve funds or sold. Some stocks can be calculated as costs, reducing the tax obligations of the company. The Government decided that the so-called "M" capacities (comprising mainly capacities, units and stocks that are idle in peacetime but which can be mobilized for military use in case of emergency) would have to be revised and reduced, easing the financial burden on companies and on the central budget. In the future the companies will have the possibility of negotiating with foreign (CMEA) partners, and they can contract with them at their own risk. The liberalization measures on imports are also considered to be helping these companies in their adjustment.

From the experience of recent years, several conclusions may be drawn with regard to the planning of conversion. In fact, the military economy was and continued to be the "most planned" sector of the economy. While in civilian fields as a result of reforms marketing was combined with the transition to indicative planning, classical directive administrative central planning has been maintained almost unchanged in military fields. The military sphere was kept under central control and the five-year planning practice, including also physical targeting, was further applied. The sector worked to a large extent with calculated prices, which in most cases not only covered the costs but also secured high profits. In foreign trade the State monopoly was preserved, the special State foreign trade companies were required to sell and buy these products, and the bilateral balancing of trade was strictly practised. To ensure the supply of raw materials, components and spare parts stocking for two years was built into the plans.

There has been a general belief that unlike conditions in the civilian economy, the classical "planning" models have been successful in military fields. It was also supposed that under directive central planning the conversion was only a technical issue, and this approach dominated also the Marxist conversion literature. According to these assumptions the military production targets are simply replaced by civilian ones that meet the most urgent social needs of the country. The question how the plan can cope with the changed material and labour inputs was seen only as a technical issue.

The experience of recent years, however, contradicts these assumptions. The false motivation of bureaucracies is no less detrimental in the military fields and the system has proved to be too rigid to meet sudden changes. The prices and profits actually guaranteed and the monopolistic market position of companies make them insensitive to efficiency and innovation. In the light of the recent stock-minimizing policies of leading Western companies, the two-year stocking practice can be seen as nothing other than a built-in scheme for wasting resources in the system.

There is broad agreement that more market-oriented planning is needed also in the military sectors, and as recent measures show, these companies are supposed to be operating much more on a commercial basis. The importance of the time factor in conversion planning must also be stressed. In fact, some companies have recently been complaining—quite rightly—that as a result of sudden budgetary cuts, they received only two months' advance notice about the postponement of some long-planned contracts. This is, of course, beyond any reasonable possibility of adjustment. The time-factor has to be taken into account particularly in the case of long-term developments and new investments. The close co-ordination of interests and co-operation between the partners are also of the utmost importance. In recent years the companies and the Government have been blaming each other and this has proved to be counter-productive and of no benefit to either side.

It has been pointed out that behind the "iron curtain" of excessive military secrecy there have been good opportunities for lobbying and sometimes even the economic policy-makers have had no clear picture of the real situation. Secrets have to be guarded in the national interest, but effective democratic parliamentary control over military budgets and industries is widely considered to be desirable. In the coming years, Hungary faces the difficult and complex tasks of completing fundamental reforms and consolidating a debt-burdened economy. A comprehensive programme of further conversions can contribute greatly to the solution of these problems.

Notes

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The International Arms Trade

Ian Anthony

Introduction

During the past thirty-five years, the size and distribution of conventional arms transfers has been determined principally by two factors. First, the East-West confrontation—and in particular the adversarial nature of the super-Power relationship—and secondly, the collective failure of all parties to manage or solve conflicts in the third world. Moreover, the arms trade has taken place in an international environment without any realistic prospect of conventional arms control.

A change in one of these areas would have an important impact on the international arms trade. In the period after 1987 there have been important changes in all of them. As a result, the pattern of future developments is unpredictable but could significantly alter the size and shape of the global arms market in the 1990s. A number of key questions currently have no answer.

Will the improvement in East-West relations produce a conventional arms control agreement and, if so, what will be the scope of that agreement? Can the conventional arms control process be confined to Europe when significant numbers of Asian and Middle Eastern countries are on the threshold of military programmes that will change the nature of their external relations both within their respective regions and with the super-Powers?[1] How far will developments in

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several long-standing armed conflicts during 1988 and 1989 provide the framework for stable and durable political solutions to what have seemed intractable problems?

While the answers to these broad questions will affect the arms trade, controlling conventional military technology transfers is not currently a subject of any multinational negotiations. As a result, the future development of the global arms market will continue to be governed by factors beyond the control of any single Government.

Continuity and Change in the Global Arms Market

Looking at some indicators, one would be tempted to conclude that the global arms market during the 1980s has not been dynamic. Levels of military expenditure in industrialized countries and in the third world have stabilized during the second half of the 1980s and in some cases have begun to decline, at least in real terms. The overall size of the global arms trade has also remained stable in the 1980s, albeit at a high level relative to the 1970s. However, this picture masks important changes in the distribution of conventional military technology transfers.

Some of these changes are the end result of a process identified in the 1970s. Accounts of the arms trade published ten years ago focused chiefly on three developments: the proliferation of defence industrial capacities; the emergence of new sources of supply in the global arms market, whose policies were likely to be driven by commercial rather than political rationales; and the spread of ballistic missiles to third world countries.[2] While the same issues dominate current discussions of arms transfer,[3] the international political context has changed significantly.

In the 1970s, the proliferation of military technology was seen as part of a wider diffusion of power. The growing number of new States, the failure of the United States to achieve its objectives in Viet Nam and the British decision to withdraw permanent forces stationed "east of Suez" were seen as symptoms of a relative shift in military capability away from traditional power centres. Meanwhile there were high expectations concerning the rate of economic growth of third world countries such as Argentina and Brazil.

In fact, while more difficult for a variety of economic and political reasons, military intervention by major Powers has remained a usable policy option in the 1980s. Between 1979 and 1989 the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China all employed force against countries in the third world. At the same time, while economic growth in some developing countries has been rapid, the report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) entitled "Revitalizing Development, Growth and International Trade" has reported "large increases during the early 1980s in the number of countries experiencing negative growth in expenditure . . . . 18 of the 24 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean suffered declines in 1980-83. Among the 47 countries of Africa other than North Africa, growth during this period was negative for 30."[4] In the face of general economic failure, the military sector has competed unsuccessfully in many countries for the material and human resources required to overcome the enormous capital cost and technical difficulty of establishing and maintaining large armed forces. Countries such as Argentina, Brazil and India have not established autonomous research and design capabilities in the military industrial area, and their military products remain dependent on imported technology.

Current discussions of changes in the power balance within the international system tend to argue that a multipolar system is likely to be the outcome of northern disarmament (either negotiated force reductions or unilateral cuts forced by economic constraints) combined with the growth of military capabilities in the third world.[5]

Changing Patterns of Military Technology Transfer

The overall imbalance in military capability between North and South remains. In 1987 developed countries were responsible for 83 per cent of military expenditure.[6] Although the total value of global arms transfers has remained roughly constant in the 1980s, the respective shares of the major alliances as against non-aligned countries within the third world has changed. In 1978 the third world accounted for 69 per cent of the global total, falling to 61 per cent by 1988. The fastest growing arms importers are currently among industrialized countries—in particular Japan and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adjoining the Mediterranean, such as Greece, Spain and Turkey. Between 1984 and 1988 the percentage of total arms imports by industrialized countries—accounted for by Greece, Spain and Turkey—rose from under 8 per cent to 27 per cent.

In this environment, countries in the third world not surprisingly reject the idea that they are overarmed.[7] However, across the third world there is an uneven pattern of development and some particular countries have increased their military capabilities both through the volume of their arms procurement and through the nature of the weapons systems now available to their armed forces.

The pattern of arms imports within the third world reflects the different economic fortunes of oil-producing countries and the newly industrialized countries, on the one hand, and those that have been increasingly constrained by the need to service large debts accumulated in the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s, on the other. The Middle East, South and South-East Asia account for 70 per cent of the third world arms imports in 1988. Within this percentage South and South-East Asia are becoming increasingly important. For example, whereas 12 per cent of third world arms imports in 1984 were accounted for by South and South-East Asia, this figure rose to 22 per cent by 1988, largely as a result of the increase in arms imports by India.

Financing Arms Exports

Although lucrative for companies and corporations producing weapons, arms exports do not bring high economic benefits to most exporting economies (one exception here is France). Governments consider direct economic returns of marginal importance relative to the contribution arms exports make to foreign policy, though some foreign policy benefits are of economic importance. The major exporters are the principal beneficiaries of a stable international environment, and in particular of stability in Europe and the North Pacific. Arms exports also act as a subsidy from the Government to its defence industry, in itself a useful feature of export policy, as maintaining the defence industrial base is considered a vital interest.

The distribution of third world imports also reflects the strategic value placed on the Middle East and Asia by major Powers. Some countries in the Middle East that have significant debts have been insulated from the need to reduce arms procurement by military assistance programmes from major Powers.

The pattern of distribution of United States arms exports is focused on a very small number of recipients—Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan account for over 70 per cent of American exports to the third world. From fiscal year 1974 until 1984, Egypt, Israel and the Sudan had part of their loan repayments waived. From 1985 Egypt and Israel have had all loans forgiven, though Egypt still has to make repayments on an enormous debt acquired before 1985. In 1988 the United States Congress authorized partially forgiven loans for Pakistan and Turkey. The impact of these assistance programmes is considerable. Since 1985 the value of non-repayable military assistance (effectively grant money) offered through direct programmes has been over $3 billion per year.[8] Against this, the total value of United States exports has been in the region of $8 billion to $12 billion per year.[9] It is not unreasonable to suggest that since 1985 the United States Government has consistently subsidized arms exports up to 30 per cent of their total value, and on occasion during the late 1980s this has risen to 40 per cent.

In Western Europe too, Governments have a central role in the management of arms exports. Arms deals are not normal commercial transactions but are offered with direct subsidies, most often in the form of export credit (a loan issued by the Government or by private banks and underwritten by the Government). British companies pay an insurance premium to the Export Credits Guarantee Department within the Trade Ministry, which insures manufacturers against defaults in payments by overseas customers. Subsidies are also likely to include interest rate subsidies and an enhanced ability to refinance loans. Organizations similar to the Export Credits Guarantee Department exist in France and the Federal Republic of Germany, while in the United States the Guarantee Reserve Fund was created by Congress in 1980 as a reserve for making payments to United States financial institutions unable to recover debts or where debtors missed payments.[10] This kind of comprehensive subsidy between suppliers runs counter to the philosophy Governments accept when joining economic organizations like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). However, as fast as OECD has sought ways to limit subsidized trade, Governments have found ways to remain within the letter of OECD guidelines while continuing to assist domestic companies.[11]

Some countries, the Republic of Korea and Saudi Arabia for example, pay for arms imports in hard currency and, if they receive loans, they are expected to repay them with interest. However, arms programmes to these countries are accompanied by offset arrangements. Looking at the total value of United States arms sales and the value of offset obligations, the Office of Management and Budget in the Executive Office of the President has estimated that roughly 60 per cent of the monies gained through arms exports over the period 1980-1987 have been returned to the buyer through offsets.[12]

The Soviet Union's arms relationship with India, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Syrian Arab Republic suggests that arms exports do not represent a major source of hard currency for it.[13] India pays for arms in rupees and, as the rupee is not convertible currency, this forces the Soviet Union to buy goods in India.[14] It was assumed that Middle Eastern countries settled accounts with hard currency, but these accounts may in fact never be settled. In the case of Syria, Damascus has built up a debt of roughly $12 billion, of which the Soviet Union has written off $4 billion and agreed that the remainder be spread over 40 years with payments beginning in 1991.[15] The Democratic Republic of Korea was held in default of foreign debts totalling $4.1 billion in 1988, half of which is apparently owed to socialist countries.[16]

Chinese arms sales to important customers such as Thailand also take place on a concessional basis, at as little as 10 per cent of their value, with payments waived for 10 years.[17] Moreover, the defence sector in China has to compete for resources with other sectors of an economy where demand is greater than available supplies of inputs such as energy, raw materials, and high-quality finished goods.[18] Production costs must reflect this, though it is widely accepted that the unit price charged by China to a recipient is less than that of other suppliers. Looking at some recently quoted prices, a Type 59 tank has been said to cost $250,000.[19] A Type 69 tank (a version of a Soviet T-59 with an Israeli-supplied 105-mm gun) is believed to cost $750,000 against $1.5 million-$2 million for a comparable Western model.[20] A Chinese F-7 aircraft (a version of the Soviet MiG-21) was quoted to be around $3.5 million in 1987 as opposed to a minimum of $8 million-$10 million for a Western model.[21] Assuming that these figures are correct, the Chinese Government must subsidize arms exports.

The Industrialized Arms Exporters

The Super-Powers

In the five-year period 1984-1988, the Soviet Union and the United States accounted for 65 per cent of the total global arms trade. The reasons for the super-Power market dominance become clearer when it is noted that a handful of major importers closely aligned with one or the other super-Power dominate the arms trade. Seven countries—Angola, Cuba, India, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Syria—account for over 80 per cent of all Soviet exports to the third world. Five countries—Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Korea—account for 65 per cent of United States exports to the third world.

These long-standing arms transfer relationships are unlikely to change in the near future since these countries remain close to the centre of United States and Soviet global interests. As discussed below, competitive arming of friendly developing countries may increase if United States-Soviet policies towards third world areas of tension follow their traditional pattern.

The Growing Significance of Europe

The close relationship between the arms trade, security assistance and alliance relationships has placed a ceiling on the growth of Western European arms exports—the five largest Western European arms exporters accounted for 20 per cent of total exports in 1988, compared with 22 per cent in 1978. Within that 20 per cent share, French sales declined and those of the Federal Republic of Germany increased significantly. Individual European countries cannot match the level of economic assistance or offer the same kind of security relationship as the United States. However, the growing emphasis on European co-operative defence production and the evolution of a more coherent European defence industrial base might bring about an important change in the overall global pattern of arms exports.

Several developments acting in conjunction may have important long-term effects on the size, capacity and structure of the arms industry in Western Europe. In political terms, arms control negotiations and procurement planning will have to be linked if conventional arms control talks in Europe lead to significant reductions in the size of forces in Europe. The mandate provided to negotiators at the Vienna talks on conventional forces in Europe states that the "objectives of the negotiation shall be to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, *at lower levels . . . . Each and every participant* undertakes to contribute to the attainment of these objectives" (emphasis added).[22] If achieved, this would require a verified reduction in future procurement and arms production among the largest arms exporters.

A reduction in forces may result from the squeeze on defence budgets among Western European countries created by the pressures of escalating costs of weapons programmes and competing public expenditure needs in an environment of reduced perception of the threat from traditional adversaries. Looking at table 1, one would expect that European defence budgets are likely to fall in real terms over the next few years.

Table 1

1989 budget decisions by selected European countries

Belgium	Mid-term budget review will cut $51 million annually from the Belgian defence budget, though not from the procurement budget
Denmark	Defence spending frozen for the next three years at a level index linked to inflation
FRG	Proposed budget increase for 1990 is below the expected rate of inflation
France	Less than half of the money required to sustain planned programmes has currently been guaranteed by the Government. Some major programmes have been put back into future budget years.
Netherlands	Dutch Finance Minister proposed to cut defence spending for the first year since 1979. In the debate on the budget in September, members of the Dutch Parliament are expected to suggest cuts in procurement
Norway	The rate of growth planned for the Norwegian defence budget will be reduced to 2 per cent, probably requiring cuts in planned equipment programmes for the navy
UK	Reduced spending budgeted for 1989-1990 for the sixth consecutive year, with level funding planned for the next two budget years.

It is not clear whether this budgetary environment is a permanent feature of European defence planning, but it offers some indication of why the emergence of a more integrated Western European defence sector is the intended outcome of the September 1988 Action Plan by the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) within NATO.[23]

The European defence industry is able to produce more arms than European countries can absorb. Powerful economic interest groups, threatened with the loss of protected domestic markets, and Governments, apprehensive about losing their arms production base, may limit the internationalization of arms production, and one alternative approach for Western European arms producers would be to push for additional arms exports. However, the level of economic support required to compete with the United States could only be sustained through the European Community (EC), perhaps with an intensified role assigned to the European Commission in co-ordinating external trade and security-related affairs. If this were to occur, Europe might emerge as an attractive supplier of traditional clients of one or the other super-Power. Some traditional friends of the Soviet Union—such as India and Libya—not only follow the practice of avoiding alliance dependency in their foreign policy, but also have long historical ties with one or more EC member States. However, this development is certainly not inevitable and may be constrained by article 223 of the Treaty of Rome, which states:

"a No Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security;

"b Any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war matériel; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes."

The Defence-Industrial Capacity of Third World Countries

Within the third world, buyers are now demanding a greater local involvement in producing arms in collaboration with the seller.

Early predictions about the speed with which arms industries would grow were overstated, but over the longer term this spread has been a persistent and important trend. Developing countries that used to buy arms now insist that a larger share of their military expenditure contribute to local industrial activity, and two broad categories of arms producers have emerged. On the one hand are countries that use defence production to support a foreign policy of non-alignment—such as India. Here arms production (primarily in the public sector of the economy) is used to underline political independence and avoid dependence in conflict. On the other hand are countries that use arms production to forge closer ties to Western companies in order to boost the development of local manufacturing. This pattern has emerged in East and South-East Asia.

Countries which were among the largest arms importers in the 1970s—notably Israel, Egypt and Taiwan—now meet a large proportion of their needs from domestic production. Countries in Southern Europe and South-East Asia are also unwilling to buy arms without participating in the production and, where possible, the development of weapons systems.

In the Islamic Republic of Iran and in Iraq, the Gulf war stimulated a major increase in investment in defence production.[24] However, neither of these countries is likely to overcome its dependency on arms imports because of its limited technology base and the large scale of its military requirements.

Armed Conflict and the Arms Trade

As noted in the introduction, the pattern of armed conflict is one key factor influencing the arms trade. There were 30 major armed conflicts in progress at the end of 1988.[25] All these conflicts had an important international dimension, most often expressed through the supply of arms to one or more parties to the conflict.

In 1988 the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) recorded a reduction in the number of major armed conflicts from the 36 recorded for both 1986 and 1987. Moreover, during 1988 and 1989 there has been some evidence of progress towards the resolution of several protracted conflicts, largely as a result of changes in the international environment, in particular in the super-Power relationship.

Up to September 1989, cease-fires in conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia, Libya and Chad, Iran and Iraq and in Nicaragua (all declared in 1988) have held. On 15 February 1989 the Soviet Union completed its troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in the context of the four Geneva agreements signed on 14 April 1988. On 22 December 1988, Angola, Cuba and South Africa signed accords which promise the withdrawal of the 50,000 Cuban forces from Angola and Namibia by December 1990, together with the establishment of Namibian independence. In April 1989, Viet Nam committed itself to withdraw its forces from Kampuchea by the end of September 1989. Negotiations have also been held during 1988 and 1989 between conflicting parties in Kampuchea, Colombia, Cyprus, Mozambique, the Western Sahara and Ethiopia (with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front), and between Ethiopia and Somalia.

In some of these cases improved political communications between conflicting parties offer a chance of progress towards conflict resolution. However, these optimistic developments require careful qualification. None of these countries has solved the root causes of its conflict and most of them remain at war. Moreover, while the involvement of foreign armed forces in the conflicts has declined, in some cases this has been accompanied by increased levels of arms supplies.

In Afghanistan the level of Soviet arms supplies to the Kabul Government increased significantly after 1984, reflecting the growing responsibility of Afghan forces for fighting the Mujahideen in order to reduce Soviet casualties and, later, preparations for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. In 1989, in spite of predictions that the Soviet Union would not continue major support to the Afghan Government after the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the level of arms supplies to the Afghan Government has increased further with the supply of long-range surface-to-surface missiles (the SCUD-B) and combat aircraft such as the SU-25 and MiG-27.

Sophisticated systems that attracted a great deal of public attention are no longer being supplied to the Mujahideen. The United States also attempted, unsuccessfully, to secure the return of stockpiles of Stinger portable surface-to-air missiles from the Mujahideen. However, large quantities of less sophisticated rocket artillery, mortars and small arms are still being supplied to the Mujahideen from both China and Western suppliers via Pakistan.

In Angola, the willingness of the Soviet Union and Cuba to replenish stocks of Angolan equipment and, with the assistance of the German Democratic Republic, offer training and advice has helped shift the local balance against South Africa. This changing military balance has been one of the factors which has led South Africa to negotiate with regional enemies. If Cuban troops take their equipment with them when they withdraw, it may be that the Soviet Union will increase the level of arms transfers to Angola in an effort to prevent the South African forces from reclaiming local military superiority.

In Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge, deposed by Vietnamese forces in 1978, remains numerically and militarily the most powerful opposition group in the country and continues to receive arms supplies from China and Thailand. To prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power, Vietnamese troop withdrawals are being accompanied by increased arms transfers to the Government of Heng Samrin/Hun Sen from the Soviet Union via Viet Nam. Moreover, the Vietnamese Government has reserved the right to respond to any call for assistance from the Kampuchean Government under the terms of a 1979 treaty. Other opposition groups—the group led by Son Sann and the forces loyal to Prince Sihanouk—are receiving increased assistance from Thailand and Western countries.

In other cases progress in resolving inter-State conflicts has been accompanied by an increase in the intensity of domestic conflict. Improvements in relations between Ethiopia and Somalia (each of which had previously supported opposition forces in the other) was followed by an increase in the intensity of their respective civil wars. In Iran and Iraq sharp increases in the intensity of internal conflicts followed the August 1988 cease-fire agreement.

The cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war has been followed by increased Iraqi involvement in the war in Lebanon, where the supply of arms to Christian forces has contributed to an escalation in the level of violence during 1989. In July and August 1989 the supply of arms by Iraq to Lebanon threatened to bring about a crisis in Iraqi-Syrian relations, with Syrian and Lebanese Muslim forces threatening to attack ships said to be bringing Frog-7 surface-to-surface missiles from Iraq to Christian Lebanese forces. This apparently led to intervention at the highest political level by the Soviet Union with both Iraq and Syria.

In spite of improvements in super-Power relations and efforts to address regional conflicts in 1988-1989, there is no evidence that the level of arms transfers to areas of conflict has been reduced.

The Pattern of Arms Transfers to Conflicts

The determinants of arms imports are the nature of a recipient country's political alignment (in particular its relationship with the super-Powers), the nature and capabilities of the enemy being faced and the environment in which the weapons are expected to operate. All of these features have changed during the 1980s.

The relationship between supplier and recipient has been changed in part by the presence of an increasing range of suppliers. As noted above, the United States and the Soviet Union account for over 65 per cent of arms transfers, a reduced share compared with that of the 1970s.

The market share lost by the super-Powers has been taken by new exporters of two broad types: those that have decided to establish defence industries in spite of a relatively small domestic demand for weapons and those that re-export arms that they did not produce themselves.

The first group of countries exports arms essentially in order to make domestic defence industries less of a financial drain on the economy, and would include Brazil, China and Israel. This rationale for arms exports also exists among European suppliers.

The second group exports arms not for financial gain, but in order to support regional foreign policy interests. Iran, Iraq, Israel and Syria support various factions in Lebanon in an effort to frustrate the policies of regional rivals. This motive is also present in South-East Asia, where China and Thailand have supplied arms to Kampuchean resistance groups to weaken Viet Nam. China and Israel belong in both categories since more than one motive underlies their arms export policies.

There also exists a black market for arms, particularly small arms, to which recipients can turn if foreign Governments will not meet their needs. The size of this market is impossible to ascertain and therefore a true measure of its significance is also elusive. However, even in cases such as Iran and Lebanon, it is a minor element of the arms imported into those countries and, in an environment where Governments continue to see arms transfers as legitimate instruments of foreign policy, this will continue to be the case.

The Iran-Iraq War

The Iran-Iraq war was the dominant feature of the arms trade with the third world between 1980 and 1988. Iran and Iraq between them accounted for roughly 25 per cent of major arms imported by third world countries in this period, receiving over $27 billion worth of major weapons. This figure excludes large deliveries of small arms, ammunition and other military supplies, spare parts, technical assistance and training to Iran and Iraq and all deliveries to other Gulf countries.[26]

While sharing the same goal—preventing either Iran or Iraq from emerging as a dominant regional Power—the super-Powers have used different means to that end. In the 1970s arms transfers (including those to Iran) were a central feature of United States policy in the Middle East. In the 1980s the United States found itself excluded from influence in the Iran-Iraq war after the collapse of its relationship with Iran, and so it has deployed more of its own armed forces in the region to protect national interest. The Soviet Union—which shares long land borders with both Iran and Iraq—supplied arms to both sides in quantities considered sufficient to prevent defeat. After the Iraqi invasion of Iran, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries initially provided arms to Iran. After 1981 (and on a much larger scale from

1983 onwards), as Iran gained the upper hand, the Soviet Union became Iraq's largest supplier of arms. In 1988-1989, as Iraq regained the military initiative, the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries have resumed supplies to Iran.

Since the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, United States policy in the Persian Gulf has emphasized, through demonstrative actions and direct intervention, the local capabilities of United States forces. Support of the military capabilities of regional countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, has remained important, but this policy has been constrained by the more active role of Congress in arms export decision-making. All arms exports worth in excess of $14 million for "significant military equipment" and $50 million for other weapons and military services must be approved by Congress. This approval has been refused in a significant number of cases—especially to Arab States and anti-Government guerrilla movements. Since 1986, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have all had one arms agreement or more refused by Congress.

Soviet arms exports in particular have been linked to conflict areas. In addition to Afghanistan and Iraq, Angola (along with Cuban forces in Angola), Syria and to a lesser extent Nicaragua and Viet Nam have been important recipients of Soviet arms. Whereas the series of Arab-Israeli conflicts between 1967 and 1982 took place some distance from the Soviet Union, the USSR shares its border with Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq, and has a more direct interest in the internal development of these countries. With the failure of direct intervention in Afghanistan and the lack of alternative strategies—such as the use of economic assistance—arms exports to these countries are likely to remain an important element of Soviet regional policy.

For Moscow simply to abandon commitments to long-term partners in the third world beyond the Soviet border, such as Angola, Syria or Viet Nam, would be for it to relinquish any aspirations to a global foreign policy. Nevertheless, the supply of military assistance to third world Governments unable to command political authority inside their own countries has been expensive. This expenditure may become increasingly difficult to defend under the scrutiny of the Supreme Soviet while shortages of consumer goods in the Soviet Union continue.

New Arms Suppliers

The traditional major Powers remain by far the most important actors in the arms trade, but there are other suppliers whose role is not insignificant. Moreover, the significance of these exporters as suppliers of countries at war is greater than their overall importance within the global arms market.

Table 2 indicates the comparative importance of supplies to countries at war for a selected group. As can be seen, imports by countries at war are particularly important to smaller suppliers.

Table 2

Arms supplies to countries at war as a percentage of total arms exports

Brazil	China	Egypt	France	Libya	Syria	USSR
40	43	86	25	46	99	28

For the most part, the future export performance of these newer suppliers is likely to remain linked to imports by countries at war. It is questionable whether any new market can substitute for that provided by the Iran-Iraq war. For countries like China and Brazil, exports to Iran and Iraq represented roughly 40 per cent of total exports during the period 1984-1988. While companies from the United States and Western Europe remain politically constrained from selling to Iran, the position of important supplier to Teheran may be retained by China, Libya and Syria. However, there are signs in 1989 that Eastern European supplies to Iran have increased since the 1988 cease-fire. Brazil and Egypt may benefit from reduced supplies to Iraq by France and the Soviet Union. The French Government has been reluctant to sanction new orders from Iraq before existing debts are cleared, while the Soviet Union does not want to see Iraq establish itself as the dominant regional Power and, as noted above, the Soviet Government interceded to try and prevent the delivery of Iraqi arms to Lebanon.

Egyptian exports may benefit from the formation of the Arab Co-operation Council in February 1989 by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Yemen. Iraq has become the largest customer for Egyptian arms exports.

The newer suppliers depend on a political climate favourable to their arms exports since they cannot match the financial terms, including offsets and economic assistance, or the level of technology offered by the major Powers. In fact, most of the equipment manufactured in countries such as Brazil and Egypt continues to include a high proportion of imported technology.

The Influence of Local Factors

The future pattern of arms exports to conflicts will also be heavily influenced by the location of those conflicts.

In Beirut, a large city, both Syria and Israel have learnt that heavy equipment and air power are difficult to use effectively, while relatively unsophisticated small arms and man-portable equipment are effective weapons. Under these conditions the range of suppliers able to meet the requirements of local combatants is greatly expanded. The inventory of small arms and ammunition available in the world is vast. To give some indication, United States companies manufactured roughly 6 million personal weapons per year during the Viet Nam war.[27] Assuming that the Soviet Union and China maintained similar outputs for the duration of the war, this would have placed around 18 million small arms of the M-16/AK-47 type in circulation every year. Added to these figures, similar European weapons are also produced in large quantities around the world. The West German Heckler and Koch G3 rifle is licence-produced in 14 countries (and imported by many more), and the Belgian FAL rifle is licence-produced in 11 countries, while others (such as Brazil) have developed local copies.[28]

In addition, a large number of countries manufacture these and other unsophisticated weapons systems, such as heavy machine guns, 20-35 mm calibre guns, rocket artillery and 60-80 mm calibre mortars. Not only is the destructive power of these weapons high, but the sheer volume of equipment already available and the number of suppliers would make effective monitoring and verification of their distribution difficult to achieve.

In some countries the availability of large quantities of major weapons systems has had an important influence on the outcome of conflicts. As noted above, this remains the case in Afghanistan and Angola. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq in particular brought to bear enormous quantities of heavy equipment, including the latest generation of fighter aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles and chemical weapons. If this pattern of conflict persisted, the range of suppliers able to meet the needs of combatants would be considerably smaller.

Prospects for Arms Transfer Control

An important unknown factor arising from the Iran-Iraq war is the evaluation that third parties will make of the extensive use of chemical weapons by both Iran and Iraq. If chemical weapons come to be seen as effective weapons or effective deterrents of a potential aggressor, then a qualitatively new dimension may be added to the international arms trade. Moreover, the issue of deterrence in particular may act as a spur to military nuclear programmes.[29]

The use of chemical weapons has been overshadowed to some extent by concern over the spread of ballistic missiles and the technology to produce them. Some countries have certainly initiated programmes designed to give them the option of developing future force structures based on these systems. This in turn has added momentum to efforts by the United States and Western European countries to control their transfer, notably through the 1987 Missile Technology Control Régime (MTCR). Since the MTCR excludes the Soviet Union and China—in the past the primary suppliers of ballistic missiles—and all the third world countries engaged in buying or developing such systems, it probably has little chance of success. Moreover, the means of delivering weapons by air over considerable distances have been available for many years to most of the developing countries currently known to have military missile programmes—such as India, Iran, Iraq and Israel. Ballistic missile programmes would add a new dimension only where they involved missiles with a very long range or carrying new types of warheads. The issue is therefore closely linked to questions of chemical and nuclear arms control.

As yet efforts to place arms transfer control in the context of negotiations concerning regional conflict resolution have completely failed. The clearest example of this has been the disregard of commitments entered into by both super-Powers when signing the 1988 Geneva agreements on Afghanistan. One has to conclude that as long as Governments see arms transfers as legitimate instruments of foreign policy, the outlook for arms transfer control will continue to be bleak.

Arms transfer control is likely to become an issue of great importance in the process of negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) for two reasons. First, force levels in Europe must take into consideration forces deployed in Europe for use outside the region. The Soviet Union and the United States are global Powers, while France and the United Kingdom have residual responsibilities in places as far removed as Djibouti and Tahiti, Hong Kong and the South Atlantic. Secondly, regional arms control is workable only where geography and politics allow a self-contained area to be defined and isolated from neighbouring regions, but at the southern and eastern boundaries of Europe, countries represented at Vienna live in proximity to Africa and the Middle East, where the risk of war is greater than in Europe. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze raised this issue specifically in Vienna on 6 March 1989, when he said:[30]

> "In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, that is, in close proximity to Europe, powerful weapons arsenals are being created. It is not enough just to mention that 25,000 tanks and 4,500 aircraft are deployed and ready for combat in the Middle East, and there is a real danger of nuclear and chemical weapons appearing there: Missiles have already appeared with an operational range of 2,500 kilometres . . . . The conclusion is obvious: The processes of disarmament in Europe and settlement in the Middle East have to be synchronized."

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a failure to draw in both non-European countries and the issue of conventional military technology transfer will put in jeopardy the overall process of conventional arms control.

Notes

1 These programmes will become increasingly important if, as some analysts have suggested, the ceilings for combat aircraft in the inventories of the super-Powers established at the CFE talks in Vienna are to be global rather than regional. See Jane Sharp,

"Conventional arms control in Europe", in SIPRI, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1989* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 390-391, and R. A. Mason, "Conventional forces talks: a place on the agenda for airpower?", Council for Arms Control Bulletin (London), April 1989.

2 B. Jasani, "World arms production", and S. Landgren-Bäckström, "The trends in the arms trade with the third world", in SIPRI, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1978* (London, Taylor & Francis, 1978).

3 See, for example, "Discriminate deterrence", report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, January 1988).

4 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Revitalizing Development, Growth and International Trade: Assessment and Policy Options*, report to UNCTAD VII, United Nations document (TD/328/Rev.1), 1987.

5 The need to sustain a capacity for the global projection of power as well as forces adequate to confront the Soviet Navy has been one of the key reasons presented by the United States Navy for a reluctance to enter an arms control process. See the Statement of Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, Director of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy, before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues, 1 March 1988, pp. 53-54.

6 ACDA, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1988* (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 1.

7 Thomas Ohlson, *Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988).

8 Data on United States security assistance is taken from "Security assistance: update of programs and related activities", General Accounting Office Fact Sheet for the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security Economics, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, GAO/NSIAD-89-78FS, December 1988.

9 ACDA, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (Washington D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1987).

10 For a discussion of the Guarantee Reserve Fund, see part 3, title III, "Military assistance", testimony of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, Senate Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations on Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations, 100th Congress of the United States, especially pages 111-113.

11 A. M. Moravcsik, "Disciplining trade finance: the OECD export credit arrangement", *International Organization*, Winter 1989.

12 "Offsets in military exports", report of the Office of Management and Budget to President Bush, December 1988, p. 11.

13 For a general discussion of the economics of Soviet relations with developing countries, including arms sales, see A. H. Smith, "Soviet trade relations with the third world", in *Soviet Interests in the Third World*, R. Cassen, ed. (London, Sage/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985), pp. 140-158; and A. S. Becker, "A note on Soviet arms transfers to the Middle East", in *The Soviet American Competition in the Middle East*, S. L. Spiegel, M. A. Heller, and J. Goldberg, eds. (D. C. Heath, Lexington, Mass., 1988), pp. 49-60.

14 A clearing account is a bank account in the name of the supplier held in the recipient country where money is deposited to cover the cost of imports. The Soviet Union has tried to move away from the practice of using clearing accounts since they tend to focus overall trade relations on balancing on a bilateral rather than a multilateral basis. In fact, in the 1980s the Soviet Union has built up a substantial deficit in overall trade with India. For recent discussions of the Indo-Soviet relationship, see P. Lyon, "The Soviet Union and South Asia in the 1980s", in *Soviet Interests in the Third World*, R. Cassen, ed. (London, Sage/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985), pp. 32-46; J. Banerjee, "Indo-Soviet security relations", in *The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Third World*, R. E. Kanet, ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 221-227; and I. Anthony, "Indo-Soviet defence co-operation", *RUSI & Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1988* (London, Brassey's, 1988), pp. 221-235.

15 A. Levran, "Changes in the Syrian armed forces and their impact on the military balance with Israel", in *Middle East Military Balance, 1987-88*, A. Levran, ed. (Boulder, Col., Westview Press, 1988).

16 Statement to the United States Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations by General L. C. Menetrey, Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces Korea, reproduced in *Asian Defence Journal*, August 1988, pp. 12-20. Menetrey notes that the only significant export product of the Democratic Republic of Korea able to generate hard currency is armaments and military equipment.

17 "Asia: PRC clinches defense deal with Thailand", *Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly*, 18 May 1988.

18 J. D. Pollack, "China and Taiwan in 1987", Rand-P-7413, Jan. 1988 (Santa Monica, California, Rand Corporation, 1988), pp. 5-9.

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The Third Review Conference of the Sea-Bed Treaty —A Panorama

Sergio Q. Duarte

Since the second half of the 1960s, periodic conferences of the parties to multilateral treaties in the field of disarmament have become a standard feature of such agreements. Only three such instruments—the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty—lack specific provisions on the review and assessment of their operation and on the adequacy with their objectives. The Antarctic Treaty, which was concluded in 1959 and thus predates both the PTBT and the Outer Space Treaty, already contained a detailed clause on regular consultations and the exchange of information among its parties in order to further the principles and objectives of the instrument. As for other multilateral treaties in the field of disarmament, be they of a regional or a more universal scope, most, if not all, do provide, in one way or another, the mechanisms for the periodic assessment of their operation.

The international community has found it necessary and worth while to conduct such periodic exercises. Specif-

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ically, they are very useful in determining whether the objectives of a particular instrument are being realized, as well as in improving procedures or clarifying interpretations and points of view. Review conferences may also give preliminary consideration to issues that may generate future amendments to the texts. Furthermore, periodic reviews provide an opportunity to discuss and call attention to matters which, although not immediately or organically related to the performance of the instrument, do have particular relevance to it and thus deserve to be raised and examined. Obviously, some international instruments in the field of disarmament are more controversial than others, by virtue of their intrinsic characteristics, and therefore tend to give rise to more heated debate on the occasion of their review. In most cases, however, debate has proved beneficial to the strengthening of the instrument or instruments concerned and to the reaffirmation of the parties' commitment to the objectives with which they originally joined the instrument.

In the case of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, controversy is not a trade mark. Indeed, it is perhaps one of the least controversial among the legal texts with which the international community has sought to prevent the extension of the arms race to a particular environment. It is, in fact, considered a particularly successful measure for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, since its three nuclear weapon parties (among them the two most heavily armed nations in the world) are thereby committed not to extend the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons to the environment covered by the Treaty. Furthermore, in the Sea-Bed Treaty, all parties, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, are subject to the same obligations and entitled to the same rights, without any discrimination, and the verification procedures also apply equally to all parties.

It may be argued that so far there has been little strategic and technological incentive for those who currently possess nuclear armament to seek their permanent emplacement on the sea-bed or in the subsoil thereof. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the Sea-Bed Treaty has an important role to play as part of an international régime aimed at banning nuclear weapons from environments in which they have not yet been introduced. Other treaties relevant to this régime are, for instance, the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty and the Additional Protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, all of which seek to curb specific aspects of proliferation, including its most dangerous forms. Adequate verification provisions for monitoring and ensuring compliance by the nuclear-weapon Powers with their commitments under those and other instruments are obviously relevant to their operation and should be part of the set of questions to be addressed by parties on appropriate occasions.

The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty was held at Geneva from 19 to 28 September 1989. The task of the Conference was completed one day ahead of schedule and the Conference adopted a Final Declaration which spells out the consensus achieved on the matters before it. A very high degree of understanding and a relative absence of deep differences of opinion prevailed throughout the Third Review Conference. There are several reasons why this was so.

To begin with, the Third Review Conference took place in the atmosphere of relaxation of mutual tensions which lately has come to characterize the relationship between the two most powerful nations and their respective systems of alliances. This undoubtedly facilitated the achievement of consensus by the Conference. We have, of course, every reason to hope that this encouraging trend in the mutual relationship will develop further in the future, so that the awesome arsenals of mass destruction accumulated during over forty years of confrontation and hostility may begin to be dismantled and replaced by instruments of co-operation among nations. The prevailing climate also permitted the Conference to devote most of its time and energy to the concerns, ideas and proposals put forth by the parties, rather than wasting its resources in sterile antagonism as unfortunately happened so often in disarmament forums. Although not all the suggestions presented are expressed in the Final Declaration, we can be sure that many of them will be examined by Governments and may re-emerge on future occasions, particularly those dealing with technological developments relevant to the Treaty.

In the general circumstances and background described above, it is not surprising that the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference closely follows the structure of the corresponding documents adopted at the two previous review conferences. There are some differences between the Final Declaration and its predecessors which reflect the current consensus of the parties on two sets of questions before the Conference. Those encompass: (*a*) the relationship between the Treaty and the development of the law of the sea and (*b*) the Treaty's significance as an instrument for preventing one aspect of the arms race and its ability to promote further multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament.

As regards the first set of questions, it may be said that the debate at the Conference reflected that fact that the legal framework generally referred to as "the law of the sea" is at a comparatively early stage of its development, despite the considerable progress achieved in the last decade or so. It became evident at the Third Review Conference that the existing differences of a substantive nature, whether deriving from political and strategic perceptions or from considerations of a juridical character, cannot be resolved in the context of the Sea-Bed Treaty itself. Specific references to existing instruments on the law of the sea appear in the tenth preambular paragraph of the Final Declaration and on the section dealing with Article IV. The first of these formulations slightly modifies the text adopted at the Second Review Conference to state that "nothing contained in the Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 affects the rights and obligations assumed by States Parties under the Treaty". The section on Article IV merely repeats the corresponding section of the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference. This probably means that solution of the questions raised during the Third Review Conference will depend on the achievement of further progress in the solution of remaining differences regarding the law of the sea, including the enlargement of participation in the body of positive international law governing relations among nations in that field.

The second set of questions addressed by the delegations at the Third Review Conference is more directly related to the subject-matter of the instrument. These were questions dealing mainly with (*a*) the scope of the Treaty; (*b*) compliance with obligations assumed under the Treaty; (*c*) verification procedures contemplated in the Treaty; (*d*) further negotiations on disarmament issues, either of a specific or a general character; (*e*) technological developments relevant to the implementation of the Treaty; (*f*) the mechanism for future reviews of the operation of the instrument; and (*g*) enlargement of adherence to the Treaty.

Considerable interest was shown on questions of scope. Ideas had been aired, within and outside the Conference, on an extension of the field of application of the instrument, both in the geographical and in the functional sense, which are of course not mutually exclusive. The exploratory character of the remarks made by delegations on both aspects of the issue shows that further reflection is needed before concrete proposals can be put forward. Some of the States parties argued for an extension of the geographical application of the existing provisions of the Treaty, or the "shore-to-shore" approach, but stopped well short of presenting specific formulations on how the matter could be dealt with. Others stated that the present provisions on the area of application of the régime of the Treaty well suited their purposes. The idea of the extension of the "functional" prohibition, so as to cover other kinds of weapons than those of mass destruction, was also given consideration. It would seem that the parties do not contemplate making concrete proposals for any change in the scope of the Treaty in the immediate future.

Questions regarding compliance were also touched upon during the discussions. While the Final Declaration unequivocally states that parties are generally satisfied that "obligations assumed under Article I of the Treaty have been faithfully observed by States parties", several delegations noted the possibility of enhancing the verification procedures by utilizing new technological developments in this field. This entails, of course, problems related to the ability to provide technical expertise, since only a very small number of parties possess technology capable of ensuring adequate monitoring of compliance. Of this very reduced group of parties, the majority are nuclear-weapon Powers.

Still as part of the set of questions dealing with compliance, an unexpected and interesting result of the Conference was the declaration by the delegations of the three nuclear Powers party to the Treaty to the effect that they "have not emplaced any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed outside the zone of application of the Treaty as defined by its Article II and have no intention to do so". Their statements, duly recorded in the Final Declaration in the form quoted above, were received with interest by the other parties and were further clarified in the concluding remarks by the representatives of the three nuclear-weapon parties, who stressed that such statements could not of course be understood as commitments on future policy decisions.

The parties also commented upon other aspects of procedures contained in the Treaty to promote its objectives and ensure compliance with its provisions. One delegation reiterated its interpretation of the expression "observation" in paragraph 1 of Article III, to the effect already stated on previous occasions by the party concerned, as well as at the time of its signature and ratification of the instrument.

The question of further negotiations on disarmament was an important part of the discussions, and the results of deliberations on those matters appear in two preambular paragraphs and in the formulation of the section on Article V, which differs from the corresponding section in the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference. Several parties considered that mention should be made of the general improvement in the climate of bilateral relations between the two major military alliances and of the implications of this trend for further progress in disarmament negotiations. At the same time, several parties deemed it necessary that the Final Declaration clearly reflect the absence of negotiations on further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, and renew the call on the Conference on Disarmament promptly to consider such measures, as the two previous Review Conferences had decided. By the same token, others wished it to reflect the contribution to the effectiveness of the Treaty which other negotiations might have when successfully concluded.

With regard to technological developments relevant to the implementation of the Treaty, the Conference received a communication from the Secretary-General containing information provided to him by some parties in response to the call of the Preparatory Committee. Some years ago, the Second Review Conference had also invited the Secretary-

General to collect and to publish information from "officially available sources", as had the First Review Conference. The Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference contains a significant departure from the practice, which appears in the section dealing with Article VII of the Treaty. The Secretary-General now has the possibility of availing himself of the "assistance of appropriate expertise" in preparing a report at three-year intervals until the convening of the Fourth Review Conference. Furthermore, States parties are urged to provide information and to draw the Secretary-General's attention to "suitable sources".

If a conclusion can be drawn from the debate on technological developments, it is clearly that some parties are disappointed with the scarcity and the general nature of the information provided up to the time of the convening of the Third Review Conference, while others consider that this situation simply reflects the lack of significant or relevant information on which to report. Since most parties do not possess sufficient technological capability to make independent assessments of the state of the art, the idea of utilizing expertise other than "officially available sources" seemed attractive to many. Concern has however been expressed by developing countries in other disarmament forums that excessive emphasis on technical matters when dealing with questions that bear on national security might somehow offset the political, economic or other aspects of such questions. Similarly, nations which cannot provide their own expert assessment of technological issues might feel placed at a disadvantage.

Be that as it may, the consensus achieved at the Third Review Conference and reflected in the section on Article VII referred to above constitutes an original approach to the issue of expert advice on disarmament questions. It will be reviewed at the Fourth Conference.

Another point on which differences of view were finally reconciled in an innovative way was that of the next Review Conferences. Some delegations, for reasons which probably derived from practical or budgetary considerations, believed that intervals between such Conferences should be longer than was the current practice. At best, in their view, there should be no automatic recurrence of Review Conferences; on the contrary, these should be convened only when exceptional circumstances warranted it. Other delegations, on the other hand, while sensitive to this argument, favoured a more regular and predictable pattern for the review mechanism which could not only take into account those considerations but also allow for the periodic discussion of issues of relevance to all parties. The consensus formulation, based on the review mechanism contained in the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, provides for a flexible system in which a relatively small number of parties and the depositary Governments share the power to convene a review conference as early as 1997, or later, within a comparatively short time span.

Finally, the Third Review Conference dealt with the question of adherence to the Treaty, and noted with concern that despite the demonstrated effectiveness of the instrument, universal adherence had not yet been achieved. By the same token, the Conference welcomed the fact that 10 States had become parties since the Second Review Conference, thus bringing the total number of parties to 82. The Conference reiterated the call upon States that had not yet adhered to the Treaty to do so at the earliest possible date, and stressed in particular the importance of adherence by all nuclear-weapon Powers.

By and large, the Third Review Conference confirmed the general view that the Sea-Bed Treaty deserves to be deemed a success in the history of disarmament agreements, even if its membership is still relatively small in comparison with other multilateral agreements in this field. To be sure, the measure of success of an international agreement is not so much the size of its membership as its ability to satisfy the legitimate concerns of all the prospective parties, so that the interests of all are taken into account equally. Discriminatory and unbalanced arrangements, which are geared to promoting only the narrow interests of a limited number of adherents, are doomed to fuel controversy and generate apprehension and instability. The success story of the Sea-Bed Treaty and the smooth conclusion of the Third Review Conference bear ample testimony to its equanimity and adequacy, as recognized by its parties in the Final Declaration and in their statements during the Conference.

Multifaceted Co-operation: A Post-Confrontational Perspective for the United Nations

Vladimir F. Petrovsky

At the beginning of a new year—indeed a new decade—it is of benefit to review the results of the one that has just ended. Looking back as interested parties over the mosaic of the United Nations' recent achievements, we single out the day 15 November 1989. It was on that day that the General Assembly, on an initiative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, adopted by consensus resolution 44/21, entitled "Enhancing international peace, security and international co-operation in all its aspects in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations".

Wherein lies the significance of the Soviet-American initiative? For the first time in the history of the United Nations, the Soviet Union and the United States acted in concert to support this unique Organization. Drawn up on the basis of the efforts of two great Powers, the resolution became their joint contribution to the strengthening of the United Nations, and thus a joint success. The manner in which the resolution was adopted is also important. Although the draft resolution was originally proposed by the Soviet Union and the United States, participation in it was, from the outset, open to other countries. Another 41 Member States joined in sponsoring it, and it was supported by the entire

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world community. In substance, the draft resolution affirms the cardinal Charter concept of collective action by Members of the Organization in the interest of maintaining and enhancing international peace and security.

Let us emphasize right away that it would be utterly wrong to regard this resolution as some "covert" understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States in which only their interests are represented. The very fact that the proposal was made—and it may have been something of a surprise to many—illustrates, indeed, that the USSR and the United States have renounced such an approach. Accordingly, the significance of the joint action lies in the fact that it symbolizes the beginning of a new and different phase in the activities of the USSR and the United States at the United Nations, a phase in which they work together in parallel: now, instead of maintaining a separate Soviet-American dialogue, they are incorporating it into the international debate.

No less important is the content of the resolution adopted. Action of this type puts an end to the cold war and confrontation at the United Nations. The habitual tendency to make proclamatory statements in United Nations proceedings, with propaganda battles and the cultivation of political intolerance, is becoming a thing of the past. The stereotyped behaviour whereby one side automatically, so to speak, rejected the other side's proposals is ceasing. The United Nations is entering the post-confrontational era, in which a new international order will be established, based on mutual understanding and active co-operation. It is no accident that at the most recent session of the General Assembly a number of other resolutions were also adopted by consensus, including two important international conventions of a humanitarian character: on the rights of the child and against the use of mercenaries.

The changes in the material and spiritual life of civilization which are taking place before the eyes of the present generation are of an unprecedented character. The rapid scientific and technological progress of recent years, the takeoff of computer technology and the transformation of the world into a single information space, the trend towards interacting economic mechanisms and integration on a regional and global scale, and the growing gap between the levels of development of individual countries: all of these developments turn upside down the conventional wisdom about the present and the future. Transformations of a political character are also accelerating. Ideas of freedom and democracy, the supremacy of law, freedom of choice, and responsible behaviour on the part of States are uppermost in people's minds. Peoples, nations and countries are becoming politically more active, and an international community in the full meaning of that term is taking shape. Not finding convincing answers to the contemporary challenges which affect the very foundations of human existence, in the economic, political, humanitarian or any other sphere, means being left on the sidelines of world civilization.

Thus, what is at issue is not simply security, but security in all its aspects and forms. Resolution 44/21 properly reflects this requirement. It is apparent from its text that peace, security and co-operation are inseparable. The combining of these three concepts is no accident; it embodies the essential characteristic of the kind of international relations now taking shape.

The maintenance of international peace and security is the central aim of the United Nations Charter. Today it is particularly important to understand the two-in-one, complex nature of authentic security. Such security is characterized not simply by the absence of war, but also by the presence of reliable and positive guarantees of the non-use of force and the establishment of comprehensive conditions for peaceful development. With the recognition of this complex and diverse character of security it can be seen that a multifaceted, comprehensive approach to the achievement of security is called for.

It also follows from resolution 44/21 that, in the new conditions, co-operation is the only possible course of action for States. Co-operation affords, for the first time, an opportunity—at the current level of world civilization and with the United Nations Charter as a basis—to set the development of international relations on an evolving course that would allow the turbulent natural changes occurring in the world to be set within a framework of stability, so as not to break up existing structures or endanger peace and security. Co-operation, previously a sporadic phenomenon, is becoming the central principle of active joint creation and co-development. It is the proper response to the needs of an emerging peaceful era in international relations. It is characterized by positive, rather than negative, interaction by States in their efforts to ensure optimal external conditions for their development.

Precisely for this reason, the aim of the joint resolution is to mobilize Member States for the expansion of practical efforts to guarantee peace and security. The search for lasting security through power rivalry is unthinkable today. The States Members of the United Nations have spoken up unequivocally in favour of ensuring security in tomorrow's world through political means alone, that is to say, through consultations and co-operation within the framework of the United Nations, in all its bodies without exception.

Lastly, it follows from the resolution that peace, security and co-operation are regarded as a *single system*, based on the United Nations Charter. This constitutes a recognition of observable trends in today's world, which for all its diversity is increasingly becoming an indivisible and interdependent whole. Our civilization is a functioning system the component parts of which cannot be disturbed without causing harm to the working of the entire mechanism. In other words, peace cannot be maintained on a selective basis, in a particular region, without regard to peace in other parts of the world. The organic bond between national and international security is becoming increasingly apparent: when the diminished security of any country becomes unfavourable for other countries, this leads to a destabilization of the overall situation, and hence it is only within the framework of global security that the security of an individual State can be reliably ensured. It is becoming obvious that, in an interdependent system, progress in a given society which is separated from other societies by artificial boundaries and ideological limits is in fact impossible.

It follows from resolution 44/21 that the system of peace, security and co-operation must be backed by the authority and capabilities of the United Nations. In the past, when the work of the United Nations was greatly distorted, the Organization served first and foremost as a forum for States to express their own—uncompromising—viewpoints. Today, however, the United Nations is becoming a forum of a different kind. In it, the representatives of the Member States speak, not to engage in polemics or make accusatory statements, but to promote co-operation among all States and ensure that decisions have a practical orientation. As the Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, observed in his most recent annual report on the work of the Organization,[1] "the assistance of the world Organization is being sought as never before in its history". It is impossible not to share the Secretary-General's gratification at the "renewal of confidence in multilateralism and its agents".

Pacta sunt servanda. As far as the United Nations is concerned, the full and universal implementation of the United Nations Charter is today a doubly important goal. These are not simply words, but a deeply meaningful and significant statement. In the past, States not infrequently singled out some provisions of the Charter and ignored its other constituent parts. In the new, post-confrontational world, all the provisions of the United Nations Charter must be observed in letter and in spirit, and the Charter must be the corner-stone of all international action by States.

Such a corner-stone is now more necessary than ever. In a world that is changing so fast and at times so unpredictably, it cannot be dispensed with. (Some politicians say, not without foundation, that at the time of the cold war they felt more at ease because, however paradoxical it may seem, peace, although tottering on the brink of a "hot" war, appeared more reliable and more stable.) Today changes may occur in any region. Resolution 44/21 is therefore aimed at promoting, through the United Nations, the stability of an international system undergoing change.

The Soviet Union and the United States, together with all the States Members of the United Nations, chose to act at a critically important and decisive moment. They reached the unanimous view that the basis of action should be unconditional respect for the Charter of the United Nations and the purposes and principles enshrined in it. This means closely following the course set as a result of carefully weighing the interests of all the countries which worked on framing the Charter at a time when there was real co-operation as the war against fascism ended. In addition, the United Nations itself must be developed, and relations must be renewed between the participants in its proceedings.

The direct joint search for solutions to quite specific and tangible issues on the agenda, at all levels of international interaction, is now becoming a decisive factor.

In the military-political sphere, a real breakthrough was achieved with the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. This was the first agreement to affirm the organic nature of comprehensive security through the elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons.

The new security order can and must be established, not by the build-up of arms, but by their elimination. The results of the meeting in Malta between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States justify the hope that, by the next stage of their dialogue—in the second half of June 1990—the basic elements of a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms will be agreed on. Following that, in the course of the next few months, the treaty could be prepared for signature. In the course of this year, 1990, understandings are likely to be reached at the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces. Work on a convention for the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons is nearing completion at Geneva.

New basic categories are emerging in the concept of disarmament. Accompanying conditions such as verification and openness are assuming particular significance. The strictest and most reliable verification is needed in order to ensure the full confidence of all parties to the agreements. With the progressive introduction and refinement of multilateral procedures and the necessary extension of inspections to foreign military bases in the territories of third countries, the role of international verification, particularly under the auspices of the United Nations, will be enhanced.

Meanwhile, openness and *glasnost* will serve as the "philosopher's stone" of disarmament, facilitating an ordered transformation of military confrontation into arrangements to end such confrontation. Publication of the military doctrines and military budgets of States, their comparison and the establishment of agreed standards for the greatest possible transparency in military activity are becoming particularly topical issues. The Soviet Union is to take an active part in the work on this subject that is to be started by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1990. We believe that the new world order should be based, not on military—including nuclear—restraint, but on restraint grounded in policy, law, transparency and verification, supported by the authority and facilities of the United Nations.

The winding down of military capabilities lends substance to the economic dimension of disarmament, and gives real content to the principle of disarmament for development. On the international level, we must ensure that resources are indeed released as a result of the reduction of military programmes and that a share of them is used to assist the poorest countries and to solve global problems. This process will certainly be facilitated now that the United Nations has begun to examine the problem of converting military production, covering both international scientific research and the exchange of relevant experience.

We are convinced that development is a decisive factor in shaping the construction of a new kind of world. From the political, moral and economic points of view, the general transition to reasonable sufficiency for defence purposes is capable of giving an enormous boost to positive processes in all other spheres of human existence. However, every aspect of security is increasingly being affected by non-military factors, such as the creation of a healthy environment, stable economic development, the defence of human rights, and freedom of information. The list could be continued: more and more new transnational problems are appearing on the agenda of the United Nations.

Just as important as the banning of war will be the prevention of an ecological crisis. Everyone is by now aware that a nuclear conflict would mean the immediate annihilation of mankind. A recent analysis of "nuclear winter" by the Secretary-General of the United Nations[2] provided further scientific evidence of that fact. Nevertheless, the approaching ecological catastrophe could produce similar results. The only difference is that they would be gradual. It is therefore becoming increasingly evident that there is a vital and urgent need for special measures to conserve nature in every part of the planet, in order not only to save mankind from suffering irreparable losses but also to protect humanity against new destabilizing factors in the development of international relations.

There is growing understanding that the field of humanitarian co-operation, with primary emphasis on the defence of human rights, must be free from confrontation. Democratic society as a whole has in common the same objectives as those enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the related International Covenants, and he task of bringing the internal practices of each country up to the level of recognized international standards is one that has to be assumed by all. Efforts in the new and delicate sphere of information have also been raised to a new level.

Problems which used to be considered as relating to the purely "internal" jurisdiction of States are now moving into the forefront of international discussions. The special session of the United Nations General Assembly on the campaign against narcotic drugs and the Assembly's adoption of a resolution stating the commitment of the United Nations to the prevention of international terrorism show that world society is not indifferent to these threats.

There is now a pressing need for efforts to deal with every aspect of international security. This is the most important facet of the comprehensive approach. What we need is not to establish linkages and aggregate problems, but to solve them simultaneously and in a co-ordinated manner in each specific sphere. This approach is consistent with the need to harmonize international relations and to strengthen the links between States in their search for world stability, including their quest for social and other types of change on a basis of widely diverse systems of development.

The point at which the new thinking that has emerged in the Soviet Union was incorporated into United Nations activities may be said to have been four years ago, when the Soviet Union and certain other States proposed the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security, a proposal which was later consolidated and developed by Mikhail Gorbachev in his messages to the United Nations in 1987 and 1988. The Soviet Union unequivocally pronounced itself in favour of building a new world order, to be supported by the authority and facilities of the United Nations.

As may be seen, these initiatives have achieved their objective, which was, first and foremost, to usher in a broad democratic dialogue on the methods and principles whereby comprehensive security could be established, to enhance the role of the United Nations and eventually to lead the dialogue towards some sort of common denominator. This was done in a period of less than four years. Considering that the cold war lasted for over 40 years, this period is really quite short.

If we compare the proposal on comprehensive security with resolution 44/21, differences in wording immediately leap to the eye. But their essential meaning and basic provisions are entirely consistent. Previously, the primary emphasis was on the need to unite the efforts of States with a view to establishing comprehensive security; the resolution also addresses the need to strengthen the system of peace and security. Previously, the idea of a comprehensive approach was given prominence; now another—possibly more precise—expression is to be found: "multifaceted approaches". In other words, the essential meaning remains the same, but language has been found which suits all States Members of the United Nations.

In the course of discussions it proved possible to identify a number of areas of agreement, which now provide a clear framework for the immediate trends in the activization of multilateralism. These are to strengthen the principal organs of the United Nations, to enhance the possibilities for the conduct of United Nations peace-keeping operations, to strengthen the role of international law and actively involve the International Court of Justice in this process. The essential purpose of these measures is to promote the collective search for ways and means to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations through the full and non-selective implementation of the provisions of its Charter and the active utilization of its mechanisms and procedures. Further ahead lies the genuine possibility of proceeding to concentrate the efforts of the United Nations on preventive diplomacy and developing its ability to take effective measures to prevent differences of opinion from growing into conflicts.

As a result, the United Nations is now witnessing its own renaissance. This is being noted by all Member States, as well as by the Secretary-General. It may be said, without exaggeration, that the Organization has now begun—for the first time since 1945—once again to operate under external conditions comparable to those which were seen as a premise underlying its structure by its founder Members. The trend towards dialogue and the solution of problems by means of negotiations—in other words, multilateralism and the rule of law and order—must prevail over approaches based on military methods and the use of force and over reliance on unilateral action. The United Nations, having entered with vigour into the world-wide processes of renewal, is now to some extent becoming their catalyst and a powerful force for their acceleration.

A universal instrument has also emerged: the solution of problems by political methods and by means of co-operation, together with a determination to ensure that interests are balanced. In the efforts to harmonize interests, the patterns of parliamentary diplomacy are now assuming particular significance. Parliamentary diplomacy involves refusing to think in terms of outdated stereotypes, engaging in civilized dialogue from the speakers' rostrum and searching persistently behind the scenes for solutions to disagreements. In the case of the United Nations, it is essential that preliminary consultations should be held in each and every body that has a bearing on the balance of interests.

We are convinced that the world, in breaking with the philosophy of hostility and confrontation, is becoming more balanced, mature and wise. No longer is it an obligation to endure manifestations of national egocentricity, high-handed ways or any kind of *idée fixe*. It is now in the interests of all that policies should always be designed to strengthen the international community and to promote its survival and development.

In order to ensure the transition to political approaches using negotiating mechanisms and law, military prescriptions must be rejected, and ways of thinking generally demilitarized.

While in the last century it was the practice to describe political subjects in terms of the theatre (the international scene, the actors and performers on the stage, the curtain), the twentieth century has seen the general adoption of concepts borrowed from military theory, such as those of an offensive, a front, a breakthrough. The need is now urgently felt—and *perestroika* has clearly illustrated this—for a fresh new language of diplomacy which both reflects the creative values shared by all and operates in accordance with the interests of nations and States.

The principle of universal membership in the United Nations and related international organizations is also viewed today in a new light. The United Nations and its system have now become the only ramified mechanism for interaction between States which exercises a real influence on the external and internal political practice of any given country. Full-fledged participation in United Nations activities not only meets the interests of the world community as a whole in identifying multifaceted approaches to a strengthening of the system of peace, security and co-operation but also fulfils the long-term interests of each participant in the maintenance of international contacts. "To practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours": that phrase from the preamble of the Charter serves as a logical prelude to the provision whereby membership in the Organization is open to all peace-loving States. The task ahead—that of ensuring a prolonged period of peaceful development for mankind—is more than ever inseparable from realizing in practice the principle of universality of the United Nations and erasing the heritage of the cold war and of colonial and racist oppression.

There is also a need to ensure the active participation in the United Nations of all the basic groups of States. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries is an important force in the Organization, and its voice should be heard to the full, not only in the General Assembly but also in the Security Council. A special role is now played by public, non-governmental organizations, which must work in close contact with the United Nations, keeping open a permanent channel of communication with the broadest masses of the population in different countries.

A commitment to reaching consensus on the greatest number of problems under consideration is the most effective way to further the progressive development of international organizations. The positive results of the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly confirm this. It is no coincidence that at that session more resolutions were adopted by merging separate draft resolutions submitted initially by different sponsors. In other words, the general ethos of conducting international affairs is entering an entirely new phase; and there is a growing readiness to consider the arguments put forward by the other side and to take them into account in refining one's position.

Of course, politicians are still faced with the task of reaching a sort of "consensus about consensus". But it is already clear to us now that a consensus, by its legal status, occupies a special place among the various means at the disposal of multilateral forums. By virtue of its effectiveness it differs from recommendations and is similar to binding decisions, in view of the moral authority of the world community on which it is based. For precisely this reason, it is important always to apply the rule of consensus during both the period of drafting a document and the stage of implementing its provisions once it is adopted. We see consensus as a means to promote responsible behaviour by States and a guarantee that the interests of all will be considered, which opens up the possibility of the participation of each and every party in the taking of major decisions. The right of veto of the five permanent members of the Security Council also appears in a different light through the prism of consensus—the veto here exerts a positive influence and forces the permanent members of the Council to reach agreement among themselves.

This dramatic breakthrough is, of course, not easy to achieve; there are still many difficulties to be overcome in revitalizing the United Nations. We cannot rid ourselves of the past immediately. There are still instances of reversion to power politics and a bipolar view of the world, and this influences the actions of many States within and outside the United Nations.

A critical re-evaluation of past experience is needed to overcome outmoded stereotypes, and create the conditions necessary to prevent a repetition of past mistakes. Since April 1985 in the Soviet Union we have been evaluating the history of our activities in the United Nations from this standpoint. We see that we sometimes used a position of strength in a way that reduced the effectiveness of the Organization. We believe that the urgent task of diplomacy now is to consider objectively the prevailing attitudes in the United Nations, to initiate a dialogue involving the entire spectrum of the world's political forces, and to realize that in solving problems affecting all mankind we do not have and cannot have opponents, only allies and partners.

But we do not claim a monopoly with regard to the need for self-criticism. All States, and particularly the nuclear Powers that are permanent members of the Security Council, must take a critical look at their past policies, correct them where necessary and focus this analysis on the future. Ignoring the will of the United Nations is today, as in the past, inadmissible.

The ability and readiness to undertake self-criticism is perhaps only one of the elements of a truly up-to-date policy. The efforts of all are needed to consolidate a radical breakthrough in world affairs and create guarantees ensuring the irreversibility of positive changes. The cumulative effect of joint action by peoples, States, their blocs and groups—East and West, North and South—is necessary.

It is important to bring about also a change of style in relations between States. One-sided approaches and the posturing of a schoolmaster lecturing others have little effect today. If accompanied by pressure involving the use of force, then such actions are unacceptable and dangerous. No, a mature and wise civilization requires, not instructions from one side, but rather collective efforts, in the spirit of a "new internationalism", which is responsible and devoid of double standards.

The post-confrontational era requires as never before the intelligent management of world affairs. The period of joint creation and development is precisely what constitutes, in our view, a real challenge for politicians and diplomats. Finding a multifaceted approach leading to a comprehensive solution of the problems confronting mankind is an extremely complicated task, one which is in no way comparable to the simplistic pattern of relations during the cold-war period. It demands of those participating in the task constant work, creative initiative and a good deal of common sense. The ultimate common goal—bringing about a marked change in the overall picture of the world through co-operation—cannot be compared in terms of its importance with the selfish interests of individual countries and blocs that prevailed earlier.

The path to achieving this goal is a long one, since adapting to new realities is never an easy matter. It is encouraging, however, to note that dialogue has already made it possible to single out a number of common connecting elements in a comprehensive approach to security. These include the demilitarization of the thinking and behaviour of States, the democratization and humanization of international relations, and the elimination of ideology from relations between States.

The vulnerability of the contemporary world faced with man-made means of destruction has focused attention on the urgent need to demilitarize by gradually reducing arms and moving towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Mankind must once and for all reject war as a means for resolving political and economic differences and ideological disputes between States.

The democratization of international life requires the elimination of exclusive clubs, including the nuclear club, and the participation of one and all in working out solutions. It is closely linked to the task of humanizing international relations, since the human dimension is now becoming particularly important as a goal and a means of achieving a safe world. A non-nuclear and non-violent world would tend also to be a more just world. One of the functions of the human factor in formulating policy is to strengthen the moral basis of the policy. Our new thinking holds that man deserves a better fate than being the hostage of nuclear weapons. His living conditions and political position are increasingly determining the direction in which international relations will develop and the way in which the problems that arise in them are solved.

Eliminating ideological barriers from such relations has become a prerequisite for improving co-operation along new lines. The primacy of law, respect for human rights, and the progress of society as a whole are essential to eliminating ideology from relations between States and the rejection by States of claims to knowledge of the "absolute truth". Of course, this does not entail abandoning one's views and convictions. The fundamental right of peoples to choose their own path of development is unquestionable. The human right to freedom of conscience, belief and opinion, enshrined in universally recognized international instruments, is just as inalienable. This involves the inadmissibility of making the clash of ideological views into a battlefield between States. General moral principles must be put into practice by means of one's own example and the methods used by countries in their foreign and domestic policies.

Eliminating ideology from multilateral interaction requires the deliberate rejection of ideological attitudes towards machinery for co-operation; it is necessary to overcome the artificial politicization of the activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, focus their attention on carrying out specific tasks in accordance with their mandates, and raise the professional level of their activities.

A multifaceted and comprehensive approach requires that greater attention should be given also to the question of administering the Organization itself, an issue which has become acutely political in nature. The task is to make optimum use of the United Nations financial and material resources, co-ordinate and rationalize the activities of international organizations, and eliminate duplication and overlapping.

The post-confrontational period requires practical steps. Only convergent unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions can give assurance that the system of peace, security and co-operation laid down in the Charter of the United Nations will become an effective barrier preventing a return to confrontation and provide an assurance that the twenty-first century will be marked by a new approach to developing our civilization as a unified whole by combining all the finest achievements of mankind.

Yes, the model social system of the third millennium will be characterized first of all by a synthesis of positive experience and the United Nations will become the forum for this process. This synthesis is creating progressive norms that can be used in all countries in order to establish constitutionally governed States and civil societies. The synthesis represents the new culture of a united and interdependent world which, on the one hand, rejects rapacious behaviour, condemns such "breaches" of civilization as fascism and racism, and repudiates oppression and violence; and on the other hand, creates a culture based on tolerance, diversity and recognition of the right of different ideological and political viewpoints to exist regardless of whether they are supported at any given time by a majority or a minority.

The 1990s, undoubtedly, must be a time of change, a time for entering a peaceful era. They must also be a period in which the world community makes determined efforts to create guarantees for ensuring stability and making positive changes irreversible. Not everything is easy in the world and not everything is clear-cut in the discussions conducted in the United Nations. Much work remains to be done in order to ensure that General Assembly resolution 44/21 shall be implemented in all fields of activity of the United Nations.

The adoption of this resolution was not a goal in itself. It is designed to promote the further expansion of dialogue, co-operation through specific measures and greater co-ordination of concrete actions by States.

The main thing, in our view, is to ensure that the resolution on enhancing international peace, security and co-operation represents a further stage in the dialogue about a fundamentally new, post-confrontational world order based on the Charter of the United Nations.

Notes

1 United Nations document A/44/1.

2 *Study on the Climatic and Other Effects of Nuclear War* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 89.IX.1).

Documentation Relating to Disarmament

Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the United States–Soviet Ministerial Meeting

(excerpts)

Moscow, 10 February 1990

Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze met February 7-9 in Moscow as part of the preparations for the U.S.-Soviet summit to be held in June in the United States. Proceeding from their common goal of building a more stable, constructive and cooperative relationship, they reviewed the broad range of issues on the U.S.-Soviet agenda. The Secretary also was received by Chairman Gorbachev for an open, wide-ranging exchange of views.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister discussed developments in U.S.-Soviet relations since the Wyoming ministerial and the Malta meeting between President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev. They examined the prospects for the summit, with the particular aim of advancing the objectives and priorities defined by the two leaders in Malta.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister noted with satisfaction the progress that is being made in U.S.-Soviet relations. While certain significant differences remain between the sides, their relationship is increasingly marked by understanding, cooperation and the search for mutual advantage. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister believe that candid dialogue and continuing efforts at finding practical and concrete solutions will further the significant progress that has been recorded to date.

In this context, the Moscow Ministerial was a useful and important step in preparing the ground for a productive summit. The high-level discussions were complemented by expert working groups on arms control, regional, human rights, transnational and bilateral issues, as well as an informal group on economic questions. Specific agreements were reached in several areas of the agenda.

I

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister held a thorough exchange of views on arms control and disarmament issues. With respect to the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, they reaffirmed their common objective of resolving all major issues by the June summit in order to allow signature of the treaty by the end of the year. To further this goal, the sides reached agreement or exchanged new proposals in a number of areas.

On air-launched cruise missiles, the sides made substantial progress on a package approach, agreeing on all remaining issues with the exception of the range threshold.

The sides also made good progress on sea-launched cruise missiles. The sides agreed that such missiles would be dealt with by parallel, politically binding declarations for the duration of the START treaty. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed that the remaining issues involving SLCMs would be addressed at the negotiations in Geneva.

The sides agreed that there would be numerical limits on non-deployed ballistic missiles and the warheads attributable to them for all ICBMs of a type that has been flight-tested from a mobile launcher. Other non-deployed ballistic missiles, non-deployed cruise missiles and non-deployed heavy bomber weapons will not be subject to numerical limits. The sides further agreed on a régime governing the location and movement of all non-deployed ballistic missiles.

The sides reached agreement on major elements of a régime to ensure the non-denial of telemetry data during flight tests of START-accountable ballistic missiles. These provisions will be included in the START treaty, but will be implemented early, at the time of treaty signature, through an exchange of letters.

The U.S. side presented new proposals on verification of mobile ICBMs, duration of the treaty, phasing of reductions, and attribution of warheads to future types of ballistic missiles. The Soviet side presented new proposals dealing with non-circumvention. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister instructed their negotiators to discuss these new proposals and to expedite efforts on resolving remaining differences in the text of the Treaty and its associated documents.

The sides discussed the Vienna negotiations on conventional force reductions and reiterated their determination to conclude an agreement as soon as possible in 1993. The sides discussed President Bush's January 31 proposal on manpower which was presented by NATO in Vienna on February 8, as well as NATO's aircraft proposal presented on the same date. As a result of the discussions in Moscow, the differences on personnel were narrowed. The sides agreed to continue their discussions in the context of the negotiations in Vienna and at the Ministers' meeting on "Open Skies" in Ottawa.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister had extensive discussions on how to proceed toward their common goal of achieving, through the negotiations in Geneva, a global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The U.S. and Soviet delegations in Geneva were instructed to proceed with developing means of practical cooperation in the area of chemical weapons elimination. The sides issued a separate, more detailed statement on chemical weapons.

In discussions on nuclear testing, the sides made progress on resolving the remaining issues. They believe that the task of completing the verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 threshold limitation treaties for signing at the summit is realistic. The sides agreed on the right to simultaneous use of hydrodynamic and in-country seismic yield measurements. The sides also resolved several long-standing problems regarding the implementation of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method. The sides identified the three seismic stations in each country to be used for in-country seismic yield measurements. The sides reaffirmed their adherence to the agreement reached in September 1987 with regard to the negotiations on nuclear testing.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister expressed their hope that the Ottawa "Open Skies" conference—which they will both attend—would be a success and lead to early agreement. They believe an "Open Skies" régime can make a genuine contribution to openness, transparency and stability.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister noted the recent consultations between their experts on chemical weapons non-proliferation, missile technology control and nuclear non-proliferation. They agreed to prepare a document for consideration by their leaders covering both principles and concrete steps of cooperation in all areas of non-proliferation—chemical, missile and nuclear.

The sides conducted a discussion of the problem of non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology. They noted that they both adhere to the export guidelines of the existing régime relating to missiles, which applies to missiles capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms of payload to a range of at least 300 kilometers. They further agreed to continue joint discussions on this problem in the interim before the next ministerial.

II

[Regional issues]

III

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a wide-ranging discussion on developments in Europe. They reaffirmed the key role being played by the CSCE process in the emergence of a new Europe. They agreed in principle on holding a summit meeting of the 35 CSCE States in 1990. Such a meeting would be the occasion for signing a CFE agreement and would be preparatory to the previously agreed 1992 summit meeting in Helsinki.

IV

[Human rights and humanitarian issues]

V

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister noted with satisfaction the expanding U.S.-Soviet dialogue on transnational issues. . . .

. . .

The sides expressed their support for a continuation, on a regular basis, of U.S.-Soviet consultations on UN issues in the interest of seeking ways to enhance further the effectiveness of this universal international organization.

VI

[Trade and economic co-operation]

VII

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister reaffirmed the utility of regular dialogue at all levels—including the ministerial level—for considering and resolving problems of U.S.-Soviet cooperation. In the context of preparations for the June summit, they agreed to hold their next meeting in Washington.

Documentation Relating to Disarmament

Joint Statement on Chemical Weapons Issued at the Conclusion of the United States–Soviet Ministerial Meeting

Moscow, 10 February 1990

During their February 7-10 Meeting in Moscow, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze reaffirmed that chemical weapons must be eliminated world-wide. They have agreed on the following framework for the achievement of this goal which they consider to be a high priority:

—The sides are determined to work to conclude and bring into force a multilateral, effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention banning the development, production and use of chemical weapons and eliminating all stocks on a global basis. To this effect they will work to expedite the negotiations in Geneva with the view to resolving main outstanding issues as soon as possible and to finalizing the draft convention at the earliest date.

—Even as these multilateral negotiations proceed, the sides will work out a bilateral agreement on reciprocal obligations pending the international convention including, *inter alia*, the destruction of the bulk of their chemical weapons stocks to equal low levels. They will proceed with the objective of completing and signing such an agreement at the June 1990 summit meeting.

—The agreement would establish a program of cooperation on technology and procedures for safe and expeditious as well as economically and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons.

—When the chemical weapons convention enters into force, the sides will further reduce their chemical weapons stocks to equal levels at a very small fraction of their present holdings over the first eight years of operation of the convention. All remaining chemical weapons stocks should be eliminated over the subsequent two years. Of course, all chemical weapons-capable States must adhere to the convention. Meanwhile, the sides will closely cooperate with each other and together with other States to ensure that all chemical weapons-capable States adhere to the convention. Efforts to this effect are to begin without delay. The sides share the view that both nations should be among the original parties to the convention whose ratification would be necessary for its entry into force.

—The multilateral convention shall contain the provision that all production of chemical weapons will halt upon its entry into force.

—The sides will work out common principles that will guide their efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons.

Summary of Conclusions of the Meeting of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council on the Cambodian Problem*

Paris, 15-16 January 1990

The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, meeting in Paris on 15-16 January 1990, agreed that they would be guided by the following principles in working for a resolution of the Cambodian problem:

—No acceptable solution can be achieved by force of arms.

—An enduring peace can only be achieved through a comprehensive political settlement, including the verified withdrawal of foreign forces, a cease-fire, and cessation of outside military assistance.

—The goal should be self-determination for the Cambodian people through free, fair and democratic elections.

—All accept an enhanced United Nations role in the resolution of the Cambodian problem.

—There is an urgent need to speed up diplomatic efforts to achieve a settlement.

—The complete withdrawal of foreign forces must be verified by the United Nations.

—The five permanent members would welcome an early resumption of a constructive dialogue among the Cambodian factions which is essential to facilitating the transition process, which should not be dominated by any one of them.

—An effective United Nations presence will be required during the transition period in order to assure internal security.

—A special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General is needed in Cambodia to supervise United Nations activities during a transition period culminating in the inauguration of a democratically elected government.

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* Issued as United Nations document S/21087 of 18 January 1990.

—The scale of the United Nations operation should be consistent with the successful implementation of a Cambodian settlement, and its planning and execution should take account of the heavy financial burden that may be placed on Member States.

—Free and fair elections must be conducted under direct United Nations administration.

—The elections must be conducted in a neutral political environment in which no party would be advantaged.

—The five permanent members commit themselves to honouring the results of free and fair elections.

—All Cambodians should enjoy the same rights, freedoms, and opportunities to participate in the election process.

—A Supreme National Council might be the repository of Cambodian sovereignty during the transition process.

—Questions involving Cambodian sovereignty should be resolved with the agreement of the Cambodian parties.

—The five permanent members support all responsible efforts by regional parties to achieve a comprehensive political settlement, and will remain in close touch with them with a view to reconvening the Paris Conference at an appropriate time.

General Assembly Resolution 44/21: Enhancing International Peace, Security and International Co-operation in All Its Aspects in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations

New York, 15 November 1989

The General Assembly,

Desiring to strengthen further the role and effectiveness of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security for all States on the basis of full and universal respect for the Charter of the United Nations and through better international co-operation in resolving international problems of a political, economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character,

Mindful of the potential of the United Nations to be even more effective in achieving international co-operation,

1 *Calls upon* all States to intensify their practical efforts towards ensuring international peace and security in all its aspects through co-operative means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

2 *Reaffirms* its support for the validity and relevance of the Charter and urges all States to abide by it and, in particular, to respect the principles of sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity of States and non-intervention in internal affairs, refrain from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the Charter, settle disputes peacefully, adhere to the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and co-operation among States, and comply in good faith with their obligations assumed in accordance with the Charter;

3 *Encourages* Member States to consult and co-operate within the framework of the United Nations, the Security Council, the General Assembly and their appropriate subsidiary bodies in order to find multifaceted approaches to implement and strengthen the principles and the system of international peace, security and international co-operation laid down in the Charter.

Recent Books and Articles

Adams, Valerie. *Chemical Warfare, Chemical Disarmament*. Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1990. 276 p.

The author, a specialist in defence and arms control issues, has worked in the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom. In this new publication, she gives a comprehensive overview of the use, or alleged use, of chemical weapons, from the First World War, when the use of chemical weapons became commonplace, to modern times. She discusses the significance of chemical warfare in Viet Nam and in the Gulf War, and speculates on the future of the negotiations now under way. The author takes a fresh and sometimes controversial look at the issues raised by chemical warfare.

Altenburg, Gen. Wolfgang. "Arms Control and the Future", *NATO Review*, 37:4:1-5, August 1989.

In this article, the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, General Wolfgang Altenburg, addresses the issue of arms control in Europe, and its relationship to NATO. He gives a brief review of arms control theory, where he says the central theme is to increase stability, and he discusses the impact any pre-emptive "first strike" doctrine has on stability. General Altenburg states that, to be effective, an arms control agreement must be attractive for all participants to establish and maintain. He notes two factors that are crucial in the potential usefulness of any such agreement: the exact limitations accepted must be clear, and verification procedures must be specified. General Altenburg suggests that Gorbachev's rise to power, as well as the dire state of the Soviet economy, are the main elements that have led to changes in Soviet policy with regard to arms control. However, he maintains that future arms control discussions must be carried out with some reserve, even despite unilateral Soviet troop reductions, referring to a current Soviet 7 to 1 superiority in the European theatre. He also stresses his view that NATO must negotiate from a position of strength in order to maintain stability.

Arnett, Eric H. *Gunboat Diplomacy and the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation and the U.S. Navy*. New York, Praeger, 1989. 175 p.

Eric H. Arnett, a nuclear engineer who has worked on research projects for the United States Navy, brings his expertise to the subject of nuclear proliferation. Arnett states succinctly the problem which this study addresses: "As more countries acquire nuclear arsenals, they may find themselves capable of pre-empting United States maritime assets deployed for compellence or coercion. In addition, the possibility that a country has such a capability may deter the United States from projecting power against them." Utilizing hypothetical scenarios involving United States confrontation with the Libyan Arab Jamhiriya, India and Iran, Eric Arnett suggests certain contingencies that could reduce or negate the United States Navy's role as a tool of coercion. He includes a set of conclusions and recommendations for American policy-makers based upon his analysis of this issue. He supports his conclusions with tables and scientific data concerning aspects of bomb effects and delivery technology.

Bell, Coral. "Arms Control: Making Hay While the Sun Shines". *Pacific Research*, 2:4:8-10, November 1989.

This short piece sets forth five factors that have been crucial to the recent progress made in American-Soviet arms control talks, particularly in the CFE negotiations, START and the INF Treaty: economic pressures, surveillance capabilities, "symmetry" (similarities of super-Power arsenals), super-Power détente, and the changing configuration of the central balance of power. The author discusses each factor as it pertains to both the United States and the Soviet Union, noting the ways in which it has affected recent arms control talks, and speculates very briefly on the effects these factors may have on arms-control negotiations in the foreseeable future.

Bernauer, Thomas. *La future Convention sur les armes chimiques et son organisation : le Conseil exécutif* (The future convention on chemical weapons and its organization: the Executive Council). Geneva, UNIDIR, 1989 (Travaux de recherche No. 5). United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.F.89.0.7. 27 p.

In this brief work concerning the proposed convention on chemical weapons and the new international organization that is to supervise its application, the author outlines the problems relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council of the new organization defined by the draft convention and discusses its composition and procedures for taking decisions. He examines various possibilities in each of these areas, noting their advantages and disadvantages.

Brigot, André, Peter Schmidt and Walter Schütze, eds. *Sicherheits- und Ostpolitik: Deutsch-französische Perspektiven* (Security and East Policy: German-French Perspectives). Baden-Baden, Federal Republic of Germany, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1989. 160 p.

This volume presents eight articles on the co-operation between the Federal Republic of Germany and France on questions of security and attitudes towards Eastern Europe, presented at a colloquium of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Foundation for Science and Politics) in Ebenhausen, Federal Republic of Germany. Henri Ménudier discusses German-French co-operation in respect of security policy during the French presidential election campaign of 1988 and the modernization of NATO's short-range missiles. André Brigot analyses the financial implications of a joint security policy, taking into account the differing attitudes towards a European monetary system. Ingo Kolboom and Michel Drain discuss differences in the policies of France and the Federal Republic of Germany towards Eastern Europe and possibilities of a common opening towards those countries.

Carlton, David, and Carlo Schaerf, eds. *Perspectives on the Arms Race*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1989. 336 p.

This volume consists of 18 articles submitted to an international meeting organized by the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO), held at San Miniato, Italy. Taking the discussion out of the purely East-West context and putting it in a multidimensional framework, the contributors—who come from nine different countries, including Brazil, China and India, and from different backgrounds, including physics, law and politics—stress basically two questions: Why has there been an arms race and why have attempts at arms control and disarmament achieved so little?

The book is in three sections. Part I, which deals with the arms race in general, includes articles on such issues as nuclear deterrence, "limited" war, and verification. Part II deals with the impact of the Strategic Defence Initiative. Part III stresses regional aspects of the arms race. It presents articles on the defence and disarmament policies of the mid-1980s of China, Brazil and Italy. K. Subrahmanyam of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, discusses the impact of nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy on the developing world. Olga Sukovic, of the Institute of International Politics and Economics in Belgrade, discusses the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Costa, E. F., ed. *America Latina, el Peru y los Cambios del Sistema Internacional* (Latin America, Peru and changes in the International System). Lima, CEPEI, 1989. 269 p.

This book includes 14 articles written by prominent analysts of international politics who participated in the VI Annual International Symposium organized by CEPEI (Peruvian Centre for International Studies), held in Lima, Peru, in November 1988. The book consists of four chapters on the issues of political change in the international sphere; perspectives and limits of multilateral relations; Latin America within the new international system; and the situation of Peru in the new international order. One of the authors, P. W. Mahlsted, states that several issues, common to the developing countries, are likely to affect the security of the United States in the coming decades: the spread of military technology to developing countries, an increase in the consumption of illegal drugs, an increase in immigration to the United States, an increase in the number of AIDS patients, the debt crisis, and an increasing dependence of the United States on the natural resources and agricultural products of developing countries. The author suggests that to solve these problems, the United States should apply a global strategy in which it would redirect its defence budget to constructive programmes for the developing world. Another author, R. Avakov, evaluates the process of restructuring the internal economy (*perestroika*) of the USSR and relates this to its new international politics.

Cox, David, and Tariq Rauf. *Security Co-operation in the Arctic: A Canadian Response to Murmansk*. Report of the Panel on Arctic Arms Control. Ottawa, The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1989. 28 p.

The report on security co-operation in the Arctic, prepared by a panel of Canadian specialists in arms control in response to proposals made by Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1987, was presented at the Canada-

USSR Conference on Canadian-Soviet Arctic Co-operation, held at Ottawa in October 1989.

The panel suggests an arms-control agenda that would strengthen the role of all the circumpolar States in ensuring the peaceful development of the Arctic, protecting the well-being of indigenous societies and the environment, and promoting scientific advancement. Its recommendations reflect a circumpolar perspective on security that also takes into consideration the realities of continuing—although diminishing—super-Power rivalry. Among its recommendations are: establishment of a central Arctic demilitarized zone, as the centre-piece of an Arctic security co-operation zone; the extension of the Open Skies proposal to include the Arctic Ocean region; various related aerial confidence-building measures; limits on sea-launched cruise missiles and naval arms control; and establishment of a permanent forum for negotiation on Arctic security arrangements. In the opinion of the panel, it is time to take the first steps towards transforming the Arctic into a demilitarized zone similar to the one already existing in the Antarctic.

Darnton, Geoffrey, ed. *The Bomb and the Law*. Summary report of the London Nuclear Tribunal, Stockholm, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal Foundation, 1989.

This book presents the issues, international legal norms involved, supporting evidence, conclusions, judgements and recommendations of a non-governmental gathering—the London Nuclear Warfare Tribunal—which met in January 1985 to examine the legality of nuclear weapons. The book opens with a foreword written by Sean MacBride, Chairman of the Tribunal, before his death in 1988. Although referring *inter alia* to such principles of international law as the requirement of proportionality between means used and military objectives gained, and avoiding means that cause unnecessary suffering to victims, members of the Tribunal base their conclusions mainly on the Nuremberg Charter, an annex to the Treaty setting up the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal for the trial of major German war criminals following the Second World War. In their view, the actual use of a nuclear device in all but the most remote locations would be unlawful and, since the possession of nuclear arms presupposes a willingness to use them in certain circumstances, their possession would also be in breach of the Nuremberg principles. The authors also formulated a number of recommendations, including a proposal for an international treaty where the parties would agree that both the use and the possession of nuclear weapons were illegal under international law.

Efinger, Manfred. "The Verification Policy of the Soviet Union". *Aussen Politik* (Hamburg), 40:4:332-348. 4th quarter 1989. (English edition).

Manfred Efinger, a member of the Peace Research Study Group of the Institute of Political Sciences at the University of Tübingen, discusses the development of Soviet verification policy from the years following the Second World War up to the mid-1980s. He suggests that, with the "new thinking" that Gorbachev has encouraged through his policy of *perestroika*, a change in Soviet arms-control policy has also followed. He examines the changes that have occurred in Soviet verification policy since 1985, and the way these changes could affect the ratification of earlier bilateral treaties (including the threshold test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes), as well as the negotiation of new multilateral treaties.

The author discusses verification in general terms, and notes the dearth of earlier research on verification policy from the Soviet perspective. He discusses the history and development of Soviet verification policy and includes specific developments such as the Soviet reaction to the Open Skies proposal of United States President Eisenhower. The principles underlying Soviet verification policy, as outlined by Viktor Issraelyan, are noted and evaluated, as is the gradual redefinition of Soviet arms-control policy, beginning before the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev.

Fujita, Edmundo. *The Prevention of Geographical Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Zones of Peace in the Southern Hemisphere*. New York, UNIDIR, 1989. 57 p. Research Paper No. 4. United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.89.0.8. 57 p.

Mr. Fujita presents a study of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace as two approaches to a reduction in global nuclear proliferation. He uses nuclear-free zones and zones of peace in regions of the Southern Hemisphere as existing examples to examine the feasibility of these two concepts. He devotes a chapter to explaining the concepts of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, comparing and contrasting the elements of each.

He analyses the stipulations involved in the existing treaties covering regions in the Southern Hemisphere—the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. The Declarations on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and the Zone of Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic are also referred to. In his conclusion he examines the reception of the earlier treaties and of the two concepts in general, by nuclear-weapon States, noting that while the recent détente between the major Powers has not stopped horizontal proliferation, there seems to be some optimism as regards the settlement of regional disputes, which may translate into the further consolidation of already existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, as well as the introduction of the two concepts elsewhere. The texts of General Assembly resolutions 2028 (XX), 3472 B (XXX), 2832 (XXVI) and 41/11, and maps showing existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the areas indicated in the Declarations on zones of peace are given in annexes.

Graybeal, Sidney N., and Patricia Bliss McFate. "Getting Out of the STARTing Block". *Scientific American*, 261:6:61-67, December 1989.

The authors stress the importance of a continued and concerted effort to work out disagreements over the START negotiations. They suggest that recent fears over verification are weakening the progress of START negotiations, and that these fears are somewhat exaggerated. They note that the American fear that the Soviet Union might find reason to "break out" of an agreement could be allayed by the administration of a stringent verification régime. They also outline the criteria by which such verification régimes are judged—military, political and legal—explaining the ramifications of each criterion as well as their interrelationships.

The authors explain national technical means (NTM), as well as their implications and usefulness for the INF Treaty and START. They review the Bush Administration's outline for a verification régime, and focus in detail on the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) issue—the United States and Soviet perspectives, approaches to verification, and problems of verification. The article also discusses arms control positions and proposals for mobile ICBM systems (such as the Midgetman, MX/Peacekeeper, SS-24, SS-25), for air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), and the link between strategic arms talks and the ABM Treaty of 1972. Throughout the discussion, the authors make suggestions for verification procedures, and also review existing proposals for verification. They stress that, while verification procedures are critical in arms control, they should not hinder the progress of the START negotiations.

Harkavy, Robert E. *Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence*. New York, Oxford Press, SIPRI, 1989. 389 p.

Robert Harkavy, a professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University, provides a comprehensive analysis of the issue of global foreign military presence. He presents technological and military information and outlines the operations of the major Powers abroad. Topics dealt with in detail include air and naval facilities, overseas "technical" facilities, research and environmental facilities, as well as conventional and nuclear foreign military presence. The author examines the political and economic aspects of maintaining a foreign military presence, emphasizing in particular the correlation between this and arms transfers. Also noted are the use of security assistance policies in acquiring or retaining foreign bases, and the diplomacy involved in base-access and base-denial activities.

Harkavy concludes that both super-Powers face a gradually more constrained environment for access to bases, and that, from a theoretical perspective of international systems analysis, this may merely connote a long-term trend towards multipolarity and global diffusion of power. But such trends, he observes, can only be extrapolated with great caution.

Hollins, Harry B., Averill L. Powers and Mark Sommer. *The Conquest of War*: Alternative Strategies for Global Security. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1989. 224 p.

The authors of this volume identify the problems, the issues, the organizations and the approaches to global security in their progress towards identifying a solution based on the relinquishing by nations of their individual war-making capacities and the development of the essential institutions and structures of shared security. Part one presents a review of the United Nations security system and United Nations peace-keeping and a consideration of six different approaches to global security: the Clark-Sohn Plan for a world peace-keeping federation; minimum deterrence; qualitative disarmament; non-provocative defence; civilian-based defence; and strategic defence. In part two the authors consider aspects of verification; bringing law to bear on Governments; and economic conversion. Part three sets out a proposal for a common security system.

Krohn, Axel, and Dieter S. Lutz. *Europäische Sicherheit II* (European Security II). Hamburg, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik (Institute for

Peace Research and Security Policy), University of Hamburg, 1989. Hamburger Beiträge zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik No. 40. 79 p.

The authors present their views on peace and European security. In the first article, Dieter S. Lutz analyses the conceptual considerations leading to a system of collective security in and for Europe, such as defensive deterrence and structural incapability for attack. He discusses concrete measures leading to such a system, including a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe, and tank-free and defensive zones.

In his article, which concerns European perspectives on security, Axel Krohn discusses the *status quo* of the relations between politics, economics and the military. He analyses the relations between the United States and Western Europe and the challenges and impact of the changes in the Soviet Union for Europe. He discusses the prospects for security in and for Europe through détente, multinational negotiations, economic co-operation and political changes. He calls for a new European order, a "Europeanization" of Europe, which would eventually lead to the abolition of the confronting alliances.

Laird, Robbin F., and Betsy A. Jacobs, eds. *The Future of Deterrence: NATO Nuclear Forces after INF*. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1989. 200 p.

This book, written under the sponsorship of the Central Research Program of the Institute for Defense Analyses, is the work of eight specialists on the security and strategic affairs of Western Europe and the Soviet Union. Their essays describe and examine the philosophical positions and military doctrines that inform disarmament discussions and the arguments in favour of modernization of nuclear and conventional armaments put forward by representatives of the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union. The authors evaluate the military forces and capabilities of these countries and conclude that although the United States remains the most significant military power in NATO, nevertheless recent Western European economic and political developments will also tend to determine the form of future military decisions and actions in NATO. They warn that "American policy-makers should recognize that arms control efforts must pursue political objectives as well as military ones" and they advocate using a minimum security requirement concept in pursuing future policy. They call on the West to offer its own statement of the political requirements for Western cohesion and East-West co-operation.

Lewis, G. N., S. K. Ride, and J. S. Townsend. "Dispelling Myths about Verification of Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles". *Science*, 246:4931:765-770, 10 November 1989.

This study by a team of physicists examines the question of possible START treaty verification measures as they pertain to submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The team reviews basic specifications of the Tomahawk SLCM variants currently being deployed by the United States Navy, and also takes note of the development of its apparent Soviet counterpart, the SS-N-21. With the desire to facilitate START negotiations (currently held up because of United States-Soviet disagreement over the verification of SLCMs, among other things), this team has suggested a plan in which all nuclear-equipped SLCMs would be banned, with verification to take place at special facilities in the vicinity of the respective production sites.

The authors take into account the need for special tagging procedures to identify verified SLCMs, as well as sealing procedures which would reveal occurrences of tampering violations. Also presented is a plan for a verification régime which would include comprehensive data exchange, perimeter-portal monitoring of SLCM manufacture, special verification facilities, inspection of deployed SLCMs, and a limited number of "challenge" inspections. This régime, they argue, would deter either super-Power from violations, because of the risk and difficulty involved in the deployment of covert production facilities.

Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. *The Other Side of the Table: The Soviet Approach to Arms Control*. New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990. 209 p.

This book presents four articles by Americans, analysing the Soviet policy towards arms control, with an introduction and conclusion by the editor. Rebecca Strode, an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, analyses the Soviet policy towards a nuclear-test ban in the years from 1958 to 1963. She describes the negotiations between the Khrushchev administration and that of Eisenhower or Kennedy, taking into account the general political climate. She states that Khrushchev himself was pushing hard to implement changes in the Soviet Union's military strategy, sometimes against the advice of his military commanders. Coit D. Blacker, of the University of Southern California, analyzes the Soviet attitude during the time of the SALT II negotiations, from November 1972 to March 1976. He states that the Soviet Union's recourse to solutions based on the logic of the "lowest common denominator" enabled it to reach important agreements with the United States while at the same time continuing to develop and deploy strategic nuclear forces whose primary mission, should deterrence fail, was to limit damage to the Soviet Union. He concludes that the remarkable thing about the mid-1970s was not how much less the Soviet Union and the United States achieved in their negotiations, but how much in terms of their attitude towards détente. In the other articles, Andrew C. Goldberg writes about Moscow's INF experience, describing radical moves to clear away the existing obstacles; and Cynthia Roberts writes about changing Soviet interests and prospects for enhanced security co-operation, also stressing the impact of what she calls the Gorbachev revolution.

Mastny, Vojtech. *Soviet Military Withdrawal from Eastern Europe: Its Political Dimensions*. London, The Council for Arms Control, 1989. 33 p. (Faraday Discussion Paper No. 14)

In this paper Professor Mastny, who is at present a Fulbright Senior Professor at the University of Bonn, analyzes the situation of Soviet military power in a rapidly changing Europe. He outlines the changes in Soviet military doctrine from Brezhnev to Gorbachev. He describes the situation of the Soviet troops in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the German Democratic Republic in the autumn of 1989. Stating that the Soviet troops in Poland have been unproductive, even counter-productive, in keeping Poland's Communist governments in power, he calls them insufficient and unnecessary. Mastny sees the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the German Democratic Republic as much more difficult because it relates to the question of German reunification. He concludes that the forthcoming withdrawal of Soviet, as well as of American, forces from Europe requires the definition and redefinition of interests, ordering of priorities, choice of expectations, assessment of risks, and balancing of probabilities.

Mercado Jarrin, Edgardo. *Un Sistema de Seguridad y Defensa Sudamericano* (A South American Security and Defence System). Lima, CEPEI, 1989. 240 p.

Taking into consideration the political, economic, strategic and ecological concerns of the region, the author concludes that the time has come for the establishment of a new South American system of defence and security. To attain such a system, he proposes a series of intermediate stages. These stages are designed to denuclearize the region (South American zone of peace), create a system of security through a South American defence treaty, avoid the regionalization or internationalization of internal conflicts, and impede the military or political projection of the "East-West conflict" on the region.

Midlarsky, Manus I., ed. *Handbook of War Studies*. Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1989. 372 p.

This volume, edited by Manus Midlarsky, professor of International Peace and Conflict Resolution at Rutgers University, New Jersey, offers a systematic overview of empirically based theories of international conflict. Nineteen scholars of international relations from American universities, including J. David Singer from the University of Michigan, Charles F. Doran from Johns Hopkins and Thomas W. Graham from Stanford, provide a comprehensive survey of contemporary theories and methodological approaches to the study of war. Three major types of war theories are examined in this book: those that emphasize the structure of the international system, those that focus on relationships among States, and those that concentrate on activities within the State itself.

Moïsseev, General. "La nouvelle pensée politique et la doctrine militaire soviétique" (The new political thinking and the Soviet military doctrine). *Défense nationale* (Paris), 57-71, October 1989.

In a statement at the Ecole Militaire in Paris, General Moïsseev, Chief of Staff of the Soviet armed forces, outlined the fundamental principles of current Soviet military doctrine which, he said, had gone through radical revision towards one of a strictly defensive character. His statement calls attention to the new military doctrine of the USSR which he said is now based on the prevention of war: "Removing the risk of a conflict now becomes the supreme goal, the heart of the doctrine, the essential function of the Soviet State and armed forces". He regrets that some Western representatives have not taken fully into consideration the positive and deep nature of changes that have occurred in Soviet military organization. His proposals may be summed up as follows. He calls for better understanding between East and West by reducing the mutual suspicion through negotiations on disarmament, a mutual commitment not to be the first to have recourse to nuclear arms or conventional forces, substantial reductions of armed forces in the two alliances, and the establishment of a European centre to monitor arrangements for preventing surprise attacks. He also advocates the general adoption of a doctrine of reasonable defensive sufficiency in line with the doctrine already adopted by the USSR.

National Defence Research Establishment. *International Arms Control and Disarmament: Annual Report FY 1988/89*. Stockholm, Sweden, FOA, 1989. 30 p.

This report, compiled by the National Defence Research Establishment (FOA) of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm, reviews the disarmament and arms control issues which were studied by it in the period 1989-1990. The report includes studies done in the general categories of nuclear weapons, biological and chemical weapons, European stability and security, and space technology. The report gives technical analyses of detection seismology (methods of determining the occurrence of nuclear explosions on a global scale), airborne radioactivity in Sweden (such as the emissions which resulted from the Chernobyl incident), and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The work of FOA in the area of European stability and security, which consists mainly of *ad hoc* and long-term military-political studies, is assessed. The continuing work of FOA on space technology, divided into three main fields (treaty verification; control of space objects and space activities; and nuclear-test-ban monitoring), is also discussed and evaluated. Reference is made to the participation of members of the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment as technical advisers in Swedish delegations to arms limitation and disarmament negotiations.

Neuneck, Götz. *Strukturelle Angriffsunfähigkeit und konventionelle Rüstungskontrolle* (Structural incapacity for attack and conventional arms control). Hamburg, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy), University of Hamburg, 1988. 97 p. (Hamburger Beiträge zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, No. 35)

This volume addresses the question of reducing the importance of the military factor in East-West relations, placing particular emphasis on the issue of structural incapacity for attack. The author argues that developing a structural incapacity for attack is an essential element in ensuring common security in Central Europe. He examines the prospects for arms control in Europe in the context of the development of defensive structures and the stability of conventional weapons. He also discusses the factors that drive the arms race. If it were possible to achieve genuine crisis stability, a breakthrough in arms control and a reduction in particularly offensive weapons systems, the author states, that would create important pre-conditions for long-lasting political stability in Europe.

Nolan, Janne E. "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World—The Limits of Nonproliferation". *Arms Control Today*, 19:9:9-14. November 1989.

Janne Nolan analyses various aspects of ballistic missile proliferation in the third world. She observes the marginal usefulness of many of these systems from a military standpoint, but concludes that these missile systems will nevertheless have important political ramifications. She cites the prestige factor associated with acquiring advanced military technology, the growth of a system of international entrepreneurs, the unavoidable spread of technology, and the shift of imports to the third world from finished goods to capital goods as potential reasons for the recent proliferation of missile systems in the third world.

The author suggests that the earlier philosophy of non-proliferation, which rested on the assumption that industrialized countries would maintain a clear technological superiority, may no longer apply. She explains the problems and successes of the missile technology control régime (MTCR) of April 1987, which sought to establish control guidelines for missile exports from seven industrial countries. In this respect, she notes that the MTCR is too much of a stop-gap measure, likely to succeed only in the short term. The alleviation of regional conflicts, she observes, will probably be a more successful deterrent to the use of existing and future missile systems in the third world. She cites existing confidence- and security-building measures as a plausible foundation for such a plan of conflict containment.

Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo. *Asian Security 1989-90*. Brassey's (UK), London, 1989. 214 p.

This study, compiled by the Research Institute for Peace and Security Studies in Tokyo, provides a broad overview of recent issues concerning contemporary Asian security. United States security arrangements with the Republic of Korea, the situation in Burma, and the FS-X issue (concerning joint military development between the United States and Japan, as well as the related issue of tying together trade and defence interests) are specific matters given special treatment. The regions having a stake in Asia's security (including the United States and the Soviet Union) are discussed in separate chapters, which summarize national developments and policy adjustments that affect overall Asian security. Regional arms control is also dealt with in a separate chapter, with particular reference to the speech delivered by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Krasnayarsk in September 1988, arms control proposals for the Korean peninsula, and French nuclear testing in the Pacific area. Chronologies of political, security and economic developments in Asia for the period July 1988 to June 1989 are given at the end of the book.

Roche, Douglas. *Building Global Security: Agenda for the 1990's*. Toronto, NC Press Limited, 1989. 156 p.

This book provides a rich and readable account of the issues relating to disarmament, security and sustainable development. The author is a skilled writer who has participated, in a number of roles, in the events he discusses. He was Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament from 1984 to 1989, before which he was a Member of Parliament for twelve years and also served as International President of Parliamentarians Global Action. A selection of the chapter titles demonstrates the scope of the discourse and the global perspective: "The 1980's: How the Arms Race Produced World Crises"; "2000 and Beyond: The Road to Common Security"; "The United States: Old Ideals Needed"; "Canada: Boldness Required". The final four chapters deal with the action individuals can take to energize the political process on an ethical basis. He says the convergence of humane values and political realities makes a new global ethic both necessary and possible. This ethic would set peace as the goal to be reached through an enlarged understanding of security which demands economic and social development and the protection of human rights, as well as viable disarmament.

Singh, Jasjit, and Vatroslav Vekaric, eds. *Non-provocative Defence: The Search for Equal Security*. New Delhi, Lancer International, 1989. 256 p.

This book consists of papers presented by Indian and Yugoslav participants in a bilateral exchange of views, held in Yugoslavia in 1988 and in India in 1989, on the factors that influence defence doctrines of contemporary nations, especially the doctrines of non-aligned countries. The two editors contribute four of the thirteen papers of the book.

In the final paper, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh analyses the current ability of nations to use force without necessarily resorting to war, an ability which has blurred the earlier distinction between peace and war. He terms this phenomenon "cohesive politics". With its enhanced scope and impact, the cohesive politics concept moves traditional gunboat diplomacy to a higher plane of international affairs, offering wider ranges of national policy options between war on one side and diplomacy on the other. He contrasts this concept with the concept of equal security for all States, which would be based on the principles of non-provocative defence.

Webster, William. "Testimony on Nuclear Proliferation". *Strategic Digest* (New Delhi), XIX:8:942-958 (August 1989).

This article presents the transcript of the testimony on nuclear proliferation delivered on 18 May 1989 by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Judge William Webster. The hearing took place before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, chaired by Senator John Glenn. Judge Webster touches upon the difficulties of monitoring developments and transactions involving nuclear technology. He notes the Soviet and Chinese sales of, respectively, SCUD-B and CSS-2 ballistic missile systems to Middle East nations as examples of transactions which could potentially affect global stability. He fields questions posed by the Committee, ranging from inquiries into the Central Intelligence Agency's effectiveness in monitoring global nuclear proliferation, to the potential nuclear capabilities of Romania and South Africa, to technical aspects of the Soviet SCUD missile. Overall, his testimony argues for the overt and covert monitoring of nuclear proliferation, and stresses the dangers of nuclear proliferation to both United States and global security.

Wiseman, Geoffrey. *Common Security and Non-Provocative Defence: Alternative Approaches to the Security Dilemma*. Canberra, Australian National University, 1989. 101 p.

This book is a study of the concepts of common security and "non-provocative" or "non-offensive" defence which have been advanced in recent years as options for increasing security among States. By looking at three distinct periods of the twentieth century—the pre-1914 era, the inter-war years and the post-1945 period—the study traces the origins of these concepts, describes the concepts themselves and their evolution; and addresses the question whether common security and related ideas are useful both as a subject for academic research and as practical guidelines for shaping policies in the system of States. It also discusses whether and how these concepts may be used to solve the security dilemmas of the 1980s and 1990s.

Yazov, Dmitri. "The supreme goal of the Soviet armed forces is to prevent war". *Expert Opinion* (Moscow), Novosti Press, 1989. 31 p.

In this booklet, Dmitri Yazov, Defence Minister of the Soviet Union, answers questions about the defence of the Soviet Union from the point of view of new thinking. Dmitri Yazov, who is also alternate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, states that the Soviet Union and the world are still facing a threat of war and that the nuclear weapons in the arsenals pose a threat to life on Earth and to civilization as a whole. He explains that the essence of the present Soviet military doctrine consists in ensuring the efficiency of defence plans with predominantly qualitative parameters and that its basic political principle is aimed at the prevention of war. He explains the impact of *glasnost* on the military sphere and discusses President Bush's proposals for the Vienna talks. He states that the Soviet Union has no military bases abroad and he answers questions about military service in the Soviet army. The booklet also makes extensive use of tables, giving numbers of weapons and troops both of NATO and WTO.

Further Publications

Disarmament is unable to publish reviews of all publications which have been sent to the editor. The following list is a selection of publications received recently.

Ali, Sheikh R. *The Peace and Nuclear War Dictionary*. Santa Barbara, CA, ABC-CLIO, 1989. 294 p. (CLIO Dictionaries in Political Science)

Ball, Desmond. *The Anzac Ships*. Canberra, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1989. 19 p. (Working Paper No.184)

Beveridge, David W. *Towards 2010: Security in the Asia Pacific, an Australian Regional Strategy*. Canberra, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1989. 19 p. (Working Paper No.180)

Bomsdorf, Falk. *Sicherheit im Norden Europas* (Security in the North of Europe). Baden-Baden, Federal Republic of Germany, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1989. 357 p. (Aktuelle Materialien zur Internationalen Politik, SWP No.6)

Boyd-Carpenter, Thomas. *Conventional Deterrence into the 1990's*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1989. 189 p.

Brauch, Hans Günter, and Rainer Fischbach. *Militärische Nutzung des Weltraums* (Military Use of Outer Space). Berlin (West), Berlin Verlag, 1988. 293 p. (Militärpolitik und Rüstungsbegrenzung, No.8)

Brauch, Hans Günter, and Rolf-Dieter Müller, ed. *Chemische Kriegsführung-Chemische Abrüstung. Dokumente und Kommentare* (Chemical Warfare–Chemical Disarmament. Documents and Comments). Berlin (West), Berlin Verlag, 1985. 383 p. (Militärpolitik und Rüstungsbegrenzung, No.1)

Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. *Crisis, conflict and instability*. Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1989. 275 p.

Carter, April. *Success and Failure in Arms Control Negotiations*. New York, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1989. 308 p.

Centro de Investigación para la Paz. *Viejos y Nuevos Pensamientos: La Política Exterior de la Unión Soviética* (Old and New Thinking: The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union). Madrid, CIP, 1989. 223 p. (Papeles para la Paz No. 35)

Cimbala, Stephen J. *Nuclear War Termination: Concepts, Controversies and Conclusions*. Canberra, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1989. 49 p. (Working Paper No.186)

Collins, John M. *Military Space Forces. The Next 50 Years*. Washington, DC, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989. 236 p.

Collinson, Helen. *Death on Delivery. The Impact of the Arms Trade on the Third World*. London, Campaign against Arms Trade, 1989. 127 p.

Duke, Simon. *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*. New York, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1989. 435 p.

Ehrhart, Hans-Georg, Harald Bauer and Arnold Peter Teicht. *Sicherheitspartner im Werden? Frankreich und die Europäische Sicherheit* (Becoming security partners? France and European Security). Hamburg, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg, 1989. 108 p. (Hamburger Beiträge zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik No. 34)

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. *Nuclearisation of the Middle East*. London, Brassey's, 1989. 189 p.

Elliot, Jeffrey M., and Robert Reginald. *The Arms Control, Disarmament, and Military Security Dictionary*. Santa Barbara, CA, ABC-CLIO, 1989. 349 p. (CLIO Dictionaries in Political Science)

Fieldhouse, Richard. *Security at Sea. Naval Forces and Arms Control*. New York, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1990. 301 p.

Findlay, Trevor, ed. *Verifying a Test Ban*. Canberra, Australian National University, 1989. 121 p.

Finland. *Standard Operating Procedures for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament*. Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1989. 427 p.

Foerster, Schuyler, William A. Barry III, William R. Clontz and Harold F. Lynch, Jr. *Defining Stability. Conventional Arms Control in a Changing Europe.* Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1989. 117 p.

Gillis, John R., ed. *The Militarization of the Western World.* New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1989. 216 p.

Greene, O., C. Jeynes and P. Webber. *NATO: Life after 40? Nuclear "Modernisation" and the Search for Security.* London, SANA, 1989. 29 p.

The Guide; Guide (English and French). *The Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution.* Ottawa, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1989. 272 p.

Harle, Vilho, and Pekka Sivonen, eds. *Europe in Transition. Politics and Nuclear Security.* London, Pinter Publishers, 1989. 184 p.

Krehbiel, Carl C. *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe. The Stockholm Conference.* New York, Praeger, 1989. 388 p.

Krieger, David. *Earth Citizenship.* Santa Barbara, California, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 1989. 17 p. (Waging Peace Series No. 21)

Laffin, John. *The World in Conflict 1989. War Annual 3.* London, Brassey's, 1989. 234 p.

Landais-Stamp, Paul, and Paul Rogers. *Rocking the Boat.* Oxford, Berg, 1989. 185 p.

Lundin, S. Johan, ed. *Non-Production by Industry of Chemical-Warfare Agents: Technical Verification under a Chemical Weapons Convention.* New York, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1988. 265 p. (SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies No. 9)

Norway. *Research Report on Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention, Part VIII.* Oslo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1989. 40 p.

Pugh, Michael C. *The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989. 285 p.

Robertson, K. G. *1992. The Security Implications.* London, Institute for European Defence & Strategic Studies, Alliance Publishers, 1989. 42 p. (Occasional Paper No.43)

Royal United Services Institute. *Defence Yearbook 1989*. London, Brassey's, 1989. 361 p.

Saaty, Thomas L., and Joyce M. Alexander. *Conflict Resolution. The Analytic Hierarchy Approach*. New York, Praeger, 1989. 252 p.

Shevardnadze, Eduard. *"The World has become a safer place"*. Moscow, Novosti Press, 1989. 31 p.

Sirriyeh, Hussein. *Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict*. London, Brassey's, IISS, 1989. 84 p. (Adelphi Papers No. 243)

Spiers, Edward M. *Chemical Weaponry. A Continuing Challenge*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1989. 218 p.

United States of America. *Soviet Military Power 1989. Prospects for Change*. Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1989. 159 p.

Walker, Franklin E., Col. Roger N. Fritzel, Archelaus R. Turrentine and Kenneth J. Lifton. *A Technical Approach to Chemical Weapons Verification*. Arlington, Virginia, Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation, 1988. 23 p.

Williams, Geoffrey Lee. *Coming in from the Cold: The Evolution of French Defence Policy*. London, Alliance Publishers, Institute for European Defence & Strategic Studies, 1989. 47 p. (Occasional Paper No.42)

Chronicle of Disarmament Activities

17 October–30 November 1989
First Committee of the General Assembly, New York

24-30 October 1989
United Nations Disarmament Week

25 October 1989
Seventh United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign, New York

27-30 November 1989
United Nations Seminar on Alternatives for Common Security in South America, Lima, Peru

27 November–8 December 1989
Second Session of the Group of Qualified Governmental Experts to Update the Study on Nuclear Weapons, New York

8-19 January 1990
Third Session of the Group of Qualified Governmental Experts to Carry Out a Study on the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification, New York

16 January–1 February 1990
Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

22-26 January 1990
First Session of the Group of Governmental Experts to Carry Out a Study on International Arms Transfers, New York

29-31 January 1990
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